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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an ethnographic enquiry into how the nation-state border between 
Thailand and Laos comes into being. Southeast Asian borders, and no less the Thai-Lao 
border, are known to be porous and their porosity is often associated with ineffective 
government policies and poor border control management. This thesis looks beyond 
such state-centric perspectives by highlighting the interstices between the legal and 
illegal, the formal and informal, and the state and society in the context of small-scale 
cross-border trade. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in the Thai province of Loei, it 
unravels the Thai-Lao border as historically contingent, multi-layered, and as constantly 
in flux.  
My findings reveal that the border is not only a prerogative of the state but that it is also 
produced through the practices of non-state actors as well as through the interactions of 
state and non-state actors. Female small-scale traders reproduce the border by engaging 
in diverse practices of arbitrage. They replicate the social hierarchy between Thailand 
and Laos through their terminology and bargaining practices. The border is also 
entrenched in the social memory and imaginaries of border residents including state 
actors. The social embeddedness of state actors in the local community and cross-border 
culture allows social relationships to form and convolute stringent categories of state 
and society.  
Combined with a flexibility of legality and local conceptualisations of licitness, such 
relationships facilitate the movement of people and goods while at the same time they 
increase the state’s control over the border. They also give rise to cooperative forms of 
regulation that involve the giving of goods and money. Instead of construing these as 
corrupt practices that destabilise the border, they can also be understood to strengthen 
the state’s authority and to reinforce the border. The thesis concludes by arguing that 
non-state perspectives are a sine qua non in an attempt to comprehend the nature of a 
border throughout space and time. 
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NOTES ON LANGUAGE AND NAMES 
1. In this thesis, I follow the 1999 version of Royal Thai General System of 
Transcription (RTGS) except for proper names, e.g. Or Sor (Volunteer Defence Corps) 
and for figures copied from other sources, e.g. Figure 8. As a transcription (and not 
transliteration) method, the RTGS does not use diacritics nor does it differentiate 
between long and short vowels. It is the simplest and most straightforward Romanisation 
of the Thai language and useful for the purposes of illustration. Unlike earlier versions, 
the 1999 version of the RTGS makes a distinction between  อ,ุ อ ู(u) and อ,ึ อ ื(ue). This is 
particularly important for the term mueang (town, city, nation, country), which I often 
refer to in this thesis and which other authors sometimes transcribe as muang or meuang.  
2. I have made a minor adjustment to the RTGS regarding its merging of the Thai letters 
จ, ช, ฉ, ฌ into ch. In this thesis, I distinguish between จ (j) and ช, ฉ, ฌ (ch).  
3. For the purposes of confidentiality, the names of all my interlocutors as well as the 
names of all research locations along the border (Ban Sing, Ban Plee, Ban Donmai, Ban 
Thong, Ban Sawan) have been anonymised through the use of pseudonyms. District 
names and provinces (Thali district, Ken Thao district, Loei province, Sayaboury 
province), larger towns outside my research area (Chiang Khan, Paklay) have not been 
anonymised.  
4. Thai scholars are conventionally referred to by their first name instead of their 
surname. I have followed this convention by referencing Thai scholars by their first 
name throughout the thesis and in the bibliography, e.g. Thongchai (1994) for 
Thongchai Winichakul. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
We should not look for the boundaries 
of things, but for the things of 
boundaries.
1
 (Abbott 2001: 261) 
 
A SCENE FROM THE BORDER 
It is a warm November morning in the small Thai border village of Ban Sing as I reach 
the checkpoint along the narrow Hueang River that marks the nation-state border 
between Thailand and Laos. I arrive just in time to meet the friendly lady from the Lao 
village across the river who regularly comes here to sell vegetables. Today, she has 
three baskets of vegetables with her and has already sold several greens to the labourers 
at the small river pier. She walks up to the Thai border guard’s hut. The border guard 
inspects the contents of her baskets asking what she has on offer today and eventually 
allows her to pass through. I buy a pack of boiled peanuts from her for 5 baht (= GBP 
0.10) before she heads off into the village to sell the remaining vegetables door-to-door. 
Afterwards, I sit down on a plastic chair next to the labourers’ resting area that is 
situated in-between the border guards’ hut and the river pier.  
A man and a woman approach me from the top of the pier, both of whom speak very 
good English. They are curious about my presence here. They are cousins who have 
come to send presents to their relatives on the Lao side. They tell me they are Thai but 
their parents are Lao. The woman owns a factory in a larger town in Laos but lives in a 
Thai city several hours from here. Her husband is American and lives in the United 
States while she is seeking to expand her business in Laos. Her cousin has a hair salon 
in the neighbouring village of Ban Sing and she visits him often. While we speak, a 
pick-up truck arrives at the top of the pier. A young man gets out of the car holding a 
part of a car engine in his hands. He gives it to one of the boat drivers at the pier. I know 
the young man. He works for a car repair shop in the area, the owner of which has a 
long-standing relationship with several shop owners on the Lao side across the river. In 
                                                 
1
 In this thesis, I use the term ‘border’ to denote the territorial margin of the nation-state and the term 
‘boundary’ when referring to social groups and identities. In the quote, Abbott refers to boundaries 
between professions and temporalities but I suggest that the point he makes should be extended to nation-
state borders as well. 
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return for the engine part, the young man receives 2,000 baht (= GBP 40) in cash from 
the boat driver who had been trusted with the money by the Lao shop owner earlier that 
day. 
Later, I speak to one of the female labourers at the pier. Her name is Boon-Ma. She 
explains that the checkpoint in Ban Sing opens at 8am and closes at 4pm. These are also 
her working hours. However, people can also cross the river outside these hours by 
making an appointment directly with the boat drivers by phone. This morning, a villager 
from the Lao side had crossed the river at 5am in order to go to the hospital in a 
neighbouring Thai village. Generally, she says, border residents can cross the border 
without an ID card. They must only provide the Lao border guards with their name. The 
Thai border guards usually know most border residents after a few months of duty and 
do not need to check their identity. However, only residents from the two neighbouring 
border villages are allowed to use the border-crossing here. Everyone else must travel 
via the international immigration checkpoint at the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge.  
I also speak to the border guard who is on duty today. He is from a Thai border district 
about one hour away from Ban Sing. He speaks both Central Thai (phasa thai klang) as 
well as the local dialect of Loei province (phasa loei)
2
. He has been stationed here for 
over one year already and knows most of the people who cross the border on a regular 
basis. Having previously worked along other parts of the Thai-Lao border, the guard 
describes this area as rather quiet, apart for some instances of drug, motorbike and car 
smuggling. Today, it is his turn to carry out checks and examinations of the people who 
cross over the checkpoint while his colleagues are patrolling other areas along the river. 
While we are talking, a young woman from Ban Sing arrives at the border guards’ hut 
with a plastic bag containing fresh meat. Without saying a word, she hangs the plastic 
bag on a nail on the inside of the guards’ hut and leaves.  
At 11am, a group of young children appear on the Lao side of the river. They start 
jumping and swimming in the water, racing each other to the pier on the Thai side. They 
stay there for a while, using the higher ground to make larger splashes when jumping 
into the river. Boon-Ma explains that these are Lao school children who often come 
here during their lunch break. I ask whether the school children from the Thai villages 
do the same. “No”, she says, “they never swim in the river. Thai children don’t like the 
                                                 
2 
The dialect in my research area is more similar to the Lao dialect spoken in Luang Prabang than to 
Central Thai. 
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dirty water because it is full of rubbish and animal faeces. It’s not healthy to swim [in 
the river] especially if you get water in your mouth.” Her male colleague notices our 
conversation and adds: “It is because Thai children cannot swim!”  
RESEARCH AIMS AND QUESTIONS 
The above scene from the border provides a glimpse into the highly mobile and diverse 
social practices that are conducted in the small part of the Thai-Lao borderland where 
my research was situated (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Map of the Thai-Lao border; the black rectangle indicates my 
research area between Loei and Sayaboury province 
Shopkeepers, labourers, boat drivers, border guards, petty traders, school children and 
other residents from neighbouring border villages come together at the Hueang River in 
order to trade, catch fish, bathe, and visit their relatives. Many border residents are 
involved in cross-border trading activities, using them as a first or second source of 
income. Petty traders, shop owners, middlewomen, boat operators, labourers and border 
guards on both sides of the border form relationships with each other and work together 
in manifold ways, making the smooth running of daily trading activities possible. The 
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border seems porous here, with traders and other border villagers crossing it without 
documentation. Border guards seem to sit back and turn a blind eye to trading activities 
that circumvent customs duties. 
In Southeast Asia porous borders are usually associated with poor border control 
management, lax immigration laws and law enforcement, resulting in a high level of 
illegal flows including undocumented migration, trafficking and smuggling 
(Tagliacozzo 2005; Smith 2005). This also includes the over 1,700km long Thai-Lao 
border that covers mountainous and sparsely inhabited terrain, parts of which have yet 
to be fully demarcated by the Thai and Lao governments
3
. Many other parts of the 
borderline are unpatrolled and unmonitored, providing attractive routes for contraband 
traders. In the late 1990s, one of the villages in my research area made headlines for its 
storing of cannabis, methamphetamine pills, and arms that had come from Laos. This 
caused violence among drug gangs but also by the Thai police whose suppression 
efforts had left 67 children orphaned by 2000 (Chouvy and Meissonnier 2004: 41). 
Upon the crackdown initiated by former Prime Minister Thaksin in 2003 several years 
later, thousands of pills were seized and further villagers killed along the border. Local 
villagers explained to me how this severely diminished the cross-border drug trade 
(although some still exists). This example seems to confirm the notion of the Thai-Lao 
border as porous and therefore as a generator of illegal and criminal activities that can 
only be diminished through government policies and their enforcement. But associating 
porous borders in Southeast Asia with ineffective government policies, poor border 
control management and illegal activities reflects a state-centric perspective. It assumes 
that state actors should visibly enforce borders in order to block and control cross-
border flows.  
This thesis starts with the opposite premise, namely that cross-border flows are part and 
parcel of the border and everyday life along it. Focussing particularly on the small-scale 
cross-border trade of daily necessities, my findings reveal that such flows are conducted 
openly and in a highly organised manner, and that they involve the negotiation, 
contestation and cooperation between state and non-state actors. In this respect, my 
thesis builds on Andrew Walker’s study of the Thai-Lao border in which he argued that 
“what needs to be condemned as truly exceptional is the tendency of some states, and 
                                                 
3 
To date (January 2015) only 90% of the Thai-Lao border has been fully demarcated. The Thai and Lao 
governments have agreed to finalise the border survey, the installation of land and river border posts by 
2018 (Vientiane Times 2015). 
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some agencies or officials within states, to restrict the very normal exchanges and flows 
that occur at the boundaries of all social systems” (2009: 110). Rather than 
preconceiving the border as an “unruly” and “disorderly” space that is “porous” or 
“weak”, this thesis explores how the nation-state border is produced, reinforced, 
weakened and renegotiated through the activities of both state and non-state actors. In 
order to do so, it conceptualises the border as an ongoing process that is constantly in 
flux. 
Over the last few decades, border scholars have shown that borders are complex 
systems where geopolitical and cultural factors intertwine and contest with each other. 
While nation-state borders are the prerogative of the state, it has been demonstrated that 
non-state actors may also be involved in their reproduction and dissolution (Horstmann 
and Wadley 2006; Flynn 2007; Green 2012). In other words, although border 
populations are vulnerable to the effects of the border, they also “adapt to the human 
and social necessities of living with the border as well as living despite the border” 
(Donnan and Wilson 2010: 11). For example, when traders take advantage of the border 
by selling goods to their colleagues on the other side or when increasing the price of the 
goods after taking them across the river, they reproduce the nation-state border and the 
economic asymmetry between Thailand and Laos that accompanies it (Chapter 4).  
In this thesis I thus seek to show how the border is a social construction that is not only 
imposed or weakened through the practices of state actors but also by those of non-state 
actors as well as by the interactions between state and non-state actors, the lines 
between which can be very much blurred. It is often in this blurred realm between state 
and society that the border is negotiated, rearticulated, made, and unmade. If we come 
to understand the border as a process that happens in space and time by different kinds 
of actors, then we may come closer to unravelling the complex realities of its nature on 
the ground. Indeed, the border may not always become meaningful in the social 
practices of the local population. While representing the demarcation line where 
Thailand’s territorial sovereignty, law, society and culture ends and where that of Laos 
begins, the Hueang River is also part of the livelihoods of many people on the Thai and 
Lao side. It serves among many other things as a water resource for farmers, as a source 
of food for villagers, and as a site of play for children. The river also nearly dries out 
during the season between March and May, making it possible to walk across it by foot. 
While the river may be seen as a natural separation line, it also brings people together, 
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creating connections and relationships. In order to gain an understanding of the 
everyday realities along the Thai-Lao border, we must therefore not ask whether the 
border is adequately enforced but rather how it comes into being in the first place. How, 
when, where and by whom is it produced, negotiated and contested? In asking these 
questions in the context of small-scale cross-border trade between Thailand and Laos, 
my thesis contributes to an anthropology of borders in Southeast Asia.  
SMALL-SCALE TRADE ACROSS NATION-STATE BORDERS 
In its investigation into the processes through which the border is made and unmade by 
state and non-state actors, the thesis focuses on those actors who are involved in the 
small-scale cross-border trade of daily necessities. The vantage point of the small-scale 
cross-border trade of daily necessities bears significance for the production of the Thai-
Lao border in several ways. Firstly, a focus on this kind of trade allows us to explore the 
research questions among a specific group of people who engage in cross-border 
activities as part of their everyday life. This is a very much ordinary undertaking. The 
vast literature on small-scale trade has shown that there is nothing exceptional about 
trading daily necessities across nation-state borders (Flynn 1997; Muzvidziwa 1998; 
Chalfin 2001; Nugent 2002; Schoenberger and Turner 2008; Titeca and Herdt 2010; 
Mutopo 2010; Wagner and Lukowski 2010; Turner 2010). In my research area, daily 
necessities flow from Thailand to Laos through the small-scale trading activities of 
female traders (Kudo 2002; Gomez et al. 2011). Goods are traded at border markets, at 
checkpoints along the river, at the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge and (to a lesser extent) 
along other more remote and unmarked parts of the river. In contrast to the clandestine 
smuggling of drugs and motorbikes, most of this trade is conducted openly and visibly 
during broad daylight and under the gaze of state officials.  
Secondly, a focus on daily necessities makes it possible to analyse how different types 
of flows influence the temporal production, enforcement and management of borders. 
Such flows include people as well as goods. The goods included in the small-scale trade 
of daily necessities are diverse, ranging from a can of ice coffee to several boatloads full 
of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). Each of these commodities underlies different 
restrictions, tax levels and limits of toleration when traded across the nation-state 
border. In taking these differences into account, my thesis questions the usefulness of 
state-centric dichotomies such as those of legal-illegal and formal-informal in the 
17 
context of small-scale trade and the nation-state border more broadly, contributing to a 
more nuanced account of where, when and how borders appear and disappear. To avoid 
the use of such dichotomies, I use Bruns and Miggelbrink's (2012) broader definition of 
small-scale trade who define it as arbitrage: “the exploitation of differences in prices 
and exchange rates over time and space via circulation activities” (Williams and Balaz 
2002: 323 as cited by Bruns and Miggelbrink 2012: 11). At the border between Loei and 
Sayaboury, the exploitation of differences is based on an economic asymmetry between 
Thailand and Laos. The scarcity of consumer products in Laos means that imported 
goods from Thailand can be sold at a higher price in Laos. At the small-scale, such 
arbitrage is conducted by individual female traders (rather than by companies) who 
operate with limited economic resources and who rely on local social networks to trade 
successfully (see also Phadungkiati and Connell 2014). 
Exploring processes of border making from the vantage point of small-scale cross-
border trade is particularly interesting in the context of changing border policies and 
economic cooperation efforts. Border policies along the Thai-Lao border have changed 
dramatically since the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) came to power in Laos 
in 1975, after which the border area became militarised and the Thai government placed 
an economic embargo on Laos. Cross-border movements and trade in my research area 
continued during this time, albeit in a more restricted manner. When Thai-Lao relations 
improved from the late 1980s onward, border controls were relaxed and the opening of 
border-crossing sites initiated by local district offices (Chapter 2). In 1994, the first 
Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge opened, financed by the Australian government, connecting 
the Thai province of Nong Khai with the Lao province of Vientiane across the Mekong 
River.  
Ten years later, the second Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge opened, connecting the Thai 
district of Thali with the Lao district of Ken Thao across the Hueang River, which is a 
tributary of the Mekong River. Financed by the Thai government as part of its 
‘Economic Cooperation Strategy’ policy, the 110 metre-long Thai-Lao Friendship 
Bridge opened in 2004 with the aim to boost trade and tourism and to control drug 
smuggling and human trafficking along the Thai-Lao border (The Nation 2003; Thai 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004). The Bridge entails immigration, customs and 
medical facilities that provide people and vehicles with legal documentation to cross the 
nation-state border via the Hueang River. Following the opening of the Bridge, many of 
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the checkpoints that existed in the neighbouring border villages were shut down and 
villagers and traders were redirected to the Bridge (Chapter 2). 
 
Image 1: Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, view from Thali district, Loei 
province in Thailand (Source: Author) 
 
Image 2: Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, view from Bridge towards Ken Thao 
district, Sayaboury province in Laos (Source: Author) 
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Despite the USD 1.2 million that the Thai government invested in the Bridge, it has not 
received as much attention by academics, the media, tourists and businessmen as the 
other Thai-Lao Friendship Bridges that cross over the Mekong River (meanwhile there 
are four). In fact, in many publications, the Bridge in Loei province is not even 
considered as one of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridges as these are usually associated 
with the Mekong River. Tucked away between the mountains of Loei and Sayaboury, 
the roads that lead to the Bridge on the Thai and Lao sides are twisting, narrow and 
bumpy
4
. During the time of my research, the scale of trade and tourism was lower than 
at the other Thai-Lao Friendship Bridges and among international tourists, the word had 
not yet spread that entry into Laos was possible here. The seeming insignificance of this 
border area and the lack of interest by academia and the media is what made it so 
appealing to me. As an anthropologist who seeks to study the everyday life of the 
border, the low-key character of a border area that is neither subject to ongoing open 
conflict, nor to high volumes of trade and tourism, nor a recipient of NGO support 
makes it a compelling research site.  
Apart from academia, the media, tourism, and business, the area has also been ignored 
by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in its regional integration efforts within the 
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). The area is neither part of the older GMS Economic 
Corridors nor included in the newer GMS Transport and Trade Facilitation (GMS TTF) 
programme. Although Loei and Sayaboury have been considered as part of the 
Northeastern Corridor of the GMS TTF, which reaches from Bangkok via Luang 
Prabang to Than Hoa in Vietnam, it is made clear on the GMS’ website that the 
Northeastern Corridor is neither a trade nor a transport corridor: “It is more of a 
theoretical road link between locations with low or negligible trade demand. To the 
transport and logistics community, it appears illogical, especially as there is a major gap 
between Luang Prabang and the junction with NR 1C near Meung Hiem, and between 
Loei in Thailand and the Lao PDR border” (GMS CBTA 2013)5. 
                                                 
4 
On the Thai side, a highway leads from Mueang Loei (provincial capital) to the border district of Thali. 
On the Lao side, a highway leads from the Lao border town of Ban Sawan to Mueang Sayaboury 
(provincial capital). It has been financed by various supranational organisations such as the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) of the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) over several decades. During the time of my research, however, 
the 225km-long road was still unfinished. 
5 
Since my field research, the Second Northern GMS Transport Network Improvement project (41444-
013) has been initiated in the Northeastern Corridor to improve transportation and trade across the Lao-
Vietnam border (ADB 2014). 
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Despite the claim that trade demand is negligible, I found that a considerable amount (if 
not the majority) of daily necessities in Sayaboury province consisted of Thai products 
that were traded via Loei province
6
. This is due, among other factors, to the economic 
asymmetry between Thailand and Laos, limited manufacturing opportunities in Laos but 
also to the sheer proximity of Sayaboury province to Loei when compared to other Thai 
border provinces. What underscores the claim of negligible trade amounts on the other 
hand, is that daily necessities are almost exclusively traded by individual small-scale 
traders of various kinds including market traders, shop owners, and middlewomen. This 
applies to short and long distance traders alike. Short distance trade is mainly conducted 
between shop owners in Thai border villages and their counterparts on the Lao side but 
also at Thai border markets where Lao villagers buy goods for personal consumption. 
Long distance trade has flourished since the opening of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge 
and involves middlewomen who supply shops and market traders further inside 
Sayaboury with products from wholesale shops in Mueang Loei. 
Most small-scale traders in my research area were female. Shop owners and 
middlewomen often worked together with their husbands and children as part of a 
family business but women usually took on the customer-facing role, representing the 
business as a whole (Chapter 3). This is in line with the literature on small-scale trade in 
Southeast Asia, which has highlighted the prominent role of female traders in small-
scale trade throughout history (Reid 1988: 164f; Kusakabe 2004; Derks 2008: 120). 
While men have long dominated long-distance trade, several studies have shown an 
increase in women who trade over long distances as well and who have been able to 
continue this kind of trade to survive in a politically volatile environment (Walker 1999; 
Busarin 2015). This thesis contributes to this literature as I demonstrate how the women 
in my research area have been able to withstand and adapt to changing border policies 
and to be active agents in the conduct and regulation of cross-border trade between Loei 
and Sayaboury province.  
As border policies and infrastructures have changed, so have these traders’ strategies, 
their ways of transport as well as their relationships with one another, with customers as 
well as with state officials. One part of this thesis highlights the effects of these 
                                                 
6
 This claim is based on my observations and conversations with villagers, traders, and state officials 
throughout Sayaboury province. However, the share of daily necessities that came from Loei became 
smaller with further distance from Loei. In Sayaboury’s provincial capital, daily necessities were 
imported from Thailand via Loei as well as via Nong Khai but also from China and Vietnam.  
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changing border policies more specifically. As I will show, the official closure of the 
Thai-Lao border in 1975 as well as the increased regulations, which have accompanied 
the opening of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge in 2004, have had negative impacts on 
cross-border traders, although in different ways for those on the Thai and Lao side 
(Chapter 2). Particularly with regard to the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, I argue that 
such efforts to boost trade not only facilitate but also restrict certain kinds of trade. 
While I argue that borders can be produced and weakened by both state and non-state 
actors, I do not deny the violent and devastating effects borders and their enforcement 
can have on local populations. But my main argument does not begin with the premise 
of a state-resistance paradigm, in which the state is assumed to be the perpetrator and 
the local population the victim. Instead, I call for a more nuanced perspective that 
explores power relations at the micro-level. Such a perspective reveals not only the 
explicit and implicit negotiations that take place between state and non-state actors but 
also gauges the frictions that exist in-between state actors themselves with regard to 
their attitudes and behaviours that inform how and when borders are produced.  
In order to analyse the role of the state in micro-level processes of border making, I 
suggest looking more closely at the individual actors who make up the so-called “state” 
rather than taking the notion of the state for granted (Das and Poole 2004; Sharma and 
Gupta 2006). One of the key aspects of the thesis (particularly Chapters 4, 5, 6), in this 
respect, concerns the social embeddedness of state officials and how this influences the 
decisions they make with regard to the facilitation and restriction of cross-border flows. 
The social embeddedness of state officials in my research area was characterised by 
their local origin, their ability to speak the local dialect, and their relationships to local 
villagers including traders, labourers and boat operators along the border. Their actions 
and decisions were often influenced by their social embeddedness, which in turn had an 
effect on the making and unmaking of the border. I therefore draw on anthropological 
theories of the state that emphasise the actions of the individual state officials that 
represent it (e.g. Migdal and Schlichte 2005) rather than on more abstract notions often 
employed by political scientists.  
An additional aspect that cuts across all of the themes in my research including that of 
the social embeddedness of state officials is gender. All of the state officials I 
encountered in my research area were male while most of the traders involved in the 
small-scale trade of daily necessities were female. This situation informed not only the 
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relationships between state officials and traders but also my positioning as a female 
researcher in the field, and consequently the data I obtained. Although I was able to 
interview and observe several border guards, my ethnography revolves mainly around 
the everyday lives of female small-scale cross-border traders and how they navigate 
landscapes of power when interacting with their customers, other traders, their kin, 
labourers, boat operators and state officials along as well as across the nation-state 
border.  
RESEARCH AREA AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is based on thirteen months of ethnographic research, which I conducted 
mainly in Loei province, Thailand, between August 2011 and August 2012. Having 
lived and travelled throughout Thailand in previous years, I set out to conduct research 
along the Thai-Lao border between the provinces of Loei and Sayaboury as the border 
here seemed underrepresented in scholarly works on Southeast Asia when compared to 
the parts that are marked by the vast Mekong River. My initial plan was to study 
negotiations specifically between state officials and cross-border vegetable traders 
between Loei and Sayaboury.  
What initially triggered my curiosity about such negotiations was my research for my 
MA degree, which I conducted along the Thai-Burmese border in 2008. I studied the 
livelihoods of Burmese refugees who were living in villages on the Thai side of the 
border while maintaining their rice fields on the Burmese side during the day. Asking 
the local Thai border officials why they did not check the documents of these border 
crossers, one smiled and replied calmly: “We are all brothers and sisters, we are all 
kin!” When delving deeper into the topic, my Thai friends recounted captivating stories 
about negotiations with state officials along the Thai-Lao border as well, which ranged 
from being able to cross the border to Laos without documents in exchange for a bottle 
of whisky, to Lao migrants being forced to sing the Thai national anthem when entering 
Thailand. Walker’s (2006) depiction of a female Lao trader engaging in sexualised 
banter with state officials when transporting goods across the border further increased 
my interest in the topic area. When forming my research proposal for the doctoral 
thesis, I had hoped that a focus on vegetable traders would make it easier for me to 
examine such encounters with state officials by following individual traders throughout 
their everyday lives and during their acts of crossing the border. I sought to explore how 
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they negotiated with state officials and where else in daily life such negotiations took 
place.  
Upon my arrival in Loei, however, I quickly realised that there were different types of 
border-crossing sites that I needed to take into account, and that most of the 
commodities traded across these sites consisted of daily necessities. Despite the high 
amounts of goods traded and the highly institutionalised manner in which they were 
traded including specialised shophouses and labourers, the actors involved still 
described this trade as small-scale (gankha leklek). Although the bulk of daily 
necessities were transported across the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, a significant part 
went across other border-crossing sites and was left unrecorded. I found this far more 
intriguing than the fresh vegetable trade, which involved much smaller quantities, 
irregular trading patterns, was season-dependent, and was carried out by petty traders 
from Laos who sought an additional source of income. Further to this, I was bound to 
the Thai side of the border for most of my research due to the restrictions of my 
research visa, which meant that I would have to focus on goods traded by actors on the 
Thai side. In fact, crossing the border to Laos turned out to be an expensive and tedious 
exercise for me as a white, foreign national. Not only did Lao border officials prohibit 
me from crossing over the local checkpoints together with my interlocutors (see further 
Chapter 5), I also had to pay USD 30 for a tourist visa at the Thai-Lao Friendship 
Bridge every time I entered Laos. As a result, I crossed the border less often than 
expected but spent more time on each visit to my interlocutors. This was somewhat 
conducive to my research as my interlocutors usually invited me to stay in their homes 
during these visits. 
Through my research with the different actors involved in small-scale cross-border 
trade, my objective gradually shifted to the study of the production of borders. There 
were many different kinds of traders, several different kinds of state officials as well as 
other actors such as boat operators and labourers. In some parts of the river, the border 
was under strong surveillance while in others it seemed non-existent. Eventually I came 
to the conclusion that a focus on encounters between traders and state officials would be 
too narrow and would skew an account of the complex realities along the border. My 
ethnography therefore covers several kinds of state and non-state actors as well as an 
array of different border spaces and crossing points. 
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Through a fortunate assemblage of academic and personal social networks, my research 
base came to be located in the small Thai border village of Ban Thong, which was 
situated directly along the Hueang River (Figure 2). Most villagers there engaged in rice 
farming as a first or second source of income, and the area was covered in rice fields 
(both glutinous and non-glutinous), cassava fields, cornfields, banana and rubber 
plantations. I offered to volunteer at the local school in exchange for accommodation in 
one of the guest rooms, but a kind primary school teacher offered to accommodate me 
in her private home just across the marketplace instead. She also had a spare motorbike, 
which became my main vehicle of transportation throughout my research. Not only did 
this teacher become a good friend of mine, she and her father also provided me with a 
sense of security as they always knew my whereabouts and would be able to help in a 
case of emergency. 
In an exploratory phase, several teachers from the local school took me to the border 
checkpoints that existed in the neighbouring villages, introduced me to some of the 
traders and border guards there, and accompanied me on my first journeys to the big 
weekend market at the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, which was visited by hundreds of 
Lao villagers from across the river every Saturday. My relationships with teachers 
continued to be valuable over the course of my research as they introduced me to 
important interlocutors. Eventually, I decided to focus on small-scale cross-border 
trading activities in three Thai border villages: Ban Sing, Ban Plee and Ban Donmai. 
These three Thai border villages were all situated along the Hueang River that marks the 
nation-state border. Ban Sing was situated across from the larger Lao border town of 
Ban Sawan. Ban Plee was situated next to the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge and Ban 
Donmai was across from several smaller Lao border villages. Many of the inhabitants of 
the three Thai border villages maintained close social and trading relations with the 
adjacent Lao villages across the river. The spaces in and around the three border 
villages entailed both hypersurveilled parts of the border as well as unmarked and 
unpatrolled areas, all of which were characterised by diverse levels of cross-border 
flows of people and goods (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Outline of research area with Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, 
customary border checkpoints (black arrows) and most relevant villages 
(green circles) 
My research methods consisted mainly of participant observation, in-depth, semi-
structured and unstructured interviews. I spent most of my days engaging in participant 
observation at border checkpoints as described in the beginning of this chapter, 
observing border-crossers, conducting interviews with local shophouse owners and their 
customers as well as with boat operators and labourers, and the Thai border guards who 
were on duty that day. I got to know my interlocutors’ spouses and children and 
celebrated with them at village festivals on both the Thai and the Lao sides. Despite 
this, it was difficult to gain full insight into all of their trading activities, particularly 
when it came to what they themselves called ‘smuggling’ (laklob).  
In one village, all shophouse owners avoided any interaction with me for months. I later 
learnt that they had thought I was a foreign spy. It was only with the help of a local 
friend who had relatives in this village that I was able to gain the shophouse owners’ 
trust and conduct my first interviews. My friend was also valuable mediator in helping 
me strike the balance between questions that affirmed my interest in my interlocutors’ 
everyday lives and those that made me seem intrusive or interrogative. My gendered 
Ban Sing 
Ban Plee 
Ban Donmai 
Ban Thong 
Ban Sawan 
KEN THAO DISTRICT, 
SAYABOURY PROVINCE, 
LAOS 
THALI DISTRICT, LOEI 
PROVINCE, THAILAND 
26 
positioning as an unmarried female researcher was advantageous when interacting with 
female shophouse owners as it allowed me to sit alone with them inside their shops and 
build a closer relationship than with my male interlocutors. Only one of the shophouse 
owners I built rapport with was male and the local behavioural code of conduct meant 
that I could only speak to him outside his shop for everyone to see and listen to.  
In fact, my gendered positioning affected more generally the types of interlocutors 
whose everyday lives I was able to gain further insight into. Most small-scale traders 
were female while most of the state actors were male. When a group of Thai border 
guards invited me to join them for a round of beers after their shift, I had to turn down 
the offer for the sake of my reputation in the village and the relationships I had already 
built. Despite this, I was able to interview the guards at the checkpoints where they were 
on duty and also encountered them at festivals and markets. Other state actors included 
village headmen and the Volunteer Border Militia (Or Sor) whom I was able to 
interview through the accompaniment of a male research assistant and the teachers at 
my school. Some of my female interlocutors were related to state officials and knew 
much about their activities and attitudes. A female labourer at one of the customary 
border checkpoints was related to the border guard across the border while two female 
traders on the Lao side were married to local Lao state officials. My identity and 
positioning as a foreign, female researcher thus had its advantages and disadvantages, 
which I tried to navigate but which also informs the nature of my research findings. 
My main interlocutors consisted of female shophouse owners as well as female border 
market traders (Figure 3). I spent a lot of time at the local border markets, particularly at 
the big weekend market next to the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge in Ban Plee, conducting 
interviews with traders and observing the interactions between them and their Lao 
customers. I conducted a small survey with the traders at Ban Sing border market, 
which provided a useful overview of these traders’ backgrounds and trading strategies. 
But I really only gained insight into their everyday lives and their role in the process of 
border making when I became good friends with a female clothes trader from Ban 
Donmai, whose family I joined in travelling to border markets along the Hueang River 
for several days. By helping out in the stall, I was able to gain insight into the 
relationships between Thai vendors and Lao customers and observe Lao villagers as 
they were checked by border guards when crossing the border. 
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Shophouse owners at border checkpoints  Thailand 
Border market traders  Thailand 
Boat operators/labourers at border checkpoints  Thailand/Laos 
Market stall owners at central market in Ban Sawan  Laos 
Middlewomen from further inside Sayaboury province Laos 
Thai paramilitary border guards at border checkpoints  Thailand 
Village headmen Thailand 
Shophouse owners in Lao border villages Laos 
Wholesalers in Mueang Loei Thailand 
Individual border traders Thailand/Laos 
Figure 3: Main interlocutors in order of research depth 
By spending many hours at such nodes of trade and social interaction, I was able to 
build rapport with actors from both sides of the Hueang River who were involved in the 
same cross-border trading activities. This allowed me to pay several visits to my 
interlocutors on the Lao side and gain an insight into their everyday life, their 
perspectives on and role in the production of the border. This methodology can be 
described as a matched sample, “where the unit of analysis is constituted of networks of 
people who are connected across national boundaries” (Horst 2009: 124). In contrast to 
those transnational studies where informants across the border simply fall into 
comparable “categories of people” to those at the initial research site, matched samples 
have the advantage of being able to provide ever more precise information about the 
“inner workings of transnational flows” (Horst 2009: 124).  
Over the course of my research, I paid several visits to the home of a boat operator on 
the Lao side. Although the local Lao state officials apparently discouraged her and her 
family to host a Western foreigner, she welcomed me into her home for several days at 
a time. By staying with her family, I learnt not only about the important role of boat 
operators and labourers and their mediating function between traders and state officials 
in the context of trade but also about the activities that were carried out outside the 
official checkpoint hours. I was also able to make use of other social and kinship 
networks that led me to Laos. My connections to shophouse owners on the Thai side 
made it easier for me to establish relations with traders on the Lao side who were the 
Thai traders’ customers. I became well acquainted with a family who owned a shop on 
the Lao side in Ban Sawan and was invited to their home, family celebrations and their 
rice plantations, thereby gaining insight into their everyday lives along the border.  
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Through the teachers in the Thai border village where I lived, I was also able to get in 
touch with a woman who had strong connections to Lao traders and state officials 
within Sayaboury province. By accompanying her on one of her travels to Mueang 
Sayaboury (the provincial capital), I got to know (among other interesting people) two 
middlewomen who supplied market traders inside Sayaboury province with goods from 
Loei province. I later met them again at the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge where they 
shopped for goods. I then accompanied them across the border to their customers inside 
Sayaboury. My research shows that the importance of gaining access to social and 
kinship networks is vital when studying everyday cross-border flows across the border. 
In the next section, I will elaborate the theoretical underpinnings of my approach to 
studying the border and position my research within the existing relevant literature.  
THE BORDER AS PROCESS 
When asking the question of how the border comes into being, it is necessary to look at 
what is meant by ‘the border’. What do we mean when asking how ‘it’ comes into 
being? In other words, in order to identify when something comes into being, we must 
know what we are looking for in the first place. At the broadest level, borders are ways 
of classifying and categorising the world (Green 2012). Borders are ways of producing 
meaning through difference. An anthropology of borders focuses on the border between 
two nation-states. Theoretically, such borders are geographically demarcated lines that 
separate what belongs “inside” territorially, politically, symbolically, militarily, 
judicially, economically as well as culturally from what belongs “outside” (Zureik and 
Salter 2005). They are a crucial part of the nation-state, particularly since the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, which brought decades of war within Europe to an end by 
guaranteeing the mutual respect of the nation-state’s territory.  
The nation-state as it developed in Europe during this time is usually described as an 
“isomorphism of people, territory, and legitimate sovereignty” (Appadurai 1996: 191) 
that was exported to other peoples across the world. Guichonnet and Raffestin (1974: 
48-53, referenced by Leimgruber 2005: 240) established five functions of the nation-
state border: a legal function as it delimits rules and regulations on a given state 
territory; a fiscal function as it enables the state to protect its economy against foreign 
competition, e.g. through customs duties, which are also an important source of income 
for the state; a control function as it administers the access of people, goods and 
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information to the state’s territory; a military function in the case of national defence; 
and an ideological function based on nationalism and national identity, which is 
promoted in schools so that children who are citizens of one nation-state are not usually 
allowed to go to school in another nation-state even if it was geographically closer. In 
this thesis, I refer to a border logic that is territory-focused and that seeks to fulfil the 
legal, fiscal, administrative, military, and ideological separation between nation-states 
as the Westphalian logic of the border.  
The demarcation of a geographical borderline is a central manifestation of the 
Westphalian logic of the border. The borderline between Thailand and Laos in my 
research area stretches along the Hueang River. However, the line is not situated in the 
middle of the river but was drawn three elbow-lengths (wa) away from the Thai 
riverbank in an agreement between Siam (later to be named Thailand) and France 
(during its colonisation of Laos) in 1923 (Surin 2009). All of the small islets in the 
Hueang River therefore belong to Lao territory. Although this border demarcation was a 
well-known fact among the boat operators who worked at the border checkpoints in my 
research area, it made little difference to their everyday practices. The boat operators 
described it more as a historical fact rather than a political reality. As described above, 
boat operators and local residents from both sides used the river for transporting people 
and goods, for fishing, bathing, playing, and as a water resource for irrigation. 
With these activities in mind, the border as a geographically demarcated line and the 
Westphalian logic of the border more generally must be seen as a social construct – as 
an idea that classifies and distinguishes people and things while its reality on the ground 
depends on and varies according to the practices of those who enforce and engage with 
it on a daily basis (Donnan and Wilson 1998, 1999, 2012). Since the 1980s, border 
studies scholars have questioned the view of borders as self-evident lines of separation 
and as static and fixed lines on maps. They have called instead for an approach to 
borders as sites of connection, contestation and negotiation between actors at different 
levels, from the individual to supranational organisations such as the EU and ASEAN 
(Kopytoff 1987; Martinez 1994; Kearney 1995; Alvarez 1995; Donnan and Wilson 
1999; Horstmann 2002).  
Based on the approach that borders are a social construct, Pelkmans suggests studying 
the border in the following way: “It makes sense to start with actual lines and 
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boundaries drawn by distant policymakers, in order to see how they have been endowed 
with meaning and how they have been contested, as well as defended, by different 
actors in border region” (2006: 14). The way borders are endowed with meaning can 
vary throughout time and according to different people. Their ontological reality is 
historically contingent (Newman and Paasi 1998: 201) and this contingency is informed 
by different border epistemologies, of which the Westphalian logic of the border is but 
one. In this thesis I will draw on two further logics of the border – the centre-periphery 
logic and the post-Westphalian logic, which have influenced the becoming of the border 
throughout space and time. 
The centre-periphery logic was the basis for Southeast Asian state formations during 
much of the 9
th
 to 19
th
 centuries. Borders between central powers were fluid and the 
spheres of influence of such powers could overlap. At the local level, territorial markers 
were drawn in order to demarcate control over cities and villages, agricultural land, and 
passageways but not to demarcate the definitive reach of central power. As I discuss in 
Chapter 2, the centre-periphery logic in Thailand and Laos was gradually overruled by 
the Westphalian logic of the border with the formation of nation-states throughout the 
late 19
th
 century. In my research area, the Westphalian logic became most pronounced 
after 1975 when the communist regime in Laos came to power and the Thai-Lao border 
was militarised and cross-border trade severely restricted.  
This changed in the late 1980s with the rapproachement of the Thai and Lao 
governments. As bilateral cooperations and international institutions such as the 
Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) became more prominent, so did the 
post-Westphalian logic of the border, which places more importance on transnational 
structures than on the nation-state. According to the post-Westphalian logic, the five 
functions of the nation-state border are broken down and disaggregated. Drawing on 
Del Sarto’s work (2010), Green describes the Europen Union’s outer peripheries as a 
“smorgasbord of ‘borderness’” (2012: 583) that is based on multiple and complex 
arrangements, which make it difficult to differentiate between what is “inside” and 
“outside”. In Southeast Asia, this may seem like a move back to the centre-periphery 
logic as borders seem to become less meaningful. With Walker (1999) I argue that such 
an assumption is too simplified and that the current trend towards the post-Westphalian 
logic is very much interconnected with ongoing and fortified manifestations of the 
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Westphalian logic. Aspects of the premodern centre-periphery logic also continue to 
exist.  
In this thesis, I will explore the manner in which the nation-state border is endowed with 
meaning (and meaninglessness) by looking at the social practices of state and non-state 
actors, as well as the border’s various manifestations and functions at different times 
and at different scales. Assuming that the ontological reality of the border is variegated, 
multilayered, and historically contingent, I use a processual approach to studying the 
border that emphasises the changing meanings, manifestations, and functions it 
incorporates in space and time.  
While my approach to borders emphasises that the border is constantly in flux because it 
is based on social processes throughout space and time, the border was not always 
perceived to be in flux by those engaged in its production. Raising a similar point with 
regard to her research on the Greek-Albanian border, Sarah Green argues against the 
notion that borders are constantly subject to change. During the Cold War period, she 
argues, the Greek-Albanian border was policed in a regular and predictable way so that 
nothing seemed to change much at all (2012: 575f). The opening of the border was 
therefore “like an earthquake had happened that had rearranged the landscape” (2012: 
576). While she does concede that borders are the outcome of ongoing activity and 
processes of bordering, she argues that the long-term maintenance of certain border 
configurations is common.  
Girtler’s (2006) typology of borders underlines the notion of long-term border 
configurations while at the same time acknowledging that changes can happen quickly 
and with great effect. Girtler distinguishes between three types of borders based on their 
degree of permeability. First-degree borders are impermeable and based on fear and 
control. Second-degree borders are more permeable but still visible while third-degree 
borders are often imperceptible. In reality, borders can shift from one type of border to 
another within moments. In Germany, the border between East and West was nearly 
impermeable due to the Berlin Wall. Due to the action of one border official, however, 
the Wall broke down and made the border permeable overnight. In my research area, the 
regime change in Laos in 1975 turned parts of the Thai-Lao border from a third- to a 
first-degree border. During the time of my research in 2011 and 2012, there were 
hypersurveilled parts of the border that fit into the first-degree category while most parts 
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of the Hueang River were either regularly controlled or completely unmonitored, 
representing a second- and third-degree border permeability.  
Considering the multifaceted permeability of the border, the various meanings it can 
take on, the way it is enacted and negotiated by state and non-state actors and the way it 
changes throughout space and time, I suggest approaching the border as a process, as in 
a constant state of becoming. In this respect, my thesis is in line with a range of border 
studies that approach the border as an open-ended, ongoing, and incomplete process. By 
looking at the border as a process, we can see who is involved in its production and how 
exactly it manifests in different moments and places. In her recent publication on the 
Ferghana Valley of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, for example, Madeleine Reeves 
examines the moments “when new borders become socially salient” (2014: 7). She 
argues for an increased focus on the temporality of borders, on their ability to appear 
and disappear for certain groups at certain times. In a similar vein, van Houtum and van 
Naerssen (2002) critique that the term ‘border’ implies a fixed place in space and time. 
They argue that the processes inherent in borders would better understood through 
‘bordering’, which they define as “an ongoing strategic effort to make a difference in 
space among the movements of people, money or products” (2002: 126). By regulating 
mobility, they conclude, borders produce and reproduce places in space and time.  
Van Houtum and van Naerssen’s understanding of borders as creating and reproducing 
places fits in well with Edward Casey’s notion of place. In his philosophical elaboration 
of the notion of place, Casey considers embodied experience and movement. Our bodies 
are constantly on the move, he argues, be it between places or within places. Even when 
we stay in only one place there is motion as our bodies twitch and turn (Casey 1996: 
23). From this proposition, Casey comes to a conceptualisation of place as event: 
“Rather than being one definite sort of thing, […] a given place takes on the qualities of 
its occupants, reflecting these qualities in its own constitution and description and 
expressing them in its occurrence as an event: places not only are, they happen” (Casey 
1996: 27, emphasis in original). Casey’s description of places as “eventmental” (1996: 
38) and as a form of gathering leads me to an exploration of the constant negotiations 
and re-negotiations, codings and re-codings of the border through social practices. 
An emphasis on processes of bordering through social practices allows me to explore 
both the vulnerability and the agency of border communities in the production and 
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transformation of the border. This is important because the border is often seen as an 
external force that is violently impressed upon a passive and victimised border 
population (see Scott 2009). Investigating both the effects of the border on the local 
population and the agency of this border population in generating and rearticulating the 
border builds on the work of recent scholars who have started examining how non-state 
actors are involved in ‘border work’ (Salter 2011; Horstmann and Wadley 2006; 
Wonders 2006; Rumford 2013; Reeves 2014). Such an approach allows us to recognise 
the involvement of non-state actors in social and cultural change more generally.  
When exploring these social practices in the context of borders at a practical level, it 
may be useful to understand them as performances. In his autoethnography, Khosravi 
highlights such “border performances” (Khosravi 2010) as an integral part of processes 
of bordering. This is particularly useful when analysing social interactions between 
different actors at border-crossing sites, at border markets, as well as at village festivals. 
When crossing the border and encountering a border official, for example, a border-
crosser may perform in a certain way that will facilitate their cross-border passage while 
the border official performs in a way that represents state sovereignty. The use of 
language and clothing are an integral part of such performances, e.g. as border guards 
wear specific uniforms and carry M-16 rifles while at the same time speaking with local 
villagers and border-crossers in the local dialect (Chapter 4). Drawing on Goffman’s 
(1973) dramaturgical analysis of social situations and Butler’s (1988) concept of gender 
performativity, Salter (2011) argues that the border must be performed in order to attain 
meaning at all. He places particular emphasis on the performance of identity in acts of 
crossing the border, highlighting that a border-crosser only ever performs that part of 
their identity, which they expect the border official to be expecting.  
Based on my findings I would argue, however, that the border can also attain meaning 
outside of interactions between state and non-state actors or acts of crossing the border. 
The decision not to the cross the border, for example, is a meaningful act in itself. 
Among my interlocutors on the Thai side, this decision was often based on experiences 
with or perceptions of the Lao state (Chapter 3). During my visits to one of the small 
Lao villages across the Hueang River, furthermore, the local villagers often wanted to 
know whether I had traversed the border via the “small” or the “big” checkpoint, i.e. the 
local border checkpoint or the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. My answer implied my 
legal status and right to stay and travel to other villages. This demonstrates how 
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prominent the border was in the everyday life of the villagers there. Van Houtum’s 
research on the Dutch-German border demonstrates similar findings. Despite the 
permeability of the border, he finds that the border is “still filled with meaning, and 
internalized in everyday practices, institutions, conventions, acts and mentalities” (2011: 
49). He therefore argues that the power of the border lies in the belief that it represents a 
spatial separation. Whether this belief is pertinent or not is demonstrated by people’s 
everyday social practices. 
An important aspect of processes of bordering is that the border can also appear in 
places away from the demarcated borderline (see also Mountz 2011). In my research 
area, for example, the Thai paramilitary was not only situated at checkpoints along the 
river but also carried out regular ID checks along the road that leads to Mueang Loei. In 
this thesis, however, I am primarily interested in the changing, contested, negotiated, 
multilayered, historically contingent meaning of the space around the borderline, which 
in my research area coincides with the Hueang River. Taking into account other 
locations of the border would have exceeded the scope of the research. Along the 
borderline, I am interested in the manifestation of the border in the form of state 
symbols and signs but also in the social practices of state and non-state actors and their 
interactions. While border guards such as the Thai paramilitary and Volunteer Border 
Militia, Lao border officials, as well as immigration and customs officials represent the 
state as part of their profession, it seems important to elaborate my conceptualisation of 
the state and state actors when studying their role in processes of bordering. 
THE ROLE OF STATE ACTORS  
An exploration of how borders come into being necessarily involves state actors as it is 
they who are in charge of implementing border policies and maintaining the sovereignty 
of the state at its territorial edge. In fact, in their introduction to Border Identities, 
Donnan and Wilson suggest that: “the anthropological study of the everyday lives of the 
border communities is simultaneously the study of the daily life of the state” (1998: 4). 
In this section, I discuss my approach to studying the role of state actors in the 
production of borders through their involvement in small-scale cross-border trade. My 
emphasis lies on the study of individual state actors themselves rather than on a concept 
of the state as a unitary entity. This allows us to understand the (often differing) actions 
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and decisions of individual state actors in the way they regulate the cross-border 
movement of people and goods.  
As I demonstrate over the course of this thesis, the state actors in my research area not 
only represent the state and its sovereign authority but are also embedded in the local 
culture of the border area. Most of them come from Loei or one of the adjacent border 
provinces, speak the local Lao dialect, and maintain social relationships with non-state 
actors at their duty station. To be embedded in the local culture of one's workplace is 
not something exceptional though. What bears significance in my research area is that 
the state officials there serve to uphold territorial control over the border while at the 
same time they are themselves part of the local cross-border culture. In my thesis, I will 
explore how this local social embeddedness affects their decisions and practices when 
regulating the movement of people and goods.  
My approach to the state is similar to Hefner’s (1998) approach to markets and modern 
capitalism in his book on Market Cultures. I will briefly elaborate this here as it is also 
useful in the context of small-scale cross-border trade. Hefner argues that capitalism is 
always embedded in culture and social relations, which is why “when examined by way 
of its organizations and meanings, capitalism proves to be a more diverse beast than was 
once thought” (Hefner 1998: 29). Hefner draws on Granovetter’s (1985) notion of 
“embeddedness” to demonstrate how East and Southeast Asian societies have 
incorporated modern capitalism in ways that are different yet still comparable to the 
Western world. Hefner further highlights the many examples outside the Western world 
that prove that modern capitalism does not require a “well-mannered legal system and 
impersonal bureaucracy” (Hefner 1998: 29) to function as Max Weber once implied. 
Instead, capitalism should be studied in its variations in different societies, for example, 
how business relations are intertwined with social relations to varying degrees. 
In arguing for the embeddedness of the market, however, Hefner is very careful not to 
fall into the deterministic trap of attributing the specificity of a market solely to a reified 
culture. He defines cultures as a “meaning-making medium that interacts with other 
forces to influence all social spheres, including politics and economics” (1998: 5) rather 
than as a fixed entity, explicitly rejecting “culturalist” explanations of the economy. A 
notion of culture as a constantly changing and socially constructed dynamic of shared 
beliefs and ideas, values and concepts will also be adopted here. In fact, exploring the 
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different meanings and performances of the nation-state border is deeply intertwined 
with and even dependent on a dynamic concept of culture as the border becomes an 
integral aspect of the local culture at certain times and in certain situations.  
In the context of my research, the concept of embeddedness proves itself useful for 
studying the state at the micro-level and in its everyday social practices. Rather than 
taking the state for granted as a homogenous, monolithic institution that stands 
independently from all other parts of society, a look at the micro-level of the state 
allows us to consider differences between individual state actors and makes us think 
about how and why different state representatives act or perform in different ways. Over 
the course of my research, I came to understand the importance of differentiating not 
only between Thai and Lao state actors and their perception of each other but also in-
between Thai and Lao state actors themselves. Power plays between lower and higher 
ranking officers and between different departments, particularly within the Lao state, 
are an important aspect in the regulation of cross-border trade (Chapter 6).  
Attending to the everyday social practices of the state also highlights the ways in which 
the state competes with other actors in the making and unmaking of the border. By 
focussing on the mundane situations of everyday life, my research accounts for the 
social relationships and interactions that are often built and maintained between state 
and non-state actors throughout their daily routines. In unplanned as well as planned 
encounters at the local market, village festivals, and by engaging in gift-giving practices 
with each other, state and non-state actors engage with each other in ways that call a 
rigid state-society dichotomy into question. What further blurs the line between the state 
and society is the overlap of the domestic and work spaces of state and non-state actors. 
Shophouse owners at the checkpoints, for example, lived in the back area or on the top 
floor of their shops so that a visit to their shop simultaneously meant visiting their 
home. Border guards in lived in houses adjacent to the checkpoint, neighbouring the 
shophouses, and could frequently be seen in the villages wearing their civilian clothes 
on their days off. As my thesis will show, it is often in the blurry interface between the 
state and society where the border is negotiated, produced and weakened, sometimes all 
at once. 
As many scholars have started considering the state in its embeddedness and even 
conceptualising it as a social relation (Migdal and Schlichte 2001; Singh 2012; Jessop 
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2013; High and Petit 2013), some have highlighted the abuse of power by individual 
state actors as they exploit their position in order to seek individual gain (see High and 
Petit 2013 for the case of Laos). As is well known, state actors do not always act 
according to the law. Talal Asad (2004) argues that the margins of a state are often 
characterised by arbitrariness and uncertainty, as state actors have the power to force 
their will upon non-state actors through violence. Asad draws on Agamben’s work on 
the state of exception (1998) in this respect. Agamben’s work is also used by Endres 
(2014) to demonstrate how traders at the Vietnam-China border are entirely exposed to 
the will of border guards as their trading practices are considered illegal.  
While I agree that violence and uncertainty can be a crucial part of crossing the border 
(Chapter 5), my thesis also demonstrates opportunities of collaboration with the state 
that instil a sense of regularity and reliability among traders and border-crossers. This 
collaboration is highly individualised and depends on the character and attitude of each 
of the state actors themselves. It also depends on the social embeddedness of state actors 
and the way they interact with non-state actors in everyday life based on a shared 
culture, language, and history (Chapter 4). Quite a few studies, which touch upon 
different kinds of interaction between state and non-state actors in the context of small-
scale cross-border trade, have been conducted in Africa, South Asia but also Southeast 
Asia (Little 2005; Titeca and Herdt 2010; Schoenberger and Turner 2008; Muzvidziwa 
1998; Mutopo 2010; Wagner and Lukowski 2010; Fadahunsi and Rosa 2002). Some of 
these confirm state practice as arbitrary and predatory while others emphasise the 
collaborative aspects of such interactions.  
In the case of cross-border economies in Southeast Asia, the Development Analysis 
Network (DAN) estimates that informal flows of trade may account for 20-30% of 
overall trade along the Thai-Lao border (DAN 2005: 11) while at the same time 
acknowledging the fuzzy intersection between formal and informal processes. They also 
point to a frequent arbitrary exercise of power by local authorities in Thailand, which 
often made it difficult for cross-border traders to predict tax costs and duties (2005: 8). 
Several other authors working on Southeast Asia have highlighted the necessity of 
bargaining between traders and state authorities for trading successes across the 
Mekong River. While Kusakabe (2009) illustrates the encroachment of the state on 
small-scale trade and finds that state authorities erode profit margins, other studies have 
found that such negotiations usually maximise the benefit of both the trader and the 
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state official (Walker 1999; Jakkrit 2006; Phadungkiati and Connell 2014). Based on his 
research in the Thai-Lao borderland, Walker finds that Thai officials and state agencies 
are deeply “embedded in the social and economic networks of the frontier” (Walker 
2009: 105). In one example, he reports how a female Lao trader used sexualised banter 
in her negotiations with state officials (Walker 2006) while in another he describes the 
subtle process of cultivating such an alliance by way of socialising with each other in 
informal settings (Walker 1999).  
Negotiations and relations between state and non-state actors often involve gifts and 
money. While they are labelled as bribery and corruption by some (Endres 2014), I 
suggest interpreting them in a broader social and historical context, focusing on their 
role in the making and unmaking of the border. In my research location, the Thai state 
employed a legal flexibility with regard to small-scale cross-border trade and decisions 
around its regulation were largely left to the discretion of the local border guards. Social 
relationships, gifts, as well as money influenced their decisions and therefore the 
production and weakening of the border (Chapter 6).  
OVERVIEW OF THESIS CHAPTERS 
The ethnography that follows (Chapters 1-6) consists of three parts. Chapters 1 and 2 
cover the historical, political, and regional context that informs the border and its 
becomings in my research area
7
. The chapters are based on written historical records as 
well as on the memories and narratives of my interlocutors. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on 
the situation and lives of my main interlocutors, female traders and state actors, 
demonstrating how these contribute to the becomings of the border through their 
everyday practices. Chapters 5 and 6 bring these actors together by highlighting their 
interactions in the act of crossing the border and trading goods. I will now provide an 
overview of each individual chapter. 
Chapter 1 deals with the historical becomings of the border from the 18
th
 century to 
1975. This seems like a long time period to cover but I argue that it is necessary in order 
to demonstrate how so-called breaks in history such as the first demarcation of the Thai-
Lao border in 1893 did not cause as much disruption as the term “break” implies. 
Instead, I emphasise the gradual process of the becoming of the border and the 
                                                 
7
 There have been further developments since the end of my research in 2012, which I will not cover in 
this thesis. 
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transition from the premodern polities of the mueang to the Westphalian model of the 
nation-state. I argue that my research area has historically been situated on the 
peripheries of larger centres of power and continued to do so until 1975. Despite the 
contestations around the demarcation of the Thai-Lao borderline and the various actors 
engaged in the border area throughout the civil war in Laos, my research area did not 
experience any major effects of the nation-state border until the communist takeover in 
Laos. This is confirmed by my interlocutors’ nostalgic memories of the time before 
1975.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the effects of the changing border regulations since 1975 and how 
small-scale traders have adapted to these. I argue that the cross-border trade in daily 
necessities has continued throughout these changing regulations despite their 
restrictions on cross-border flows and because of the opportunities these created. The 
chapter takes into account how the Thai and Lao side of the border were affected 
differently by the regulations following three events in particular: the economic 
embargo placed on Laos by Thailand in 1975, the opening of ports of toleration for 
villagers along the Hueang River from the 1980s, and the opening of the Thai-Lao 
Friendship Bridge in 2004. Particularly since the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, I argue, 
small-scale trading practices have become more competitive and diverse and the 
distribution of daily necessities more diffuse with new kinds of actors emerging as a 
result. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the female traders that engage in small-scale trade and the ways in 
which they contribute to the making and unmaking of the border in my research area. 
The chapter focuses on three aspects in particular: the ways in which female traders 
integrate their trading practices with family life, their social networks, and their cross-
border mobility. Acknowledging the many kinds of female traders involved in the cross-
border trade of daily necessities, each aspect highlights the situation of those female 
traders to whom it is most significant and relevant with regard to the border. The section 
on social networks, for example, demonstrates how shophouse owners at customary 
border checkpoints simultaneously transgress and reinforce the border by referring to 
their trading partners in Laos as siblings (phinong).  
Chapter 4 examines the situation and lives of the most relevant state actors in my 
research area and their social and cultural embeddedness. By revealing their practices 
and attitudes as well as their interactions with non-state actors, the chapter highlights the 
40 
blurred line between the state and society. I argue that this allows us to not only 
understand how the state is constituted in all its different forms but also how the border 
is made and unmade in this blurry interface of state and society.  
Chapter 5 concentrates on the act of crossing the border itself and the way state and 
non-state actors interact with each other in the process. I examine the role of travel 
documents, border performances, and social relationships between traders and border 
guards and how these facilitate and restrict cross-border movement. Building on the 
social embeddedness of state actors, I demonstrate how a cultural intimacy between 
border guards and border crossers often trumped the necessity for paperwork. Social 
relationships, familiarity and trust between border guards and regular border-crossers 
created order and stability in what otherwise may be seen as a porous and unregulated 
border. Border-crossers without such ties were subject to arrests and sometimes 
violence.  
In Chapter 6, the thesis culminates in a discussion on the way the border comes into 
being through the interactions of state and non-state actors in the act of trading goods 
across the border. The interactions come in the form of social relationships and gift-
giving practices. I place particular emphasis on the trading practices conducted in sites 
outside the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. At customary border checkpoints, for example, 
it was at the discretion of the local border guards to decide what they consider licit and 
illicit goods and how many goods they consider “small-scale”. Border guards on the 
Thai and Lao side differ in their considerations of the licit and also in their involvement 
in bribery. With regard to bribery, I argue that we must differentiate between more 
predatory forms such as extortion and more collaborative forms.  
The final chapter provides a summary of my findings and their implications for the 
study of borders more generally. It also provides a brief insight into the most recent 
developments in my research area, suggesting further research to be done. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I  
 
HISTORY AND MEMORY  
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CHAPTER 1 
HISTORICAL BECOMINGS OF THE BORDER 
 
 “Since they [the residents] cross over [the river] 
continuously for visits, the Hueang River is just 
a symbol of geographical division between 
Thailand and Laos but it cannot break the 
friendship and relatedness between the villagers 
and the string that binds them together” (Surin 
2009). 
 
BREAKS IN HISTORY AND REALITY ON THE GROUND 
Ban Thong was the first community to be established in my research area in 1851 when 
villagers from Laos brought elephants across the Hueang River to graze. Due to a river 
flood they ended up staying there. According to a written collection of village histories 
in Loei province, the other villages on the Thai side of my research area were 
established between the late 19
th
 and the early 20
th
 century (Thongdam 1984). Their 
stories of origin all involve some form of migration from Laos, with the first settlers in 
Ban Plee fleeing a cholera outbreak in the Lao village across the river in 1877. Ban 
Sing’s first inhabitants, it is mentioned in the book, migrated from Laos in 1925. Ban 
Donmai’s complex legend of origin entails a princess who hands over the reign of the 
village to her brother in a neighbouring village (on the Lao side of the river).  
These stories of origin are revealing in that they capture some of the disruptive 
processes including environmental challenges and shifts in power and control that are 
characteristic of the whole area’s history, some of which I will present in this chapter. 
At the same time, they involve migratory patterns across the Hueang River, which 
substantiate the historical (and kin-based) connection between people on either side of 
the river that marks the border today. The historical bond between villagers on either 
side of the river was emphasised by many of my interlocutors, particularly by those who 
cross the river on a regular basis for the purposes of trade and/or visiting kin. When 
discussing the history of the area, many of my interlocutors referred to the time before 
1975 in a very nostalgic way, describing it as the time when the adjacent Thai and Lao 
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border villages were perceived and lived as “one village” rather than as separate units 
divided by the border.  
Although the Thai-Lao border already agreed upon in 1893 (and 1904 between Loei and 
Sayaboury) my interlocutors highlighted the year 1975 as the most significant in the 
history of the area, particularly with regard to small-scale trade across the Hueang 
River. According to my interviewees, the communist takeover in Laos in 1975 led to a 
military enforcement of the border, accompanied by an influx of refugees from Laos to 
Thailand. This was followed by a series of border wars in the nearby area. While I will 
take a closer look at the effects of the reinforced border from 1975 in Chapter 2, here I 
will focus on the historical becomings of the border before 1975. If the nation-state 
border was only reinforced from 1975, how did the border come into being before then? 
Aiming to unravel some of the historical events, developments, and actors that inform 
the becomings of the border in my research area until 1975 and placing them in the 
broader historical context of the region, the chapter begins with an overview of the 
region’s power constellations and the regulation of trade already before the first Thai-
Lao border agreement in 1893. This has two reasons. Although the famous agreement of 
1893 was the first international demarcation of the Thai-Lao border, it is not often 
emphasised in the historical literature that the agreement mapped the border along the 
Mekong River so that the province of Sayaboury officially belonged to Siam (formerly 
Thailand). It was only in 1904 that Siam ceded Sayaboury to France (the colonial power 
in Laos), creating an international borderline between Loei and Sayaboury. This would 
change again during the Second World War with Sayaboury being annexed by Thailand 
for a short time between 1941 and 1946.  
As several studies suggest, however, these political shifts in power had little impact on 
the local population and everyday small-scale trading practices in my research area 
(Hafner 1983; Ducourtieux et al. 2005; Laffort and Dufumier 2006), at least much 
smaller effects than the changes that happened in and after 1975. According to my 
interlocutors, even the civil war in Laos from the 1950s that ended with the victory of 
the communist movement of the Pathet Lao in 1975 had little impact on everyday life 
along the border between Sayaboury and Loei. This was because Sayaboury province 
did not come under Pathet Lao control until the party’s victory. Instead, the mountains 
of Sayaboury province (less so the border area) became a site of anti-communist forces 
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while the border area became increasingly used as a route for cross-border logging and 
drug trading activities.  
Another reason to capture the historical becomings of the border already before the first 
demarcation of the Thai-Lao border is because the making of the nation-state border 
was a gradual and often contested process that started long before the first international 
border agreement and that is still ongoing today. As I will demonstrate, the concept of 
the territorial border was nothing new to pre-colonial Southeast Asia, although it was 
applied merely at the local level rather than for the demarcation of larger polities. 
Despite this, scholars working on Southeast Asia often describe the modern nation-state, 
its territorial borders, bureaucratic administration, and national identities as something 
imported and imposed by European colonialism, thereby disrupting the region’s 
‘natural’ indigenous development (Reid 1993, 1997; Blussé and Gaastra 1998)8. The 
implication of this is to conceptualise Southeast Asian nation-states and their territorial 
borders as something sudden, something artificial to the region and its people, which 
denies Southeast Asians any agency as well as any ownership of their historical 
development and current situation. More recent scholars, however, have questioned 
such a narrative and instead focus on the contestedness, contingency, and discursiveness 
of colonialism in Southeast Asia (e.g. Day 2002; Hawkins 2007; Gainsborough 2007; 
Walker 2008).  
In line with these authors I highlight the contestations and negotiations that have taken 
place between foreign, indigenous, state, and non-state actors in the context of the Thai-
Lao border rather than assuming a break in history at the onset of colonialism (and with 
the first border agreement) and its accompanying processes of territorialisation, state-
making, and bordering. The same applies to the communist takeover in 1975, which 
marked a significant change in the manifestation of the border from my interlocutors’ 
point of view but which should equally not be seen as a break in history. As I will show 
in Chapter 2, trade continued despite and because of restrictions on cross-border trade, 
albeit in a different fashion than before. Since 1975 the nation-state border has been 
differently emphasised and enforced by different Thai and Lao governments, which has 
                                                 
8
 Many scholars have argued that although Thailand was never colonised by external forces and remained 
politically independent, it was not free from Western influences and followed similar patterns as 
colonised countries
 
. Some scholars have used the term ‘semi-coloniality’ to describe Thailand’s situation 
as politically independent but strongly influenced by the West, see especially Harrison and Jackson’s 
(2010) Traces of the Colonial in Thailand but also works by Thongchai Winichakul, Michael Herzfeld, 
and Hong Lysa. 
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had different effects on and responses by different actors on the ground. So although the 
historical trajectory produced in this chapter ends in the year 1975 (marking a rather 
literal break), it should not be seen as a point of complete discontinuation. 
Although the chapter follows a chronological trajectory leading up to the year 1975, I 
seek to counter a teleological narrative that is dominated by state discourse. I do so by 
taking both written and oral accounts as well as state and non-state perspectives into 
consideration. Such an approach supports a conceptualisation of the border as 
historically contingent and as a multi-layered process that is constantly in flux. It also 
takes into consideration the multitude of actors that have been involved in processes of 
bordering, thereby supporting Hawkins when he calls for a more differentiated approach 
to the history of Southeast Asia, which: “must be seen as a historical matrix composed 
of millions of heterogeneous processes and historical actors responding to various 
stimuli in an attempt to manage order and the world as it occurs” (Hawkins 2007: 282). 
When discussing the becomings of the border before 1975 I also engage with the 
nostalgia around the pre-1975 period that was particularly apparent in my interlocutors’ 
recalling of the past. Along with Pickering and Keightley, I define nostalgia as “a 
longing for what is lacking in a changed present…a yearning for what is now 
unattainable, simply because of the irreversibility of time” (2006: 920). That does not 
mean that nostalgia of the past emphasises a discontinuity between the past and the 
present but rather that it is a way of negotiating between the past and the present, 
between continuity and discontinuity (Atia and Davies 2010: 184).  
ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE MUEANG 
Up until the administrative provinces of Loei and Sayaboury were established in the 
early 20
th
 century and integrated into the nation-state of Siam (former name of 
Thailand) and later Laos, they were part of locally governed principalities situated on 
the periphery of larger state formations, which competed with each other for power
9
.  
                                                 
9
 Most historians refer to the pre-colonial system of competing centres of power as mandala, which is a 
Sanskrit term meaning ‘circle’ and which depicted a cosmological centre in ancient Indian manuals of 
government. Wolters (1999) borrowed the term for the Southeast Asian context in order to describe a 
“particular and often unstable political situation in a vaguely definable geographical area without fixed 
boundaries and where smaller centers tended to look in all directions for security” (1999: 27-28). While 
other authors have used different terms such as “galactic polity” (Tambiah 1976) and “theatre state” 
(Geertz 1980) for such a system, in this thesis I chose to adhere to the local terminology used in Thailand 
and Laos that depicts centres of power as mueang. Large valley states and kingdoms were usually named 
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Figure 4: Relevant centres of power (green) in mainland Southeast Asia 
16th to 20th century (Thongchai 1994: 2; own additions in green and red)
10
 
In the mid-19
th
 century, the towns of Loei, Chiang Khan
11
, Ken Thao
12
, and Paklay
13
 
were the main principalities around my research area (Figure 4), despite being very 
small centres with both Loei and Chiang Khan’s populations below 2,500 (see 
Sternstein 1966: 70, no data for Ken Thao and Paklay available). The advantage of this 
sparse population’s peripheral location in relation to the larger centres of power such as 
Luang Prabang and Bangkok was that it was subject to local chiefs (who paid tribute to 
                                                                                                                                               
after their centre of power, e.g. Ayutthaya, Sukhothai, although some were given their own name, e.g. 
Siam, Lan Xang. 
10
 Smaller dots indicate approximate locations of towns/research area; Larger circles indicate centres of 
power whose reach was constantly in flux. The circles do not indicate the reach of these centres of power. 
11
 Chiang Khan is a Thai border town situated long the Mekong River, further east of my research area.  
12
 The town of Ken Thao formed the basis for today’s Ken Thao district. 
13
 Paklay is a Lao trading centre in Sayaboury province situated along the Mekong River. 
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the larger centres of power) rather than under the direct influence of powerful rulers 
while at the same time being able to engage in trading practices throughout the region.  
In Tai
14
 societies, centres of power were called mueang, which encompassed polities of 
different sizes ranging from a conglomerate of small villages to powerful valley states 
such as those centred on Ayutthaya and later Bangkok
15
. The power of the mueang was 
based not on territorial claims but on the amount of people a ruler was able to call his 
subjects. Capturing and displacing people as part of military campaigns were common 
strategies for gaining and maintaining manpower (Scott 2009: 82–83). The jao mueang 
(ruler) reinforced his legitimacy through sacral objects and royal displays of power 
(Gunn 2011: 59). Premodern Southeast Asian polities were thus based on a centre-
periphery logic in that the location of the ruler was also the centre of power. A ruler’s 
power diminished towards the periphery, similar to the light of a reflector lamp 
originating at the bulb and becoming weaker towards the distance (Anderson 2007 
[1972]: 22)
16
.  
The Lan Xang kingdom, which is often seen as the precursor of Laos and which 
spanned a vast area from Luang Prabang across Vientiane to Champassak at the height 
of its power in the 15
th
 and 16
th
 centuries (LeBar and Suddard 1967), had a semi-feudal 
state system with a hierarchical layer of rulers. The kingdom’s major cities consisted of 
Luang Prabang and Vientiane but it also encompassed towns in today’s Thailand across 
the Mekong River including Nong Khai. The ruler of each tributary mueang provided a 
surplus of accumulated wealth to their immediate overlord and where needed a certain 
amount of soldiers. As long as these provisions were met, the heads of the mueang were 
able to govern at their own will within the agreed codes of conduct (Stuart-Fox 1998: 
50).  
                                                 
14
 The term Tai designates a language family and cultural space that encompasses, among others, the Thai 
language in Thailand, Lao language in Laos, Shan language in Burma, and Zhuang and Dai languages in 
Southern China (see Turton 2000: 3-5). 
15
 The term mueang is also spelled muang or meuang by other authors. In the contemporary Thai 
language, the term mueang can mean city, larger town, but is also often used as a synonym to prathet, 
meaning country or nation-state. In colloquial terms, Thailand is therefore often called mueang thai while 
the town of Loei is called mueang loei and distinguished from the province of Loei (which is then called 
jangwat loei). 
16
 This analogy must be taken with caution as it conveys the idea that a ruler’s power spread out evenly 
throughout space, albeit with diminishing strength. Instead, a ruler’s power was patchy and could mean 
controlling some inhabited spaces in one area while none in another area. There was also much 
uninhabited land in the periphery, particularly in the mountainous areas, which was under no control at all 
(see Thongchai 1994). 
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In the early Thai kingdoms of Sukthothai (13
th
 – 16h century) and Ayutthaya (14th – 18th 
century), kings strategically appointed princes, brothers and nephews to towns in order 
to protect the centre. Those who were appointed to govern a certain area extracted taxes 
and gifts at their own will and managed labour forces within their respective area (Thak 
2007: 112). This system of governing was known as kin mueang (lit. transl. to eat the 
town) and was a normal practice until the centralisation of the administration by King 
Chulalongkorn (Rama V) in the late 19
th
 century (Bidhya 2011: 33). Despite the early 
abolition of the kin mueang system, many authors trace contemporary Thailand’s 
allegedly engrained culture of corruption back to the kin mueang system (Neher 1979; 
Mulder 2000: 133; Nishizaki 2006: 273). The term is also still used in Thai language 
today as an idiom to denote excessive forms of corruption (Callahan 2000: 65). In 
Chapter 6, I will revisit this discussion when presenting the local kin ngen (lit. transl. to 
eat money) practices among Thai border officials in my research area.  
For now, suffice to say that this system allowed each mueang to govern the population 
at its own will as long as it paid tribute to its overlord. Overlords also drew on the 
loyalty of the mueang for the purposes of military campaigns, trade, and access to 
resources. In order to ensure continuing loyalty, power was often consolidated through 
matrimonial alliances, e.g. through marriages between rulers and the daughters of local 
chiefs, because a ruler was dependent on the loyalty of his governors and 
administrators. In other words: “everything depended on man-to-man relations” 
(Wolters 1999: 30). With regard to Lan Xang, Stuart-Fox suggests that: “The great 
kings in Lao history were those powerful enough both to subdue the factious nobility in 
the capital and to retain the allegiance of outlying meuang” (1998: 73). Over time, 
however, loyalties and tributary relationships between centres and the mueang in the 
periphery shifted. As smaller centres attracted people and wealth, they could overpower 
previously powerful centres and shift the relations accordingly. 
The difficulty in sustaining the allegiance of smaller mueang lay not only in the fact that 
they could grow and present a threat to the larger centre of power, but also because it 
was not uncommon for the mueang on the periphery to pay tribute to several larger 
centres simultaneously. In this respect, several authors have pointed out the 
considerable overlap of the larger Southeast Asian realms (Tambiah 1974; Wolters 
1999). Thongchai has described this situation as multiple or shared sovereignty (1994: 
96). This meant that the rulers of smaller petty states were autonomous to the extent that 
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they incorporated the interests of their overlords, even if this meant paying tribute to 
several larger kingdoms at the same time (Thongchai 1994: 84ff). However, 
Thongchai’s use of the term sovereignty should be questioned as it originated in 
Western Europe during the Middle Ages and is based on state mechanisms, which 
distribute laws, decrees and rights evenly throughout a territory with definite boundaries 
(Dean 1999: 105).  
Having described premodern Southeast Asian polities as based more on tributary 
relationships than on laws, it is, perhaps, more useful to think of them as contest states. 
Adas uses this term to highlight the “constant struggle between the ruler and the 
nobility, between factions of the elite at various levels, and between supravillage elite 
groups and village notables and peasants for the control of labor and the agricultural 
production which formed the basis of these predominantly agrarian states” (Adas 1981: 
218). So from a bird’s eye view, such contest states seemed simply to have shared 
spaces. But on the ground, there was a constant struggle for power. What Thongchai 
describes as shared sovereignty must thus be regarded in terms of this contestation and 
rivalry rather than an actual sharing of sovereign power.  
When the villages in my research area were established in the 19
th
 century, they were 
situated on the edges of the mueang of Luang Prabang (Figure 4) and Lomsak (situated 
west of Loei, not shown in Figure 4), both of which were paying tribute to the kingdom 
of Siam (established by the Chakri dynasty in Bangkok) by that time
17
. Siam had just 
destroyed the city of Viang Chan (Vientiane) and its surrounding areas (including parts 
of Chiang Khan to the east of my research area) in retaliation to an attack in 1827 and 
was seeking to consolidate its power among the Lao population across the Mekong 
River. As part of this project, Chiang Khan with its location along the Mekong River 
(Figure 1) was used as an administrative centre to govern the area from the southern 
edge of the mueang of Luang Prabang towards Viang Chan (Smuckarn and Breazeale 
1988: 12, 23). Siam also appointed a governor of Viang Chan origin to the mueang of 
Lomsak, which encompassed Loei and Ken Thao, who would help gain cooperation 
from the Lao towns along the Mekong River. Despite these contestations and shifts in 
power, Laffort and Dufumier describe life in my research area during the early 20
th
 
century as resembling “living on an island lost in the middle of the forest” (2006 section 
                                                 
17
 The historical records referenced here do not clarify whether the local princes governing my research 
area were paying tribute to Luang Prabang, Lomsak, or both mueang at the same time. 
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15), with isolated villages located near the river and close to lowland rice paddies. 
Historical records also suggest that a group of elders from Lomsak came by foot each 
year in order to pan for gold, which was sent to Bangkok for the payment of taxes 
(Schmuckarn and Breazeale 1988: 102). Local princes collected tax and demanded 
labour but did not interfere in land allocation as land was abundant in the area.  
In fact, the abundant land in the periphery was often appropriated by people who fled 
from overbearing rulers that threatened their subsistence by increasing extractions or 
corvée labour. James Scott (2009) describes this flight towards the periphery (especially 
from lowland centres to upland peripheries) as a strategy to escape the direct control of 
the state before these states started penetrating into more remote territories as part of the 
nation-state project throughout the 20
th
 century. This suggests that the premodern 
polities of Southeast Asia allowed for the free flow of people between centres as well as 
from the centres to their peripheries (except in the case of forced displacements and 
slave raids) and that territorial borders did not exist between larger kingdoms up to the 
late 19
th
 century.  
In fact, premodern Southeast Asian polities are often glossed over as “multicentered and 
boundaryless” (Wolters 1999: 221). While I agree with this in the context of larger state 
formations, I will argue that such a view misses out on the fact that territorial borders 
were indeed used at the local level. According to Wijeyewardene (2002: 135), village 
borders were often marked by fences in order to prevent strangers from entering. The 
northern Thai city of Chiang Mai was bounded by walls and strangers including traders 
were often physically removed from the city over night (2002: 136). Baird (2008) points 
to “three-dozen examples from the 16th and early 17th centuries of where two towns, 
villages and monasteries created fixed boundaries once they came into proximity with 
each other” (Baird 2008: 599). Baird also refers to a personal communication with 
Breazeale who mentioned a resource dispute in pre-colonial times between two Lao 
villages that was resolved by accepting a stream in the forest as the border between the 
two villages. 
In order to understand the use of borders in premodern Siam, I draw on Thongchai’s 
(1994) use of the Thai term khetdaen (border) as it signifies a polymorphous meaning of 
borders. The khetdaen was never determined by the central authority (in contrast to 
nation-state borders) and could refer both to the outer limits of a town and at the same 
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time to the extremities of a kingdom. The khetdaen of a town depended on the 
surrounding area it could protect while that of a kingdom referred to the furthest extent 
to which the local population in the outlying mueang protected their local territory. An 
important point here is that these outlying mueang were often situated far away from the 
outlying mueang of neighbouring centres of power. Where the nation-state border 
demarcates the line between two adjacent territories, the khetdaen of premodern Siam 
referred to a frontier area, beyond which there could be vast areas of forest and 
mountains that were not ruled by any centre of power.  
A khetdaen could also refer to control over important mountain passages for travel and 
trade. According to Wijeyewardene, spirit shrines in Northern Thailand that were 
usually built on the highest point of caravan tracks later coincided with the borders 
between Thai provinces (2002: 133). In the case of mountain or forest passageways, 
Thongchai describes how the ruler in Bangkok ordered guardhouses to be set up along 
them. However, the guardhouses had no meaning as people were allowed to travel 
through and settle within the principalities beyond them. The extent of Bangkok’s rule, 
according to Thongchai, was dependent on the patrolled distance of the guards at the 
local level rather than on a demarcated line on a map (1994: 76). 
It was merely in cases of hostility between neighbouring kingdoms that the space 
patrolled by such guards became relevant as the local population under the rule of one 
kingdom was then prohibited from trespassing into the territory of the enemy (1994: 
77). While the reality of this border as it was practiced on the ground is not further 
elaborated by Thongchai, it can be seen as a historically contingent moment where the 
border in the sense of territorial exclusion came into being. A similar case is described 
by Stuart-Fox, although it underlines the multiple meanings of the khetdaen rather than 
evidencing the use of a territorial border. In the 14
th
 century, according to Stuart-Fox 
(1998: 39-40), the Vietnamese ruler sent a diplomatic mission to the eastern mueang of 
his realm for purposes of negotiation after an attack by the Lao ruler Fa Ngum. A border 
was established in order to distinguish between Vietnamese and Lao spheres of 
influence based on two conflicting criteria. One divided control according to the types 
of houses of the population while the other was based on the flow of rainwater (using 
the watershed as the divider).  
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Another example that is more relevant to the thesis here concerns the khetdaen between 
the Thai kingdom of Ayutthaya and the Lao kingdom of Lan Xang. In 1560 the rulers of 
these two kingdoms formed an alliance against the Burmese, pledging that they would 
coexist in peace. A memorial was hence built in Dansai (in today’s Loei province) to 
symbolise this alliance. The sign, which is still on the memorial today, reads: “The 
generations to come must not violate and dispossess territory of the other. They must 
not be greedy or act in a deceitful manner in their interaction until the sun and the moon 
fall down on this land.” Although the insignia makes reference to territorial possession, 
the memorial should not be mistaken to signify a border marker in the modern sense. 
Instead, it was a symbol of the relationship between the two kingdoms (Gerson 2003: 
186f)
18
. 
While the list of different khetdaen examples could be extended ad infinitum, the point 
here is that territorial borders did exist to a certain extent in premodern Southeast Asian 
polities but merely at the local level rather than as a territorial separation between two 
kingdoms. Such a separation would defy the concept of the mueang, which continuously 
grew and diminished in size depending on its tributary relationships, as well as the 
existence of principalities that paid tribute to several overlords at the same time. Before 
taking a closer look at the first demarcation of the Thai-Lao border in 1893, however, I 
would like to come back to the importance of passageways for trade. Control over these 
through the use of khetdaen was not only crucial to the generation of wealth for 
Southeast Asian kingdoms, but was also an essential way in which ethnic groups in the 
high-, mid- and lowlands engaged with each other (e.g. Leach 1970). 
While the acquisition of manpower was essential to the strengthening (and weakening) 
of premodern Southeast Asian states, another important aspect was control over (Hall 
1985). Trade was a principle means of generating wealth. In Lan Xang, Tai-Lao 
middlemen maintained trading relationships with lao theung (called midland Lao in 
English; ethnic minorities speaking Mon-Khmer languages) using their canoes to travel 
upstream several times a year to give cotton cloth, iron and silver in exchange for forest 
products. While rivers were the main means of transportation, buffalo carts and pack 
animals were also used in-between nearby villages. Lan Xang also maintained trading 
                                                 
18
 The Ghost Festival, which is nowadays a major tourist attraction in Dansai, Loei province, is based on 
this relationship as the spirit mediums in the festival symbolise descendants of the kings. 
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relationships with neighbouring kingdoms such as Ayutthaya, Lan Na and Cambodia 
(Stuart-Fox 1998: 49).  
Control over trade passages increased wealth and power and therefore also constituted 
another competitive aspect between the mueang. Viang Chan was difficult to reach by 
boat and oxcart (from all directions) as travel was slow and often dangerous (Gunn 
2011: 61)
19
. This greatly limited its opportunities of trade. What exacerbated this 
situation was that Siam did not allow Lao traders to sell their goods freely at 
Ayutthaya’s market and also discouraged foreign merchants and missionaries to trade 
with the Lao. Because of this, the latter did not get the opportunity to trade directly with 
the Dutch and Portuguese, e.g. to obtain weapons (see also Mayoury and Pheuiphanh 
1998: 50f). This contributed to the declining power of Lan Xang towards the end of the 
17
th
 century (Stuart-Fox 1998: 89ff). 
Although my research area was described as mainly forested by French travellers in the 
mid-19
th
 century (Mouhot 1864), there is also evidence that a range of trading activities 
were conducted that connected it to the wider region. According to Laffort and 
Dufumier (2006), Chinese traders from Bangkok regularly travelled to Ken Thao to sell 
cotton, matches, and dishes, receiving stick-lac in exchange. Salt was also extracted in 
the nearby area and sold to other provinces in Siam. The local elite also raised 
elephants, which they used to transport heavy loads over long distances and through 
which they had access to the caravan trade. The then Siamese currency (ticals) as well 
as silver coins from British Burma were therefore circulating throughout the area during 
this time (Aymonier 2000). The construction of roads during World War II further 
facilitated such trading practices and access to international trade. I will come back to 
this in the next section. 
Apart from generating wealth and establishing social relations, trade relations also 
prompted Siam’s path towards becoming a modern nation-state. In 1855, it signed the 
Bowring Treaty with the British, which removed protective import barriers and 
instigated a “liberalised” trade regime that eventually led to the decline of local 
industries (Terwiel 1991). While creating the conditions for a capitalist economy in this 
context, the Thai monarchy also began to pursue reforms that would allow it to form a 
centralised and territorially fixed administrative structure (Connors 2007: 36). In the 
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 There was intense competition between those traders who did reach Viang Chan, including Siamese 
and Muslim (e.g. Malay, Indian, Persian and Arab) traders. 
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following, I will describe the colonial encounter that accelerated nation-state building 
efforts in Thailand and Laos as well as the demarcation of the borderline between 
Thailand and Laos but also created new national imaginings that were a crucial part in 
processes of bordering. 
BORDERING THROUGH NATION-STATE BUILDING 
The creation of the Thai and Lao nation-states involved (and still involve) technologies 
of state-making and nation-building, processes of territorial bordering as well as 
discourses of identity and belonging between Siam/Thailand
20
 and Laos. In 19
th
 century 
mainland Southeast Asia, control over people was supplanted by control over space. 
Processes of territorialising Laos were led by Siam and France, with Siam increasing its 
control over the Lao territories from the West (including my research area), and the 
French embarking on its mission civilatrice from the East. Eventually, Laos was 
incorporated into France’s Indochina and its border with Siam negotiated through a 
series of treaties and maps
2122
. The treaties involved the multiple ceding and retroceding 
of Sayaboury, though this only had a minor impact on livelihoods of the local 
population in my research area. Meanwhile, Siam/Thailand also continued to 
incorporate the Lao in Laos and the Lao population inside Siam within its category of 
the “Thai race” while the French sought to differentiate between the Thai and the Lao. 
Siam had already started reasserting its suzerainty over the Mekong region (east and 
west of the Mekong) in the early 19
th
 century (particularly after the revolt of Chao Anou 
against the Siamese king in 1827) on the basis of the centre-periphery logic. It 
appointed Thai officials and loyal administrators to govern the smaller polities in the 
Khorat Plateau (Northeastern Thailand with Loei on its fringes) who were rewarded by 
the king for increasing the manpower of their polities. This resulted in the (voluntary 
and involuntary) resettlement of a large number of Lao people from the east side of the 
Mekong River to the west side (Stuart-Fox 1998: 113; see also Grabowsky 1995: 115).  
                                                 
20
 Siam changed its name to Thailand in 1939. 
21
 The fact that Laos had no claim to itself is due to its fragmentation between the kings of Luang 
Prabang, Viang Chang, and Champassak (southern Laos), and the small principalities situated in-between. 
22
 Historians have debated whether or not Laos is a creation of the French. While Lan Xang can be seen 
as a state that existed before the arrival of the French (although Lan Xang disintegrated into three parts in 
the 18
th
 century), the existence of a common sense of belonging or national identity is questionable (see 
Stuart-Fox 1998; Jerndall and Rigg 1998 for a summary of the debate). 
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According to Grabowsky, at least 100,000 Lao were forced to resettle in what is today 
Northeast Thailand, also called Isan (1995: 121). Grabowsky even goes so far to say 
that in the decades that followed the war of 1827: “the demographic centre of gravity of 
the Lao country had moved from the trans-Mekong territories […] to the Khorat 
plateau” (Grabowsky 1999: 46). Situated on the periphery of both the Mekong 
territories and the Khorat Plateau, my research area was not affected as much by these 
policies (the villages in my research area were only established from the mid-19
th
 
century) although I have already noted above that a governor of Viang Chan origin was 
appointed to govern the area while at the same reasserting the suzerainty of the Thai 
monarchy.  
Despite not having directly affected my research area, the population displacements of 
the early 19
th
 century are an important aspect of the regional history that resulted in 
more ethnic Lao living in Thailand than in Laos itself (Jerndal and Rigg 1998)
23
. What 
is interesting to note, furthermore, is that by forcibly displacing large parts of the 
population from the east to the west side of the Mekong River, Siam not only 
(intentionally) created a sparsely populated buffer zone with Vietnam but also 
(unintentionally) anticipated the French vision of the Mekong River as the “natural” 
border between Siam and Laos (Grabowsky 1995: 124).  
By the 1860s the French had already established a protectorate in Vietnam and 
Cambodia (French Indochina). Although France had verbally reassured Siam that it was 
uninterested in the Mekong territories, it published a map in 1885 on which Siam’s 
territory was limited to the area West of the Mekong River (including Loei and 
Sayaboury), thereby questioning Siam’s suzerainty over the area that is today Laos 
(Ivarsson 2007: 34, see also Thongchai 1994 on the importance of mapping in the 
creation of the ‘geo-body’ of Siam). Although Siam was not completely unaware of the 
European conceptions of space and both King Mongkut (Rama IV who reigned Siam 
from 1851 – 1868) as well as his son King Chulalongkorn (Rama V who reigned from 
1868 – 1910) displayed an interested in Western knowledge, Siam only started 
reinforcing its territorial control over the Mekong region in the 1880s by sending royal 
commissioners who asked the local officials to defend their territories from the 
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 Jerndall and Rigg claimed in 1998 that there were nearly 20 million ethnic Lao living in Thailand, 
which was eight times as many as in Laos (Jerndall and Rigg 1998: 821).  
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advances of the French. Despite these efforts, the French claimed Laos as a tributary of 
Vietnam in 1887
24
.  
A major dispute over the islets within the Mekong River eventually occurred in 1893, 
leaving Siam and France at gunpoint. The outcome of the crisis was that Siam ceded the 
entire territory east of the Mekong River to France and agreed to a 25km demilitarised 
zone along the west bank of the Mekong River where no Siamese police or military 
fortifications were allowed (Grabowsky 1995). The treaty of 1893 gave way to the first 
official map of the border between Siam and Laos that saw Loei and Sayaboury as part 
of Siam (Figure 5). To Thongchai, the agreement also led to “the emergence of modern 
territorial sovereignty and international order and a new meaning of native soil” 
(Thongchai 1994: 111-112). In other words, a border based on the Westphalian logic of 
territoriality and sovereignty replaced a mode of governing according to the centre-
periphery model.  
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 Under the French, Laos was part of Indochina, together with Cambodia, Tonkin (North Vietnam), 
Annam (Central Vietnam), and Cochinchina (Southern Vietnam). Laos, however, was only merged to a 
single administrative unit in 1899. The French rebuilt Vientiane (formerly Viang Chan) and the Résident 
Supérieur set up his residency there (Ivarsson 2008: 94). Luang Prabang, however, was not directly ruled 
by the French but only as protectorate of French Indochina. Apart from a limitation on his forestry rights, 
the king of Luang Prabang retained all of his privileges, although his decisions and decrees needed 
approval by the Résident Supérieur to Laos (Phongsavath 2002: 7). After the Thai-Lao treaty of 1904, 
Luang Prabang comprised four provinces that included Sayaboury and which were administered by 
royally appointed governors. 
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Figure 5: Thai-Lao border along upper Mekong River in 1893 (St John 
1998: 13) 
In reality, however, the implementation of the territorial border between Siam and 
France was not as straight forward. In his account of the Thai-Lao border situation 
between 1893 and 1900, Walker demonstrates how French colonial officials could not 
simply impose a new spatial conception but instead had to learn to interact with, and 
win the favours of local chiefly elites and Siamese bureaucrats (Walker 2008). This was 
the case not only within the territorial limitations of Indochina but across its newly 
established borders as well. Toye suggests that the colonial period in the Thai-Lao 
borderland was a time when “the Lao people mingled freely across their great river 
[Mekong]; the scattered hill peoples hardly noticed the new boundary posts in the north-
east” (Toye 1968: 48). And in the 1930s, the Thai government allowed anyone to cross 
the border from French Indochina into Thailand without documentation (Mayoury 1994: 
60), thereby drawing the Lao population into their realm. Such accounts clearly 
highlight the discrepancies that often existed between border demarcations on maps vis-
à-vis the realities on the ground.  
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The same goes for the introduction of a new provincial system in Siam and the 
centralisation of its administration from the 1890s. With the abolition of slavery and the 
corvée labour system, the king’s subjects turned into citizens (Keyes 2014: 8). Based on 
the model of British Burma, Siam was subdivided into 18 administrative circles 
(monthon), cities (mueang), districts (amphoe), subdistricts (tambon), and villages 
(muban). Not only were these divisions artificial constructs that (mostly) did not 
coincide with existing patterns of settlement (Englehart 2001: 100), but the new 
administration system was also met with some resistance among the nobility (Bunnag 
1977: 164). While up to this point, provincial governors could run their provinces and 
collect taxes at their own will (kin mueang) Bangkok now appointed salaried officials to 
each level down to the subdistrict. Civil servants turned bureaucrats had to follow a 
code of conduct, were accountable to their superiors, could be promoted and demoted 
and confined in their functions to their administrative territory (Bidhya 2011: 33). In 
addition to the local resistance, a lack of qualified officials as well as funds meant that 
the transformation was gradual. Loei province was only formally established in 1907 
(Bunnag 1977: 164; Vickery 1970). 
Although Sayaboury belonged to Siamese territory after the treaty of 1893, it was ceded 
to France before it could be integrated into Siam’s provincial system. Negotiations 
between Siam and France from 1902 led to Siam’s loss of Sayaboury in 1904 (Figure 6: 
Area A) and the cessation of the area around Dansai (southwest of my research area) 
between 1904 and 1907 (Figure 6: Area E). According to the oral history in my research 
area, the effect of the borderline between Loei and Sayaboury as agreed by the Siamese 
and French governments in 1904 was minimal in this peripheral borderland as the 
borderline in the Hueang River was only demarcated in 1923 (Surin 2009)
25
. The 
borderline was not drawn in the middle of the river but three elbow-lengths (wa) away 
from the Siamese riverbank. Today, all of the small islets in the Hueang River therefore 
belong to Lao territory.  
During my research, the fact that the borderline within the Hueang River was three 
elbow-lengths away from the Thai riverbank was a well-known fact among the boat 
operators who worked at the checkpoints in my research area. However, it made little 
difference to their everyday practices. The boat operators described it more as a 
                                                 
25
 The maps of 1904 and 1907 would become relevant once more in 1987 when fighting broke out 
between Thai and Lao army troops south of my research area on the basis of different interpretations with 
regard to the borderline’s exact location (Chapter 2). 
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historical fact rather than a political reality. As described in the introductory chapter, 
boat operators and local residents from both sides used the river for transporting people 
and goods, for fishing, bathing, playing, and as a water resource for irrigation. So while 
the nation-state border between Sayaboury and Loei came into being on maps in the 
early 19
th
 century, it had yet to have an effect on the everyday practices of the local 
population. 
 
Figure 6: Thai-Lao border along upper Mekong River in 1904/1907 (St 
John 1998: 17) 
The story of the demarcation of the borderline in my research area does not end here 
though. During the Second World War Siam was able to gain temporary control over 
Sayaboury, annexing it in 1941 and retroceding it to France in 1945 (Figure 7). Over the 
course of these four years, the Siamese government built a road from Ken Thao to 
Sayaboury, which further facilitated transportation and regional trade. The government 
also imposed the Siamese currency (baht) as the main currency of exchange (Laffort and 
Dufumier 2006). During my fieldwork, the baht was still widely used in Sayaboury’s 
borderland districts in addition to the Lao kip despite the Lao government’s efforts to 
restrict the usage of the Thai baht. 
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Figure 7: Territory in upper Mekong region annexed by Thailand between 
1941 and 1945 (St John 1998: 20) 
In addition to the Thai monarchy’s efforts of territorialisation (border demarcation and 
provincial system) and bureaucratisation (central administration), processes of 
bordering also took place at the level of identity formation. The Thai and Lao royal 
families had always been involved in each other’s affairs and were linked by marriage 
and dynastic bonds for many years. Their relationship, however, was marked by 
historical struggles for power and particularly the war of 1827 provides evidence for the 
Lao royalty’s resistance to Thai expansionist campaigns (Mayoury 1994: 4f). Although 
they were part of the same tai language family, furthermore, the Siamese kings often 
emphasised their feeling of superiority against the Lao. In the mid-19
th
 century, King 
Mongkut still described the Lao as “slaves” with a “barbarian culture” (Mayoury 1994: 
4; Streckfuss 1993: 132f).  
At the same time, however, the Siamese kings celebrated the fact that they wielded 
power over a heterogeneous population (Streckfuss 1993: 132f; Streckfuss 2012: 419f). 
During this time the marker for social standing was not so much ethnicity than what the 
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elite deemed to be “civil” (the populations of the mueang) and “uncivil” (the hill and 
forest dwellers) (see Thongchai 2000; Renard 2000)
26
. When the European colonial 
powers showed an interest in the area in the late 19
th
 century, the Siamese kings made 
no effort to hide that they were exerting suzerainty over areas beyond the Chao Phraya 
River Basin (north of Bangkok) that were predominantly populated by non-Thai groups 
(Streckfuss 2012).  
The European colonial powers and particularly the French, however, used a “racial 
logic” 27  to interpret the differentiation between Thai and non-Thai groups, thereby 
essentialising the traits and senses of belonging of these groups. Within Siam, Thais 
were in fact a minority when compared against non-Thai groups. The French therefore 
used this differentiation to call into question the Siamese’s suzerainty over much of 
their kingdom, including the Lao areas. The Siamese, in turn, were quick to adapt the 
racial framework of the Europeans to their own advantage by stressing the shared 
heritage of the Thai and Lao and depicting the Lao as part of the “Thai race” (chon chat 
chat thai) (Streckfuss 2012: 307f).  
While these processes of social boundary making did not influence the outcome of the 
first border agreement of 1893, they did have an effect on the population censuses that 
followed, but also paved the way for the way nationalism and citizenship rights were set 
up in Thailand over the following decades
28
. In his analysis of the censuses of Siam, 
Streckfuss demonstrates how this new “racial unity” meant that in the census of 1912, 
89.3% of Siam’s population was counted as Siamese, even though 43.5% of it was 
actually Lao (2012: 308). Commissioners were sent to the Lao areas to impress upon the 
local power holders that they should describe themselves as Thai rather than Lao. 
Where state schools had been established, furthermore, the curriculum was also adapted 
to include lessons on how to “behave appropriately for a Thai” (Streckfuss 2012: 309). 
These assimilationist policies of the Siamese were met with some resistance by the Lao 
                                                 
26
 There was extraordinary diversity in the Chao Phraya River Basin as well as in the Khorat plateau with 
peasants from all across the region and an increasing number of Chinese immigrants in Bangkok and its 
surroundings. In Laos, there were constant encounters between different ethnic groups in highlands and 
lowlands. Ayutthaya borrowed cultural and ritual elaborations as well as the style of the courts of Europe 
while Lao courts adopted those of the Ayutthayan court (Evans 2002: 37). 
27
 Streckfuss uses the notion of “racial logic” to describe the assumption that a geographical and political 
entity can only be a nation if it is comprised of a people of the same race, culture, and language. 
28
 Thai citizenship (sanchat thai) was henceforth described as belonging to the Thai race/ethnicity (chuea 
chat thai). By conflating nationality and citizenship with race and ethnicity, Siam homogenised an 
ethnically diverse kingdom (Streckfuss 1993: 142). See also Pinkaew (2015) for the historical 
development of Thai citizenship.  
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living on the Khorat Plateau (Thailand’s Northeast), first in the form of the “holy man 
rebellion” (phumibun) in 1901-1902, and later through the adoption of the ethno-
regional identity of Isan rather than the national identity of Thai (Keyes 1967)
29
.  
Located on the western fringes of Northeast Thailand, the inhabitants of my research 
area speak a Lao dialect that is similar to that spoken in Luang Prabang. During my 
research in the Thai border villages, the dialect was referred to either as the “Loei 
language” (phasa loei) or the “local language” (phasa thongthin) and very rarely as Lao 
(phasa lao). On the Lao side it was described as Lao (phasa lao) and sometimes also as 
the “local language” (phasa thongthin). There seemed to be a strong distinction between 
Thai and Lao not only in terms of language description but also in terms of identity 
construction. My interlocutors always described themselves either as Thai (khon thai) or 
Lao (khon lao). As the teachers in Ban Thong School explained to me, a Lao born 
resident of Thailand was still considered Lao if both parents were Lao. If one of their 
parents was born on the Thai side, however, they could be considered Thai. This 
complex interplay of birth place, heritage, and residency in the construction of this 
border population’s identity was clearly a product of the Thai (and later also the 
French/Lao) governments’ efforts to create a unified “imagined community” (Anderson 
2006 [1983]).  
In the ethnically heterogeneous Laos of the early 20
th
 century, however, the French did 
not initially prioritise the forging of a national identity. Until the Second World War, the 
French government perceived Laos more as a resource rich annex to Vietnam than as a 
separate unity worthy of specific attention (Rigg 2009: 6). Keyes suggests that by the 
1930s, “the historical experience of Lao in northeastern Thailand had diverged 
significantly from that of the Lao living on the right bank of the Mekong who were 
under French rule” (2000: 211). Keyes also notes elsewhere, however, that in 
Thailand’s rural areas, the Thai government had a more profound influence only from 
the 1930s (which applies also to my research area). After the overthrow of the absolute 
monarchy, subsequent Thai governments further promoted the establishment of state 
schools in rural villages. The local monastery’s education was thus replaced by a 
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 Today, the older generation of Northeasterners has been found to still identify with the Lao in Laos, 
while the younger population uses the term Thai Isan or simply Thai to describe their identity. In doing 
so, the younger generation strongly differentiates itself from the Lao in Laos (McCargo and Krisadawan 
2004: 233). In his study, McCargo and Krisadawan found that “Isan people were proud of having 
surpassed Laos, of being more sophisticated and civilised”, while themselves being looked down upon by 
Central Thais and described as “country bumpkins” (bannok) (McCargo and Krisadawan 2004: 231). 
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national curriculum based on the standardised Thai language and a compulsory primary 
education of four years (Keyes 2014: 9; Waraiporn 2007: 264).  
In 1960, compulsory primary education in Thailand was raised to seven years but 
several of my interlocutors had received only the initial four years of primary education. 
This includes my interlocutors on the Lao side of the Hueang River who had gone to 
school on the Thai side during that time. With the nation-state border remaining fairly 
porous until 1975 and the Lao education system not as established yet in Sayaboury, 
several villagers on the Lao side went to school across the border by either walking 
through the Hueang River or by using self-made wooden bridges to cross over on a 
daily basis. In doing so, these Lao border residents received an education based on the 
Thai national ideology that sought to integrate the rural areas into the Thai nation-state. 
I suggest that this reinforced the already strong bond between the residents of both sides 
of the Hueang River but also the Lao border population’s affinity to Thailand. 
Thailand’s nationalist ideology was promulgated particularly during the military 
government of Phibun Songkhram (1938-1944 and 1948-1957). Phibul’s government is 
much associated with a pan-Thai nationalism that envisioned Laos and other regions as 
part of a ‘Greater Siam’. The change of Siam’s name to Thailand in 1939 was but one 
manifestation of this national culture policy that aimed to unite all Tai speaking people 
under Thailand’s control, especially those under British and French rule (including the 
Lao) (Reynolds 2002: 5f). Ivarsson suggests that this was a forbearer of Thailand’s 
campaign during World War II to reclaim the territories it perceived to have “lost” to 
the French and British in 1893, 1904 and 1907 including Sayaboury (2008: 71). While 
Thailand was in fact able to annex Sayaboury (and Champassak in the south of Laos) 
for a short period from 1941-1945, the French also began a nationalist campaign in Laos 
in 1941, which had the aim of dissociating the Lao from the Thai. 
The nationalist campaign employed by the French in Laos involved the standardisation 
of a written Lao language, the printing of a newspaper that promoted the nationalist idea 
as well as the construction of railways that connected Laos with the rest of Indochina 
and de-linked it from Siam. National symbols were also introduced such as the national 
flag and the national anthem (Ivarsson 2008). Alongside the slow but gradual efforts of 
the French, however, a young Lao lowland elite had emerged in Vientiane that, under 
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Prince Phetsarath, was calling not only for the unification of Laos but for a Laos that 
was separate from Indochina (Pholsena 2006: 88f).  
The Lao independence movement’s efforts were side-lined by the Second World War, 
during which Laos came under Japanese domination. King Sisavangvong used the war 
to declare Laos’ independence in 1945 but the French reasserted control over Laos in 
1946. After Laos’ independence in 1954, the Royal Lao Government (RLG) and the 
lowland Lao elite became increasingly threatened by the communist movement of the 
Pathet Lao. The country was soon drawn into the Vietnam War, in which not only the 
different factions within Laos but also the USA and the Thai government became 
involved. Partly due to these political developments, the nationalist campaign in Laos 
was not only very different but also had a much lower impact on the population that it 
did in Thailand (see further Pholsena 2006: 86f).  
Many Thais lament the “loss of their Lao territories” still today, perceiving Laos as part 
of a “Greater Thailand” (Pholsena and Banomyong 2006: 62). The common phrase used 
in Thailand to denote the Thai-Lao relationship is therefore ban phi mueang nong (the 
home of the elder brother, the home of the younger brother) (Pholsena and Banomyong 
2006: 60). The Lao, however, prefer to use the term ban kai heuang kieng 
(neighbouring countries). Countering Thailand’s often patrimonial attitude towards 
Laos, the current Lao government continues to promote an image of Thailand as 
expansionist, corrupt and narcissistic (Pholsena and Banomyong 2006: 64f; Rehbein 
2007: 55).  
Despite efforts of creating a social rift between the Thai in Thailand (including the Lao 
in Thailand’s Northeast, which Thailand sought to assimilate) and the Lao in Laos, the 
border villagers in my research area continued to interact and identify with each other. 
According to my interlocutors, not only were most of the villagers engaged in small-
trading activities across the Hueang River before 1975 but they were also able to draw 
on kinship and other social networks to facilitate this process and improve their 
livelihoods. 
LIFE ALONG THE RIVER DURING THE CIVIL WAR IN LAOS 
After the Second World War the anti-French independence movement in Vietnam 
instigated a communist liberation movement in Laos, which gave rise to the Pathet Lao 
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movement. By the time of Laos’ independence in 1954, the Pathet Lao had brought a 
considerable part of Laos under its control. It was supported particularly by the upland 
ethnic minorities while the French-backed Royal Lao Government (RLG) dominated the 
lowland population as well as Sayaboury. The USA started backing the RLG already in 
the 1950s and actively intervened in Laos from the 1960s. Thailand was also a key 
player in the war in Laos. Taking a strong anti-communist stance under Field Marshal 
Sarit, it hosted American air bases and army facilities, and engaged in covert operations 
inside Laos (Sutayut 2012: 186). With the help of the USA and Thailand, the RLG was 
able to control the Lao borderland including Sayaboury until the victory of the Pathet 
Lao in 1975.  
Thailand not only supported the USA, it also sought the USA’s support in fighting the 
communist threat within Thailand itself. The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) had 
emerged in the 1940s and gained stronghold especially in Thailand’s Northeast where 
its programme of radical change was appealing to the ethnic Lao population who felt 
alienated by the Thai government. It was also appealing to many ethnic minority groups 
in the highlands who felt repressed by Thai authorities (Renard 2001; Delang 2003). 
Although the CPT only reached its peak in 1976, it already led small-scale guerrilla 
operations before then (Keyes 1989: 108). One of the first big counter-insurgency 
operations of the Thai army against the CPT was conducted in the three-provinces area 
of Loei, Phitsanulok and Petchabun. It failed, however, due the unfamiliarity of the 
soldiers with the counter-insurgency operations and the difficult terrain (De Beer 1978: 
146f). The CPT was therefore able to continue its operations from its camp in Phu Hin 
Rong Kla, Loei province, 90km away from the Lao border
30
. At the same time, many 
pro-communist Hmong villages in Loei and the surrounding provinces were destroyed 
by the Thai paramilitary during this time. They often fled across the border to 
Sayaboury province
31
. 
In response to the uprising CPT within Thailand, the civil war in Laos, and the 
insurgence activities of other groups along the Burmese border in the 1950s, the Thai 
government established the paramilitary force of the Border Patrol Police (BPP). Its 
aims were to counter communist insurgents along Thailand’s borders by training local 
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 Today, the area is an open-air museum with exhibits from the Communist camp from the 1960s and 
1970s. 
31
 In Laos, most Hmong joined forces with the US and were mobilised by the US to fight against the 
Pathet Lao. Some Hmong however decided to join the Communist forces (Hamilton-Merritt 1993: xiii). 
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villagers and creating border security volunteer teams such as the Volunteer Defence 
Corps (Or Sor) (Renard 2001: 124). The BPP received training from the CIA and 
advisers from the US Army Special Forces (Peleggi 2007: 66). From 1978, it was 
assisted by paramilitary Rangers (thahan phran). Both the Or Sor and the thahan phran 
were still active in my research area during the time of my fieldwork in 2011/2012
32
. 
However, there are also many accounts of the BPP abusing its power within the 
highlands as well as of its engagement in the opium trade (Bo Gua 1975; Delang 2003). 
In fact, Peleggi (2007) describes how the Thai government had gained control of the 
opium trade in the 1950s and that it provided a major source of revenue for the Thai 
government and the CIA-backed Hmong in their fight against the Pathet Lao
33
. The 
Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) who controlled the distribution of opium across the 
Golden Triangle were also given sanctuary by Thailand after being forced out of Burma 
(see also Kislenko 2004). 
It thus becomes clear how the Thai government also cooperated with a variety of anti-
government and insurgent groups of neighbouring governments (e.g. CIA-backed 
Hmong along the Thai-Lao border, KMT of China along the Thai-Burmese border) in 
more or less covert operations and provided refuge to them. Battersby describes these 
relations as a “complex knot of trans-state politico-military linkages” (1998: 474), 
which effectively resulted in the Thai government losing its monopoly of violence over 
its border areas until the 1980s. Instead, groups like the CPT and the KMT were 
involved in regulating the Thai border areas in addition to the Thai army, police, BPP 
and other paramilitary groups. Thai border enforcement during this time was therefore 
less aimed at control over trade and immigration than at securing the core of the 
kingdom from local resistance groups. The Thai government also used its “politico-
military linkages” to advance the interests of the upper ranks of the civil service and the 
military.  
From the end of World War II until 1973, Thailand underwent a succession of Field 
Marshals as prime ministers, which increased the military’s dominance within the Thai 
polity. While the Ministry of Interior (MOI) controlled all aspects of provincial and 
district administrations, local officials often continued to adopt a kin mueang-style rule, 
thereby extracting not only taxes but also money or labour for their own personal gain 
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 I will elaborate their background further in chapter 5 and their involvement in small-scale trade in 
chapter 7. 
33
 For an account of the CIA’s involvement in the drug trade see McCoy (1991). 
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(Keyes 1989: 142-143; Hewison and Maniemai 2000: 197; Arghiros 2001). In my 
research area, my interlocutors remembered that state actors only exerted a minor 
influence on the local population and its activities during this time. State actors included 
local authorities such as village headmen and the police but not any insurgent or 
paramilitary groups. This was the case on the Thai as well as the Lao side and facilitated 
the free flow of small-scale trade across the Hueang River during this time
34
.  
With regard to foreign actors, however, one of my interlocutors recalled the CIA 
observing the Hueang River area: “Before the Revolution [the communist takeover] 
there were no foreign soldiers here. There was only the US that sometimes came to look 
at what was going on and to report back to their offices.” He then evoked with pride that 
he was working with the CIA himself: “They [The US] had officers (luknong) who 
came to get information. These officers were from the CIA. The Americans were in 
Thailand and sent the CIA to get information along the border to Laos. They wanted to 
know if there were any Red Lao [Communists] and if yes, where exactly they were and 
where their checkpoints were.” According to my interlocutor, he was asked by the CIA 
officers to observe the border area and provide them with written reports. He 
remembered regularly sending such reports to the CIA’s offices in Udon Thani.  
From these accounts, it can be gathered that during the time between the Second World 
War and the communist takeover in Laos, some parts of the Thai-Lao border were under 
control of the Thai and Lao government and their armies or paramilitary groups, that 
other parts were occupied by insurgent groups such as the CPT, and again other parts 
largely unaffected by any of these groups. Located on the western fringes of Laos and 
surrounded by the mountains of Loei and Sayaboury, the border area between these two 
provinces seemed to have been fairly peripheral to the war. For General Vang Pao, a 
prominent Hmong leader of the anti-communist forces who worked closely with the US, 
Sayaboury was seen as a viable escape route to the Thai side during the war (Hamilton-
Merritt 1993). The border population in Thali and Ken Thao districts were thus able to 
continue their livelihoods as usual during this time. This is also evidenced by my 
interlocutors’ memories. 
                                                 
34
 Although my interlocutors emphasised the free flow of people and goods across the border during this 
time, it can be assumed that this flow was regulated by non-state actors (if not also state actors) based on 
a variety of social factors. This kind of data, however, was not obtained as part of this research and I 
suggest conducting further research on this in the future. 
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Most of my Thai and Lao interlocutors were not old enough to remember the period of 
the Second World War but nearly all of them remembered the decade(s) before the 
communist takeover in Laos in 1975. In fact, a certain nostalgia around this historical 
period became obvious as I asked questions regarding the contemporary border situation 
and cross-border trade. Many of my interlocutors recalled an open border that allowed 
the villagers on either side of the river to live, work, and engage closely with each other.  
According to a member of the Thai Volunteer Border Militia, villagers were aware of 
the fact that the river marked the border between Thailand and Laos but this did not 
have an impact on the movement or daily activities of border residents. In a focus group 
I conducted with several elderly border residents, they were reminiscent of the ease of 
cross-border movement before 1975: “In the dry season, the local bus took people from 
Ken Thao district to Loei. During the rainy season the local bus couldn’t cross over the 
river so people crossed over by boat instead. Everyone knew each other. You knew 
whether someone was from the Lao or the Thai side but some people who had houses 
on both sides had two nationalities (chueachat, lit. translation: race/nationality). You 
could stay over on either side, however you wished. Thai people would take their Lao 
friends to eat in Mueang Loei. Nowadays that’s not possible anymore. You can’t just 
stay over on the other side. You have to get permission (anuyat) first”. A female trader 
further explained: “It was very convenient (sabai sabai) back then. You could go and 
live wherever you wanted”. 
In fact, several of my elderly interlocutors moved back and forth across the river when 
they were young. An elderly lady, Noi, who also lived in the same village as I and who 
accompanied me to the Lao side many times, described how she used to live on the 
“other side” when she was young. Her family owned a rice field on the Lao side where 
they worked while Noi went to primary school in Ban Thong. Her parents had built her 
a small bamboo bridge so that she could cross over the river every morning and 
afternoon. One of the village headmen, furthermore, lived on the Thai side in Ban Sing 
with his parents when he was young but on Fridays, he would cross over the river to the 
Lao side to stay with his grandparents and help them on their farm. Many cross-border 
marriages were also established during this time, although it must be questioned 
whether these marriages should be depicted as “cross-border” at all since the border was 
not experienced as a separating force during this time.  
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On the contrary, the river that marks the border was (and still is to a certain extent) a 
place where villagers from both sides came together and met, e.g. while fishing, bathing 
and playing in the water. It was a connecting rather than a separating force. A CIA 
report of 1968 (CIA 1968)
35
 confirms this situation along the Hueang River during the 
1960s. It is unclear what sources the report is based on but it noted that: “The present 
boundary [border between Thailand and Laos] traverses rugged terrain inhabited by hill 
people who pay little attention to it. They commonly have family ties on both sides of 
the border. Some villagers are situated on one side of the border and have fields on the 
other. Villagers in Kene Thao (sic!), in southern Sayaboury, reportedly cross the Nam 
Hueang [Hueang River] to a well on the Thai side to obtain drinking water. The hill 
people in some sections of the Sayaboury border areas trade in Thai towns that are 
closer to them than Sayaboury, Paklay, or other towns on the Laos (sic!) side of the 
border” (1968: 69).  
Indeed many Lao villages situated along the Thai border were better connected to Thai 
towns than to the larger Lao towns such as Vientiane or Luang Prabang. This inevitably 
resulted in more cross-border networks than domestic ones among the border population 
(e.g. Rigg 2005: 42f). But it was not only a matter of proximity that the population on 
the Lao side of the Hueang River was better connected to Thai towns. It was also due to 
the road infrastructure between Sayaboury’s border area and Mueang Loei that was until 
recently much better than between the border area and Luang Prabang, affecting not 
only the movement of people but also that of trading goods. 
Although the Thai government had built a road connecting Ken Thao with Mueang 
Sayaboury already during the Second World War, the main means of transportation 
between Thailand and Laos in this area remained the Mekong River, with the route 
leading via Chiang Khan (50km east of my research area) and Paklay (50km north of 
my research area). The Thai border town of Chiang Khan was already an administrative 
centre in the 19
th
 century and a viable alternative trade route between Bangkok and Laos 
(alternative to the trade route via Vientiane) (Hafner 1983: 65). In the 1970s Chiang 
Khan was a regional centre for cross-border trade, with its cotton mill mostly handling 
cotton from Laos and its sawmill handling much of the illegally cut timber from Laos 
(Haftner 1983: 68).  
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 This document used to be labeled as ‘secret’ but is now available for download on the CIA’s website. 
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My research area was also used as a trade route for illegally cut timber from Laos and 
several sawmills were built on the Lao side
36
. With my research area connected to 
Chiang Khan via the Hueang River, furthermore, farmers were incited to produce cash 
crops for the Thai market, consisting of seed-cotton, flax, jute, and roselle (Laffort and 
Dufumier 2006). Cotton was the most important cash crop, however, with the French 
Textile Company in Loei providing credit and supplies. Laffort and Dufumier (2006) 
report that the production of unginned cotton in southern Sayaboury increased from 200 
tons in 1966 to 2,000 tons in 1971.   
The construction of all-weather roads throughout Loei province in the 1960s by 
Thailand’s Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) unit further facilitated trade across 
the Hueang River. In June 1969 a highway was completed that connected the border 
area with Mueang Loei (Lui 1973: 23). In Sayaboury province, a highway system 
replaced the Mekong River as a means of transportation only in the late 1990s. During 
my fieldwork, the highway from Ban Sawan to Mueang Sayaboury was still in progress 
(with several unfinished sections of unpaved road) and the bridge across the Mekong 
River that connects Sayaboury with Luang Prabang was only completed in 2013, just 
after the end of my fieldwork
37
. For the border population in southern Sayaboury it was 
therefore not only closer but also more convenient to travel to the Thai side than to 
Sayaboury or Luang Prabang. 
By the 1960s much of the border population was engaged in small-scale trade and was 
regularly travelling to Mueang Loei by bus. As mentioned above, the local bus departed 
on the Lao side, drove through the Hueang River (during the dry season) to Mueang 
Loei and back. With regard to consumer goods, Hafner (1983) provides ample evidence 
of a structured market system and competitive trade practices in southern Sayaboury 
province, particularly with regard to its cross-border trade with Loei province. Drawing 
on several studies undertaken by the United Nations Mekong Committee and the offices 
of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) between 1974 and 
1976, Hafner remarks how the border population of Sayaboury province received most 
of their consumer goods directly from Mueang Loei rather than via Chiang Khan. The 
major trade route of many consumer goods from Vientiane via the Mekong River was 
secondary to this border population (Figure 8).  
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 According to my interlocutors the sawmills were shut down in 1975. 
37
 The bridge was financed by the Lao government and through a loan from the Republic of Korea (Lao 
News Agency 2013). 
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Figure 8: Distribution networks for consumer goods marketed in the 
Paklay – Chiang Khan region in 1974-1975 (Hafner 1983: 70) 
These findings stand in contrast to the peasant economy based on subsistence ethics that 
was described by Scott (1976) as the dominant economic culture of Southeast Asia in 
the 1970s. The peasant economy is associated with reciprocity and the production of 
sufficient produce until the next harvest rather than on accumulation of surplus. While 
this may hold true for many of the villages situated in the highlands of Sayaboury 
province, it does not reflect the memories of the border population between Loei and 
Sayaboury province. 
With the proximity and accessibility of the Lao borderland to the Thai market in mind, 
some of my interlocutors also remembered the local socio-economic development as 
equal on both sides of the border during the decades before 1975. A wood trader in Ban 
Plee explained for example: “Before the communists came, Ban Plee and the Lao 
village across the river were one village. […] There were many shops on both sides.” 
Those who emphasised an equal development at the local level seemed to incorporate 
the Lao borderland into Thailand’s trajectory of socio-economic success rather than 
acknowledging the Lao side’s dependence on access to the Thai market. This would 
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change drastically with the communist takeover in 1975 and the reinforcement of the 
nation-state border by the Thai paramilitary.  
ON THE PERIPHERY OF CONTESTATION 
The objective of this chapter was to provide insight into how the nation-state border 
came into being before the communist takeover in Laos in 1975. By taking into account 
the different state and non-state actors that played a part in its becomings, the border 
area can be seen both as peripheral to the centres of state power but also as a centre of 
continued cross-border relations while there were contestations of state power in the 
surrounding areas. 
Up until the 19
th
 century when Southeast Asian polities were based on a centre-
periphery logic. In these polities, borders existed in the sense of the khetdaen, which 
had multiple meanings and functions that were very different to the modern nation-state 
border. They were administered not by the centre but at the local level and were, for the 
most part, ways of controlling people and passageways rather than territory. Loei and 
Sayaboury were not only sparsely populated during this time but also situated on the 
peripheries of larger mueang such as Lan Xang, Ayutthaya, and later Siam. The local 
princes collected taxes but otherwise did little to interfere in the everyday life of the 
peasantry. According to the local histories mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, 
the villages in my research area were established in the mid- to late 19
th
 century on the 
basis of the abundance of land. There is thus little evidence to suggest that the wars and 
displacements that characterised the surrounding Thai-Lao border area in 19
th
 century 
had a major effect on the Hueang River area.  
The transition of the Thai and Lao polities from a centre-periphery logic to a 
Westphalian nation-state model came in the form of gradual changes to the bureaucratic 
and administrative structures of the Siamese kingdom as well as in the form of 
artificially constructed national identities. These changes and national campaigns had 
already begun before the first border demarcation in 1893. Among other things, they 
included the introduction of a provincial system, the replacement of the kin mueang-
style government with a centralised bureaucracy, and the standardisation of the Thai 
language that was promoted in schools. In my rurally located research area these 
changes were implemented later rather than sooner, with Loei only becoming a province 
in 1907 and state schools only established in the 1930s. 
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The same can be said for the mapping of the border between Loei and Sayaboury, as 
Thailand perceived (and still perceives) Sayaboury province to be part of a Greater 
Thailand and strived to regain control over it. Although the first border agreement 
between Siam and French Laos was signed in 1893, the border between Loei and 
Sayaboury did not appear on a map until 1904 when Siam was forced to cede 
Sayaboury (and Champassak in southern Laos). Unlike many other parts of the Thai-
Lao border, however, the actual demarcation of the borderline in my research area was 
completed in 1923. In its pursuit to regain the territories Thailand had “lost” under the 
pressures of foreign powers, Thailand annexed Sayaboury for a brief period during the 
Second World War.  
In the early 20
th
 century, the border in my research area was a line on a map that marked 
the territorial division between Loei and Sayaboury and between Thailand and Laos. 
But its effect on the everyday life of people on the ground was only limited. During the 
civil war in Laos, the Thai-Lao border once again became a contested site with different 
actors such as the paramilitary and insurgent groups controlling different parts of the 
border. Although the CPT was active in Loei province and many Hmong supported the 
anti-communist forces in Sayaboury province, the war was not carried out anywhere 
near my research area. It was only after 1975 that the Hueang River was used as a viable 
escape route for many refugees and former government officials to Thailand.  
From a centre-periphery perspective, it seems that Loei and Sayaboury were situated on 
the periphery not only of the mueang of the 19
th
 century but also of the Thai and Lao 
nation-states of the 20
th
 century. Hafner even describes Loei province as a typical 
“bypassed area”, which is due to its physical isolation, neglect by central 
administrations and planning authorities, and few incentives for developmental 
investment (1983: 65f). At the same time, I have demonstrated the various activities that 
have been conducted across the Hueang River, ranging from cross-border marriages, 
school runs, and a variety of trading activities. In fact, as state schools were established 
in Loei province, a highway network constructed, and access to the international market 
facilitated, the border population of southern Sayaboury became even more drawn to 
Loei than to the adjacent Lao areas.  
When taking a closer look, it thus becomes clear how the border area along the Hueang 
River can also be seen as a centre of trade and social activities that attracted people and 
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goods from both sides of the river. Tucked away in the Loei valley, and situated along a 
tributary river to the great Mekong River, my research area can also be seen as a centre 
to which the displacements, wars, and state power were peripheral. According to the 
memories of my interlocutors, the nation-state border came into being as a place of 
connection and social activity that reinforced the bond between the people on either 
sides of the Hueang River. These memories exhibit an interesting reversal of the centre-
periphery dichotomy that is similar to the argument made by Scott (2009) when 
claiming that the people of the Southeast Asian highlands actively resisted state power 
rather than being forced into the periphery by it.  
The nostalgic memories of my interlocutors must, however, be seen in light of the 
changes that have happened since 1975, which I will present in the next chapter. They 
include the reinforcement of the border, an influx of refugees, insurgents, soldiers, and 
the paramilitary, and several changes to state regulation of the border since the opening 
of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. According to Boym, nostalgia helps mend the 
breaks in history and also helps us cope with the changing pace of modernity: “[…] 
there is a global epidemic of nostalgia, an affective yearning for a community with a 
collective memory, a longing for continuity in a fragmented world. Nostalgia inevitably 
reappears as a defense mechanism in a time of accelerated rhythms of life and historical 
upheavals” (Boym 2007: 10).  
While the memories of my interlocutors were certainly tainted by a longing for 
continuity, I suggest that the nostalgia around them was also used as a justification for 
the continuation of formal and informal, legal and illegal cross-border activities. As I 
will show in several of the chapters that follow, the conduct and toleration of such 
cross-border flows was validated by both state and non-state actors on the grounds of 
the historical bond, connection, and exchange of the people on either side of the Hueang 
River. As it becomes clear how important the historical context of the border is to 
understand the layers of meaning that make it what it is today and how it is used today, 
the next chapter will demonstrate the changing nature of the nation-state border from 
1975 to the time of my research in 2011/2012.  
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CHAPTER 2 
TRADING DESPITE AND BECAUSE OF THE BORDER  
 
IMPACTS AND EXPERIENCES OF CHANGING BORDER POLICIES 
This chapter highlights the different manifestations and effects of the border between 
1975 and the start of my fieldwork in 2011. Similar to the preceding chapter, I 
investigate the historical becomings of the border but while the previous chapter drew 
primarily on historical documents, this chapter uses ethnography to highlight the impact 
of changing border policies through the lens of those involved in small-scale trade. The 
narratives of my interlocutors bring to light how different parts of the border population 
have been differently affected by state regulations and policies. They also draw 
attention to the strategies traders applied to adapt to the new policies. Overall, my 
findings reveal that trade, particularly the small-scale trade in daily necessities, has 
always been a continuum throughout different manifestations of the Thai-Lao border 
that include restrictions and facilitations of cross-border flows. 
In this chapter, I focus particularly on three events that had a major effect on the border 
population between Loei and Sayaboury and its small-scale trading practices: The 
victory of the Pathet Lao in Laos in 1975, the opening of ports of toleration (jud phon 
pron) throughout the 1980s, and the construction of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge in 
2004. In the wake of the communist takeover in Laos in 1975, Thailand issued an 
economic embargo against Laos. The Hueang River area became militarised and the 
borderline heavily patrolled. As my findings will demonstrate, however, the Thai-Lao 
border was not simply closed as many scholars often suggest (e.g. Ivarsson et al. 1995; 
Bochaton 2015). According to my interlocutors, the border was almost never 
completely impermeable. Their narratives reveal how several villagers continued to 
conduct trade during this time by resisting and/or bribing local authorities and how Thai 
and Lao border officials differed in their enforcement of the border. Due to these 
continued activities, the official re-opening of the Thai-Lao border in the 1989 was not 
experienced by my interlocutors as a re-opening as such but as a continued regulation of 
the border by the state.  
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Along the Hueang River, so-called ports of toleration (jud phon pron) were created 
throughout the 1980s, i.e. checkpoints that facilitated and regulated the movement of 
people and goods between Thai and Lao border villages. There was no re-establishment 
of pre-1975 conditions. In his own research along the Thai-Lao border in the early 
1990s, in fact, Walker (2009: 101) found that Lao customs officials were now working 
harder than ever before. On the Thai side of the border, the checkpoints led to a boom as 
they allowed border markets to grow and local shops to flourish while the Lao border 
population became increasingly dependent on Thai border traders for access to daily 
necessities. 
By the time the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge opened in 2004, border residents in my 
research area had experienced a considerable change of border regulations and an influx 
of state institutions over the past two decades. After the Bridge opened, however, 
regulations changed again in that the Bridge became the official border-crossing site. 
Most ports of toleration were closed and border-crossers redirected to the Bridge where 
they could cross by car or shuttle taxi. As I will demonstrate, many Lao villagers and 
traders benefited from these new regulations while they had a largely negative impact 
on the Thai border population. I argue that the economic cooperation and market 
liberalisation that informs the opening of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge has not only 
created opportunities but has also had adverse effects on some parts of the Thai border 
population. 
Such a differentiated view on market liberalisation has also been adopted by Kusakabe 
(2004) in her article on women weavers and sticky rice box producers in the Thai-Lao 
borderland. Kusakabe shows how policies of liberalisation have created more obstacles 
for women than facilitations to advance their production. The co-presence and 
interrelation of securitisation and transnationalism along the border can lead to friction 
and contradictory processes of bordering (Tsing 2005; Walker 1999; Green 2010; 
Reeves 2014). These are often ignored by scholars who focus on processes of 
globalisation. Appadurai, for example, has explored processes of deterritorialisation, 
coining the terms “ethnoscapes”, “financescapes”, and “mediascapes” – irregular 
landscapes that create new imagined worlds. Such processes, he suggests, require a 
“reterritoralization within a new civic order, whose ideology of ethnic coherence and 
citizenship rights they are bound to disturb” (Appadurai 1996: 56).  
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By examining cross-border ties that supersede rigid borders, the literature on 
transnationalism has tried to overcome the assumption that the isomorphism of nation, 
state and society is the natural political form. Some have even proclaimed the demise of 
the nation-state (see for example Soysal 1994; Ohmae 1995). By focussing on the way 
borders are transgressed and become increasingly meaningless in a “borderless world”, 
such studies, however, tend to neglect the effects that borders continue to have 
alongside processes of globalisation and market liberalisation (Wimmer and Glick 
Schiller 2002). As I will demonstrate in this chapter, the border has not only changed in 
the way it has come into being but also in the effects it has had for different people. 
Since the opening of the Bridge, small-scale trading practices have become more 
variegated and diffuse with the different types of traders and trade routes that are used.  
“YOU CANNOT SIMPLY CLOSE THE BORDER!”  
Already before the victory of the Pathet Lao in December 1975, Thai-Lao relations 
deteriorated to the extent that the Thai government placed an economic embargo on 
Laos by banning 273 “strategic items” from being exported to Laos (Pheuiphanh 1990: 
163). After the communist victory, Thailand not only continued its embargo but also 
accommodated and trained Lao reactionaries who defected to the Thai side (Stuart-Fox 
1997). In doing so, the Thai side of the border became an ideological boundary that was 
highly regulated and that restricted movement to those with the “right” political views.  
On the ground, this meant an increased military and state presence along the border. 
According to a group of elderly border residents: “There were both Lao and Thai 
soldiers here during the revolution [the communist takeover in Laos]. The Thai soldiers 
would stay by the river and watch. They made sure that no one crosses the border 
anymore.” In addition to the already existing Border Defense Volunteers (Or Sor), the 
military was also deployed to the border during this time. Mayoury (1994) suggests that 
the decision to “close” the border with Laos in this way was a decision made by the 
Thai military in order to maintain its supremacy in domestic politics. The Thai military 
was dominating the government since shortly after the Second World War but after the 
student uprising of 1973 it was struggling to regain its power. From this perspective, the 
Thai-Lao border was not only an ideological boundary and an “economic and political 
weapon” (Rigg 1998: 168) against Laos, but also a tool for domestic power plays.  
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With Laos’ new regime in place, thousands of members of the old regime were 
dispatched to re-education camps, or so-called “seminars” (Evans 1998: 6). For many of 
these former state officials, insurgents, as well as for Lao intellectuals, the Hueang 
River turned into a viable escape route. According to the headman of Ban Sing, about 3-
400 refugees fled to his small border village alone. Most of them had relatives on the 
Thai side whom they could stay with temporarily. They then continued their journey to 
the refugee camp in Ban Vinai in the north of Loei province where most of them were 
resettled in third countries such as USA, Canada, and France
38
. Instead of fleeing to the 
refugee camp across the border, some former government officials and soldiers also 
formed resistance groups and continued to fight the Lao government from the Thai side 
(see also High 2009: 88). Several of my interlocutors remembered the Lao ku xat, a 
collective name for a number of resistance groups established by Lao refugees after 
1975. These groups operated on a small-scale basis, launching hit-and-run attacks from 
the Thai side as well as armed propaganda (Stuart-Fox 2004). Several village headmen 
clearly positioned themselves in favour of these resistance groups and one of them 
explained the deceitfulness of the new Lao government towards these groups: “Back 
then, we were helping those persons [the Lao ku xat] but some of them were lured to 
cross back over. They [LPRP] said it’s going to be fine when they cross back over, that 
they could come back to see their family. And when they returned they arrested them 
and put them into jail until death.”  
Another village headman said: “There was also a Thai man and he was a spy…his code 
was ‘33’. He worked together with the Lao ku xat. He met a Lao woman by the time he 
was already old, 60 or 70 years old, and not working as a spy anymore. When he and his 
girlfriend went to Laos, he was caught. I never saw him again since then. He got thrown 
away somewhere. We can’t find him.” The headman’s accounts demonstrate how the 
border in my research area became a line of safety for anti-communist defectors from 
Laos. For the Thai border population, these experiences and anecdotes created an image 
of the new Lao regime as unruly and deceitful. The distrust and fear of the Lao 
government contributed a layer of separation at the nation-state level to the becoming of 
the border in my research area. In fact, both Thai and Lao interlocutors distinguished 
between the Lao government on the one hand and local authorities on the other, 
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 By 1986, the Ban Vinai refugee camp was accommodating 45,000 people, of which 43,000 belonged to 
the ethnic minority of the Hmong who had lived in the highlands of Sayaboury province and supported 
the US during the civil war (Long 1993).  
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attributing distrust and deceitfulness to the Lao government rather than to the local 
authorities whom they often knew well (Chapter 4). The owner of a small business in a 
Thai border village, for example, emphasised China’s influence on the new Lao 
government and clearly stated: “The Red Chinese are not the same as Lao policemen”39. 
Such a distinction between the national and local level of the state highlights the multi-
layered meanings of the nation-state border and the practices of the people who live 
along it. At the national level, the border became a separation line between the different 
ideologies and policies of the Thai and Lao governments while at the local level, the 
border population’s everyday activities that were regulated by local authorities 
continued to exist to a certain extent. In fact, Lao authorities had a personal interest in 
gaining access to Thai goods for their own survival and therefore contributed to the 
flourishing of the clandestine trade in daily necessities during this time.  
In the context of Thai-Lao hostility and ideological conflict, restrictions on cross-border 
trade were implemented unilaterally by the Thai state. With 80% of Laos’ trade passing 
through Thailand in 1975, the restrictions were used as an economic and political 
weapon against the new Lao regime. However, while the export of “strategic” items was 
banned along the entire Thai-Lao border until 1989, restrictions on other kinds of cross-
border flows varied over time and 20% of Lao trade was still passing through Thailand 
(Rigg 1995: 158). In fact, the complete “closure” of the border was actually an anomaly. 
Rigg reports that between 1975 and 1989 the border was “closed” on only four 
occasions, each following a border incident such as shelling or direct encounters 
between Thai and Lao soldiers (1995: 159). While Rigg makes reference to the 
“closure” of the Thai-Lao border as a whole, I further suggest that the complete 
restriction of cross-border movement during these periods was differently enforced 
along different parts of the 1,700km long Thai-Lao border. Where Rigg, for example, 
states that the periods of closure lasted for approximately one month, my interlocutors 
remembered such periods to last between four days and one month in my research area. 
“The border was open or closed depending on Thai-Lao relations. It was open, closed, 
open, closed… When there was fighting in the area the border was usually closed”, one 
of the village headmen explained
40
.  
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 Historically, it was not the Red Chinese that took over Laos but the Communist party of Laos (the 
Pathet Lao), which was nevertheless influenced by the Communists in China (Hamilton-Merritt 1993). 
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 Many of my interlocutors specifically remembered the border war between December 1987 and 
February 1988, which was carried out in the area of Ban Rom Klao, located in today’s Phitsanulok 
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In his own study on a Thai border town along the Mekong River, Walker found only 
one short period of prohibited cross-border movement in the late 1970s during which 
border-crossers were shot by Thai border guards (Walker 1999: 58, 2009: 110). In 
Walker’s study, the border-crossers who were shot were traders who delivered goods 
across the border for retail purposes. None of my interlocutors had memories of people 
being shot while crossing the river during the “closed” periods. But they did remember 
being threatened by Thai authorities. Phor Phapep, a Lao trader at the central market in 
Ban Sawan, for example, remembered: “The Lao officers didn’t have a problem with 
cross-border trade. It was the Thais who weren’t happy about it. They would sometimes 
shout at us: ‘You are not allowed to do that! You are not allowed to cross over!’ These 
were the soldiers who said this. So we would have to watch out for the soldiers and if 
there were none of them there, then we would quickly rush across the river [laughing]. 
We had to sneak over somewhere (lobkanthi) [laughing]. It was a lot of fun! We used a 
boat to cross over with all the goods.” Traders thus found ways of evading state 
authorities. 
At the same time, the Lao side’s limited access to Thai goods and the dangers of 
smuggling “strategic items”, which included sugar and sewing needles (Pheuiphanh 
1985: 1257), meant that the small-scale trade of daily necessities became a lucrative 
business for the Thai traders who engaged in it. A border resident who was an Or Sor 
during that time explained to me that Thai traders would buy something in Mueang Loei 
for 5 baht and sell it to Lao traders for 20 baht, making a profit of 300%. A female 
trader who sold blankets at one of the border markets during the time of my research, 
furthermore, said she was only selling daily necessities to Lao traders during the 1970s 
because it was very profitable. Her strategy of evading border authorities was to 
exchange goods with her customers in the Hueang River. They would bathe or swim in 
the river at the same time and when meeting each other she would provide her 
counterpart with the goods they ordered. With Lao villagers being cash-strapped during 
this time, she often received gold instead of money in exchange for the goods.  
                                                                                                                                               
province. The conflict was based on the different interpretation of the treaty of 1907 by the Thai and Lao 
governments, which left the demarcation of the borderline between Sayaboury province and the adjoining 
Thai provinces unclear. Fighting only broke out however, after a Thai logging company stopped bribing 
the Lao militia in favour of the Thai paramilitary (Stuart-Fox 1989; Wijeyewardene 1990). My 
interlocutors remembered soldiers passing through the area and hearing the sounds of gunshots and 
bombs in the far distance. They emphasised that there was never any fighting in my research area though.  
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When traders did encounter Thai authorities, the outcome varied according to the 
individual state actor and the types and amount of goods traded. The former Or Sor in 
my research area, for example, recalled intercepting many traders when crossing the 
border: “If we caught them then they couldn’t make any money because we would seize 
all their goods. They had to pay a fine as well. The situation was like this for many 
years”. But not all encounters ended like this. An argument I heard several times from 
both state and non-state actors on the Thai side was that if cross-border trade 
discontinued, the population on the Lao side (including the Thai population’s kin) 
would have nothing to eat and die, so trade had to continue to some extent. As described 
in the last chapter, the population in southern Sayaboury and Loei had established 
strong kinship relations and trading networks with each other. The Lao side was 
dependent on the direct link to the Thai side across the Hueang River for access to 
consumer goods and daily necessities. 
The argument that trade had to continue on humanitarian grounds was most strongly 
emphasised by a former Or Sor who, during my fieldwork, was regularly transporting 
people and goods across an unmarked border-crossing site near Ban Donmai. When 
asked whether the border was actually closed after 1975 he exclaimed: “You cannot 
simply close the border, Sarah! You have to smuggle (laklob) goods across the border 
then. If you don’t smuggle goods across the border then they [Lao villagers] have 
nothing to eat.” When recalling this time, the Or Sor expressed the moral dilemma of 
performing his duties as a border guard while at the same time empathising with the 
cross-border activities of the border population he himself was embedded in. He thus 
justified his personal strategy of patrolling the border as follows: “They are all relatives 
on both sides of the border so you can’t be so strict. But sometimes you had to catch 
people; you can’t just let everyone go.” He would arrest drug smugglers as well as 
traders with large amounts of fresh foods such as chicken, pork and corn. With regard to 
other daily necessities he only arrested those who had more goods than they could carry 
themselves: “If you had too many goods then you had to smuggle them across in secret 
places. But you could also just go across three times to get all the stuff across. No 
problem! If you wanted to smuggle things across you just had to watch out for the 
authorities and then go across when they weren’t there.”  
It thus becomes clear how at the local level, the implementation of the Thai 
government’s policies to restrict cross-border flows not only varied but was also 
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influenced by the authorities’ embeddedness in the local border community. The border 
thus became an ideological boundary between the territories of the Thai and Lao 
governments, which resulted in the militarisation of the border area and increased 
regulations on cross-border movement. From the perspective of trade, the border 
became a barrier for many traders and an opportunity for smuggling practices with high 
profit margins.  
THE GOLDEN AGE OF SMALL-SCALE TRADE  
In the early 1980s, it was clear that Laos’ brand of economic socialism had failed to 
provide an improvement in economic conditions in the country (Joiner 1988: 55). Many 
Lao residents had already fled communist hardship and migrated to Thailand (see also 
Bounlonh 2006). As economic failure was threatening political stability, the Lao 
People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) was forced to make adjustments: it abandoned 
central planning and increased administrative and financial autonomy at the subnational 
level. Meanwhile, the provincial chambers of commerce were lobbying the Thai 
government to resolve border trade issues with Laos (Walker 1999: 70). In my research 
area, the provinces of Sayaboury and Loei cooperated with each other to establish so-
called ports of toleration. They were usually established where a Thai and Lao village 
were situated directly across from each other and where border residents had close 
social relations with each other. As temporary border checkpoints, they facilitated trade 
and the Lao border population’s access to daily necessities. They also enabled the 
establishment of border markets on the Thai side (Walker 1999: 70). The first “port of 
toleration” in my research area opened in 1982 in Ban Sing. During my fieldwork, a 
supervisor within the Thai paramilitary remembered the opening in detail: “Before the 
checkpoint opened, there were lots of people crossing over here already. Since there 
was an apparent wish and need for the people on either side of the border to cross over 
the river, the border authorities and district governments of each side of the border had a 
meeting and decided that a jud phon pron (port of toleration) should be opened here.” A 
few years later, further ports of toleration were established in Ban Plee and other places 
along the river. 
With the fall of the Soviet Union and the breakdown of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (Comecon) in 1991, Laos was forced to look to the West for 
financial aid. It introduced the chin thanakan mai (New Economic Mechanism), which 
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would open up its economy to the world market (Stuart-Fox 2002: 198; for a table of 
economic reform landmarks between 1975 and 2003, see Rigg 2005: 21-22). This 
reorientation resulted in improved relations with Thailand where the bureaucratic-
military rule changed to a more open politics. Economic expansion in Thailand 
coincided with the increased influence of powerful businessmen in Bangkok, and in 
1988, the tycoon Chatichai Choonhavan became prime minister. He sought to take 
Indochina “from a battlefield to a marketplace” (Rigg 1998: 170). Thailand lifted its ban 
on “strategic items” in 1989 and a few years later in 1994, the rapprochement between 
Thailand and Lao was symbolised by the first Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge between 
Nong Khai and Vientiane.  
Improved Thai-Lao relations and relaxed trading conditions also affected my research 
area. In 1993 a permanent checkpoint (dan thawon) was installed in a Thai border 
village near my main research sites (Sompoad and Varavudh 1994: 15). Customs and 
immigration offices were established on either side of the checkpoint and it soon 
became the main port for large-scale trade in timber, agricultural products and 
construction materials. There was no bridge across this part of the river but lorries and 
cars could float across on a big wooden raft and drive through the riverbed during the 
dry season (Image 3). Villagers made money by transporting people across the river in 
their own wooden boats. A private car pool was set up by Thai villagers who made 
additional money by driving Lao villagers to Mueang Loei. 
 
Image 3: Car raft at international trade post (Thali Customs Office 2011a) 
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While the international trade post was used for large-scale trade, daily necessities were 
traded across the ports of toleration in the villages of Ban Sing and Ban Plee, which 
flourished. Thai traders established border markets, opened shops and restaurants to 
supply Lao traders and customers. According to a member of the Or Sor, about 1,000 to 
2,000 people crossed over one checkpoint on border market days in the 1990s. He 
estimated that 99% of the people who crossed over the checkpoint came from the Lao 
side while usually only about ten people from the Thai border village went to the Lao 
side. A shop owner at one of the checkpoints said that she could sell goods worth up to 
10,000 baht per day on such border market days.  
Unlike the situation at today’s customary border checkpoints, border-crossers did not 
have to pay any money for crossing over the ports of toleration at that time. When 
explaining this to me, the Or Sor added: “But you weren’t allowed to cross over 
anywhere else either.” Cross-border movement was thus restricted to the ports of 
toleration, which were open only on border market days (two days per month)
41
 and 
usually from 8am to 4pm. On all other days throughout the month the local Border 
Defence Volunteers of the Or Sor as well as the Thai paramilitary border guards of the 
thahan phran (Rangers) attended the checkpoint and patrolled the other parts of the 
river. While the port of toleration was officially “closed” on most days throughout the 
month, local villagers were permitted to use it on a daily basis to visit each other. Lao 
villagers also used it to seek medical care, and buy daily necessities in the shops along 
the checkpoint.  
While there were no permanent customs offices in Ban Sing or Ban Plee, Thai customs 
officers monitored the situation at the ports of toleration on border market days. There 
was no limit to the amount of goods that could be taken across as a village headman 
explained to me: “People could just trade across as many goods as they wanted. There 
was no other way they would have been able to trade.” Lao customs officials, on the 
other hand, attended the ports of toleration on a daily basis. My interlocutors 
remembered that the Lao customs officer would check all border-crossers’ goods and 
issue an import tax based on the amount of imported goods. Maintaining a good social 
relationship with these officers was beneficial however. A local Lao trader remembered: 
“You didn’t have to pay as much to Lao customs officers if you knew them. Just like at 
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 The schedule of the border markets rotated according to the lunar calendar so that each border market 
was open twice a month. 
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the Bridge today.” As I will demonstrate in Chapters 5 and 6, social relationships were 
still an important factor in the regulation of cross-border movements during the time of 
my fieldwork
42
.  
Daily necessities were also traded outside the ports of toleration across unmarked 
border-crossing sites. According to a Thai Ranger, it was not difficult to send goods 
across the border outside the checkpoints because there were only few border guards 
along this part of the river. Border residents visited each other, transported consumer 
products across the river in places that were closer to their shops and homes and where 
they could avoid paying an import tax to the Lao officials. They had only to watch out 
or negotiate with the local border officials who would seize their goods when caught. 
Phor Phapep, a Lao trader in a Lao border village, for example, had already established 
a close trading relationship with the mother of one of the current shophouse owners in 
Ban Sing during the 1990s. In order to evade the tax imposed by Lao customs officers, 
he would either pick up the goods himself or pay a boat operator to transport the goods 
across the river at night. In both cases, he used the word laklob (smuggling) to describe 
the process. But he also mentioned that he paid the boat operators to bribe the Thai 
Rangers: “We were scared but we also cleared (khlia) it with the guards on the Thai side 
first. The workers there cleared it for us. The workers were associated with the guards 
and they paid for us. If you weren’t associated with the guards then you couldn’t give 
them any money.”  
The association between boat operators in Ban Sing and local Thai authorities in the 
1990s is somewhat similar to Walker’s (1999) findings along the Mekong River where 
boat operators made financial contributions to the “merit-making rituals” of local 
customs authorities in order to facilitate cross-border trading practices. Walker 
described this process as “collaborative regulation” (1999: 69) because it was beneficial 
to both sides of the transaction. The process of “clearing” described by Phor Phapep, 
however, must be seen in the context of evading Lao import taxes. In “clearing” their 
strategy of evasion with the Thai Rangers, the traders collaborated with authorities on 
one side of the border in order to subvert the authorities on the other side. It would 
therefore be better considered in a framework of resistance (Scott 1985; Bruns and 
Miggelbrink 2012) than regulation.  
                                                 
42
 When comparing the tax situation of the ports of toleration with that of the Bridge today, the amount of 
tax at the former checkpoints was much lower. 
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While I will come back to this discussion in Chapter 6 when analysing interactions 
between state and non-state actors in the context of trade during the time of my 
research, the point here is that trading practices across unmarked border-crossings 
continued during the 1990s by way of a variety of strategies. Trade across unmarked 
border-crossing sites included not only daily necessities but also cars, motorbikes, teak, 
agricultural products such as rice and corn, as well as drugs. In fact, one of the villages 
in my research location became particularly famous for its involvement in the illegal 
drug trade during the 1990s (The Nation 2004). While the trade in marihuana had been 
ongoing already for several decades, the most prominent drug traded across this part of 
the border in the 1990s became yaba, an amphetamine-type stimulant (ATS) used as a 
recreational drug. Yaba pills were produced in Burma and Laos and then shipped to 
Thailand via Ban Donmai (Chouvy and Meissonnier 2004).  
During this time the local economy on the Thai side was growing fast while people on 
the Lao side were looking for opportunities to make money and increase their own 
purchasing power. One of my interlocutors in Ban Donmai justified the trade by 
explaining: “They didn’t have anything on the Lao side back then, no shops, no [paved] 
streets, no cars, no motorcycles, nothing.” Not everyone was involved in the drug trade 
in the same way. An in-depth study conducted by Chouvy and Meissonnier (2004) 
states that influential villagers with military and political links were able to make 
authorities turn a blind eye to this kind of trade. This was also the case in my research 
area. According to my interlocutors, the wealthiest families in the (Thai and Lao) border 
villages not only had (and still have) the strongest links to politicians but are still 
reaping the benefits from the drug trade today.  
In 2003, however, the infamous former prime minister of Thailand Thaksin Shinawatra 
launched a “war on drugs”, which resulted in the seizure of forty million 
methamphetamine tablets, jailing 92,500 drug addicts, 43,000 dealers, and 750 drug 
producers and importers. At least 2,500 people were killed during the anti-drug 
campaign – some of them mere ordinary users (Chouvy and Meissonnier 2004). Many 
villagers in my research area remembered the Thai police raiding their homes during the 
three-month campaign. Even the elderly were searched and in one prominent case, 
authorities found drugs hidden inside small decorative ornaments in an elderly woman’s 
home. The elderly woman was killed in the raid. Although the trafficking of drugs in 
my research area declined after the crackdown, it continues to exist alongside the 
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smuggling of other illicit goods such as cars, motorcycles, rice, and timber (see further 
Chapter 6).  
The village of Ban Donmai was different to the other villages in my research area in that 
it was the only village where a port of toleration was not installed
43
. The nearest port 
was several kilometres away. Ban Donmai never experienced the amount of border-
crossers that attended the border markets in Ban Plee and Ban Sing, despite the fact that 
border villagers could engage with each other more easily from the 1980s. Several 
shops and restaurants opened in these villages in addition to the regular border markets. 
The new shops along the checkpoints sold individual goods to customers and goods in 
bulk to traders, thereby becoming the main suppliers of daily necessities for the Lao 
side. One of the Lao traders in Ban Sawan remembered: “The shops in Ban Sing would 
buy goods in Mueang Loei and send the goods across to Ban Sing just like today, but in 
much bigger amounts.” The same trader also felt that during that time, Ban Sing “was 
much more developed than nowadays (jaloenkwa).”  
These developments prompted the biggest supplier of Thai products in Mueang Loei, 
Khubun Supercentre Ltd., to change its strategy
44
. Instead of functioning merely as a 
retailer and wholesaler the company also started delivering wholesale goods to shops in 
the border areas, thereby functioning as a distributor (khai song) as well. Shops could 
expect to receive a delivery once a week, during which the shop owner could place new 
orders for the following week. Khubun also provided credits to trusted long-term 
customers, which included the three shop owners who were still based in Ban Sing 
during the time of my research. In the 1990s the delivery of daily necessities to shops 
along the ports of toleration facilitated the cross-border trade of daily necessities. It also 
allowed those Thai traders who did not own pick-up trucks to obtain and stock 
wholesale goods as well. Instead of having to drive to the provincial capital to retrieve 
goods, the goods were now coming to them. The Thai border area had become a centre 
of trade that attracted a variety of actors from different locations.  
                                                 
43
 The customary border checkpoint there only opened in 2005. 
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 Khubun prides itself with the fact that it only sells goods that have been manufactured in Thailand. 
Chinese or Vietnamese goods are not part of its range. According to the owner of Khubun Supercentre 
Ltd., “this is because we want to be sure about the good quality of our products. Those products that have 
been produced in Thailand have a quality guarantee since they have been inspected by the relevant 
governmental organization.” The owner believed that this kind of quality control increased customer 
loyalty. 
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To an extent, the Lao border area also became a centre of trade during this time. Lao 
retailers who bought their goods from Thai border traders increased the price of goods 
in order to make a profit themselves. This led most people living in close proximity to 
the border to shop at the border markets and shops on the Thai side rather than buying 
from Lao retailers. In this context, Lao retailers soon started stocking wholesale goods 
in the back of their shops and started taking orders from traders further inside 
Sayaboury province. Selling in bulk allowed them to reduce the price to a level similar 
to the Thai side. Traders from further inside Sayaboury province could place orders and 
pick up their goods during their next visit to the border area without actually having to 
cross the border themselves. The mobile phone became a crucial part of the trading 
business during this time. As Lao border traders in Ken Thao district became wealthier 
and were able to afford a car, they also started delivering goods to the retail shops in the 
surrounding area.  
Both sides of the border benefited from the relaxed restrictions along the border and the 
different kinds of checkpoints that were established in the 1980s and 1990s. For Ban 
Plee, Ban Sing, Ban Thong (and to a lesser extent Ban Donmai), the two decades before 
the opening of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge in 2004 could be described as a golden 
age of trade. Despite the rapprochement and increased cooperation between Thailand 
and Laos, border regulations did not return to their pre-1975 status. Restrictions on trade 
continued to affect the border population and their cross-border activities in a variety of 
ways. This confirms what Walker noted in his own study, namely that “liberalisation 
does not necessarily amount to deregulation” (Walker 1999: 69). From a state 
perspective, the ports of toleration in my research area can be seen as measures of 
economic liberalisation as they opened up opportunities for migration and trade after 
Thailand’s economic embargo. From a border resident’s point of view however, the 
state continued to intervene in the regulation of trade and limited the movement of 
people and goods across the border.  
With the opening of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge in 2004, however, this situation 
changed again. The ports of toleration were downgraded to customary border 
checkpoints and the permanent checkpoint in Ban Thong was shut down completely. 
Upon the closure of the checkpoint in Ban Thong, the boat operators and car pool 
drivers who had profited from the traffic in people had to find other opportunities to 
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make money
45
. Some were pleased about the closure of the checkpoint though. Situated 
right next to the local school the checkpoint had created a lot of pollution and noise. 
Many of the teachers in Ban Thong School were therefore relieved when the lorries 
were directed to the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge from 2004. During the time of my 
research, the checkpoint in Ban Thong looked nothing like a busy port for cross-border 
trade anymore. While the riverbank was overgrown with bushes and trees, the 
abandoned customs office and brittle road barrier were the only remnants of the state-
led regulation of a once busy trading post. All large-scale trade was now conducted via 
the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, the effects of which I will explore in the next section. 
THE THAI-LAO FRIENDSHIP BRIDGE AND ITS EFFECTS 
The construction of a bridge across the Hueang River had already been proposed in 
1993 but due to a lack of funding it only became a reality in 2004 (The Nation 2003). 
Efforts to move the construction of bridge forward became stronger after the declaration 
of representatives of the governments of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Burma at the 
first Ayeyawady – Chao Phraya – Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) 
summit in 2003. The strategy aimed at creating an area of prosperity, peace, and 
stability by developing border areas and creating border economic zones (Tsuneishi 
2008: 15). Construction on the bridge in Thali began in 2003 and the bridge opened on 
28 October 2004 with the attendance of Thailand’s Minister of Foreign Affaris, Dr. 
Surakiart Sathirathai, and his counterpart from Laos, Mr. Somsavat Lengsavad, Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lao People's Democratic 
Republic. As part of the ceremony, the two ministers also signed the Agreement 
between Thailand and Lao PDR on the Exemption of Visa Requirements for Ordinary 
Passport Holders and the Letter of Exchange on the Opening of Border Point of Entry 
(Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004).  
In terms of migration and trade, the opening of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge meant 
that all cross-border trade was now required to be conducted at the Bridge rather than at 
the permanent checkpoint and ports of toleration along the river. The permanent trading 
post in Ban Thong was closed and the customs and immigration offices relocated to the 
Bridge. The other checkpoints were transformed into dan prapheni, so-called customary 
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 Among them was an elderly woman called Noi. She was able to use the contacts she had established 
with Lao sawmill owners and other businesses in Laos to become a middlewoman for Lao timber. 
Through her I gained access to several interlocutors in Lao villages and towns during my fieldwork. 
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border checkpoints, which allowed the residents of adjoining Thai and Lao border 
villages to continue visiting and engaging with each other. They also provided a 
gateway to the regular border markets that continued to take place in the Thai border 
villages where the checkpoints were situated (see further Chapters 5 and 6). This meant, 
however, that legal cross-border movement outside the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge was 
restricted to the border villages in the immediate vicinity of the customary border 
checkpoints. Upon the announcement of the new border policies, authorities in Thai 
border villages informed their residents about the new regulations via loudspeakers in 
the village
46
. In Laos, customs officers personally visited the local shops to convey the 
message. At the ports of toleration, border-crossers and traders were redirected to the 
Bridge by the local border guards.  
From a state perspective, the enforcement of the new regulations was largely successful. 
Most cross-border trading practices shifted to the Bridge and with Thailand’s economic 
growth the overall trade volume between Loei and Sayaboury gradually increased. 
Where in 2003 the total volume of trade between Loei province and Laos (via Ban 
Thong and Chiang Khan) was worth just over 800 million baht, this had increased to 
over 6 billion baht by 2012 (now via Ban Plee and Chiang Khan). As Figure 9 
demonstrates, the majority of Loei’s trade was conducted via the Thai-Lao Friendship 
Bridge in Ban Plee (Bank of Thailand 2015). 
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 Most of the Thai villages I visited during my research had loudspeakers installed along the main roads 
of the village. The village headman made announcements on most mornings to inform the villagers of any 
new regulations and upcoming events (also see Chapter 4). 
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Figure 9: Loei province’s overall imports/exports with Laos 47  and Thali 
district’s imports/exports with Laos, measured in million baht (Bank of 
Thailand 2015, table created by author) 
 
As a consequence, the number of border-crossers across the former ports of toleration 
decreased drastically. Where once thousands of Lao villagers and traders crossed the 
border on a regular basis, there were now merely a few hundred left during the time of 
my field research (even when combining the numbers at all three checkpoints). On non-
border market days, numbers could be as low as a few dozen. Instead, many border-
crossers and traders crossed over the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. During the time of 
my research, several thousand Lao villagers and traders were crossing the Thai-Lao 
Friendship Bridge in order to attend the weekly border market next to the Thai-Lao 
Friendship Bridge. Since it is not permitted to walk across the Bridge, many border-
crossers used the samlo (three-wheeler car) services of local villagers from Ban Plee 
and Ban Sawan to cross the Bridge. Other Lao traders, particularly the middlewomen 
from towns inside Sayaboury province, drove across the Bridge in their own pick-up 
truck (Figure 10). In the year of my research between 2011 and 2012, daily necessities 
were among the top ten export items channelled via the Bridge (Figure 11). 
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 The statistics on Loei’s overall trade with Laos also includes trade conducted via Chiang Khan. 
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Figure 10: Networks for the trade of daily necessities between Loei and 
Sayaboury 2011/2012 
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Export items Thali-Ken Thao districts October 2011 – July 2012 (ranked according to export value) 
Rank 
Oct 
2011 
Nov 
2011 
Dec 
2011 
Jan 
2012 
Feb 
2012 
Mar 
2012 
Apr 
2012 
May 
2012 
Jun 
2012 
July 
2012 
#1 
Cons-
truction 
mate-
rials 
Road 
grader 
Cons-
truction 
materials 
Cons-
truction 
mate-
rials 
Diesel Diesel 
Cons-
truction 
materials 
NA 
Cons-
truction 
materials 
Cons-
truction 
materials 
#2 Diesel 
Cons-
truction 
mate-
rials 
Diesel Diesel 
Cons-
truction 
materials 
Cons-
truction 
materials 
Tractors NA Diesel Trucks 
#3 
Car 
spare 
parts 
Diesel Tractors 
Tractor
s 
Tractors Tractors Digger NA 
Daily 
neces-
sities 
Diesel 
#4 
Daily 
neces-
sities 
Trac-
tors 
Daily 
neces-
sities 
Digger Trucks Cement Diesel NA Trucks 
Car spare 
parts 
#5 Benzin 
Tractor 
spare 
parts 
Tractor 
spare 
parts 
Front-
end 
loader 
Tractor 
spare 
parts 
Daily 
neces-
sities 
Corn 
seeds 
NA 
Car spare 
parts 
Daily 
neces-
sities 
#6 Cement Tires Crane 
Modu-
lar 
homes 
Daily 
neces-
sities 
Trucks 
Modular 
homes 
NA Diggers Cement 
#7 Cars 
Daily 
neces-
sities 
Cement 
Daily 
neces-
sities 
Cement Bulldozer 
Daily 
neces-
sities 
NA Cement Motors 
#8 
Trac-
tors 
Benzin Benzin Cement Cars 
Car spare 
parts 
Cement NA Benzin 
Electrical 
appli-
ances 
#9 Asphalt Trucks Asphalt 
Tractor 
spare 
parts 
Asphalt 
Modular 
homes 
Trucks NA 
Jack 
hammers 
Tractors 
#10 
Rice 
mills 
Asphalt 
Modular 
homes 
Cars Benzin Cars 
Car spare 
parts 
NA 
Modular 
homes 
Benzin 
Figure 11: Export items from Loei to Sayaboury province via the Thai-Lao 
Friendship Bridge from October 2011 to July 2012 (Thali Customs Office 
2011b, 2012; table created by author) 
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As part of the new state regulations, the border market that traders had established next 
to the port of toleration in Ban Plee was relocated to the area next to the Thai-Lao 
Friendship Bridge. Border market traders were thus forced to move their stalls. When 
the border market was still next to the port of toleration, visitors at the market would 
pass by the shops next to the checkpoint and buy goods in the shops as well as at the 
market. One of the shop owners was reminiscent of this time: “When the border market 
wasn’t at the Bridge yet, business was good. On some days I sold goods worth 10,000 
baht. Now we have go all the way over there to sell things… And I have pay 3,000 baht 
per year for the stall. Before I didn’t have to pay anything because I just sold things at 
my shop!”  
In fact, when it was first decided by local officials that the market should be moved to 
the Bridge, the market traders protested (doen khabuan). They were afraid that once the 
market was moved to the Bridge, it would later be closed down as the administrative 
buildings at the Bridge expanded and needed the space. According to my informants, 
the traders gave the local officials money and gifts to persuade them to let the traders 
stay in their current location next to the checkpoint. At first, the officials agreed under 
the condition that the traders made no noise at the market near the customary border 
checkpoint. Many traders were using large stereo systems to bring attention to their 
stalls. Others used microphones to inform customers about their newest goods and 
reduced prices. There is always a cacophony at border markets. The noise is usually 
audible on the Lao side of the river and makes Lao customers aware of the market’s 
presence. Not being able to make any noise at the market would therefore have 
decreased the sales volume even further. Eventually, the traders in Ban Plee agreed to 
move to the Bridge, which further reduced the number of Lao villagers who passed by 
the shops in Ban Plee. 
As a result of the shifted market location, many shop owners in Ban Plee had to close 
their businesses. In Ban Sing, several businesses also closed due to the reduction in 
border-crossers at the checkpoint there. In fact, one of the first things I noticed when 
walking through Ban Plee and Ban Sing was that many residential homes had shop-style 
entrances with sliding iron gates at the front of the house, which could be opened to 
expose the entire ground floor. This made the extent of shops that used to exist in the 
area very visible (Image 4). When visiting a shop owner who sold construction 
materials in Ban Plee one early afternoon in May 2012, he had not sold any of his goods 
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yet. It was a non-border market day and not a single customer had crossed over the 
checkpoint (apart from labourers and boat operators). The shop owner expressed his 
shattered hopes saying: “The officials said that if the Bridge is constructed we will be 
richer. But how can we be rich if it's like this? We cannot sell goods because the Lao 
people buy goods in Mueang Loei and stock them on their side. They pass through the 
checkpoint at the Bridge and do not pass by here anymore. The shops in the village are 
getting less and less so that we are not able to make business anymore”.  
Image 4: View of former shop fronts during village parade (Source: 
Author) 
 
The few shops that still remained near the checkpoint in Ban Plee had to seek additional 
sources of income. Some resorted back to farming while others became drivers for 
visitors at the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. By the time of my research, four out of the 
six remaining shops had bought a stall at the border market in order to boost their sales 
in addition to their shop. On border market days (Saturdays), they closed their shop in 
the village and took their goods to the border market instead.  
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The shops in Ban Sing also suffered losses of income after the opening of the Bridge, 
though not as much as those in Ban Plee. While a few restaurants and shophouses had to 
shut down their businesses, the main three export shophouses next to the former port of 
toleration stayed open and even expanded their businesses. The border market in Ban 
Sing maintained its location next to the checkpoint. The shops and border market in Ban 
Sing continued to benefit from their proximity to the adjacent town on the Lao side. 
Generally, the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge affected Ban Sing less than Ban Plee 
because Ban Sing is situated several kilometres away from the Bridge and directly 
across from a larger Lao town. It was therefore often more convenient for the residents 
and traders of Ban Sawan to buy daily necessities in Ban Sing via the customary border 
checkpoint than to drive to the Bridge.  
Ban Donmai did not have its own port of toleration so the new border regulations 
following the opening of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge did not have many 
implications here. It must not be forgotten, however, that Ban Donmai had experienced 
several crackdowns by the state in the 1990s and early 2000s that were aimed at curbing 
the cross-border drug trade flourishing there. Cross-border flows were more strongly 
regulated here due to these activities, although authorities focused on smuggling 
activities and tolerated visits to relatives. In 2005, however, a customary border 
checkpoint was installed near Ban Donmai. On the one hand, the checkpoint is a 
gateway that provides villagers with the legal permission to travel back and forth 
between the two villages. Lao villagers (and traders) used the checkpoint to travel to the 
newly established border market (open twice a month) in Ban Donmai and buy daily 
necessities. On the other hand, villagers from both sides of the river now require legal 
documentation to cross the river. As in other parts of the border, state-led regulation 
thus increased after the opening of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge.  
While Thai shop owners, particularly in Ban Plee and Ban Sing, experienced drawbacks 
from the increase in state regulation, many Lao traders benefited from the improved 
transport conditions. With improved infrastructure, shops in Lao border villages who 
were wealthy enough to afford their own pick-up trucks started travelling to Mueang 
Loei themselves to buy goods. This drove down costs and made their business more 
profitable. One female trader explained: “Before the Bridge, we ordered our goods from 
the shops on the Thai side in Ban Sing and had the goods delivered by the workers at 
the checkpoint. We had to pay tax to the officer on the Lao side and also paid the 
97 
workers for the delivery. Now, we pay a similar tax at the Bridge but don’t have to pay 
the workers anymore. We can also take much more goods across the border. This has 
made things easier and cheaper.” A trader with a slightly smaller shop on the Lao side 
who sold both wholesale and retail held a similar perception, although she saw both 
positive and negative aspects: “Before the Bridge, profits were high but crossing over 
was difficult because you had to use the boats. Nowadays, profits are low but it is a 
much easier life since you can cross over by car.” This trader did not drive to Mueang 
Loei herself. Instead, she drove across the Bridge in her own car, parked it there and 
then hired a local driver to take her to the shops in Mueang Loei. A day’s trip to 
Mueang Loei cost approximately 900 baht.  
In fact, the majority of traders who came from towns and villages further inside the 
province followed the same process of driving across the Bridge themselves but then 
hiring a driver to go to Mueang Loei. Such traders usually drove across the Bridge on a 
Friday (the day before the weekly border market) in their own pick-up trucks and 
parked these in a free parking area in front of the Bridge
48
. They then hired a local 
driver (usually from Ban Plee, Ban Sing or Ban Donmai) to take them to the shops in 
Mueang Loei. There was an array of reasons why these traders hired drivers instead of 
driving to Mueang Loei themselves. The most common response was that they were not 
used to driving on Thai roads where driving took place on the left hand side (in Laos 
driving is on the right hand side). Thai roads were also multi-lane with traffic lights and 
much busier than in Laos. Many of the small vans Lao traders owned required special 
paperwork to enter the highway, which was too costly and not worth the effort for the 
traders. Finally, many traders preferred to go to Mueang Loei with a local resident who 
knew which shops to take them to in order to find the goods they required.  
In order to gain further insight into the practices of the traders from towns further inside 
Sayaboury province, I visited the Bridge on a Friday evening. Many of them had 
already arrived on the Thai side at noon, had parked their trucks in front of one of the 
administration buildings and were still out to buy goods in Mueang Loei. The majority 
of those who stayed behind were men. One of these men explained that it was often a 
husband who drove the truck to Thailand while his wife selected and purchased the 
goods in Mueang Loei. When the female traders returned that evening, they and their 
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 Since my fieldwork a new customs building has been established on the land that was used for parking 
and the loading of goods. 
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husbands loaded the goods they had purchased directly onto their trucks. Most of them 
stayed overnight in tents on the terrace of the administration building. The next morning 
they bought fresh fruits, meat and vegetables at the border market as well as small 
amounts of other goods such as clothes and biscuits
49
. They then headed back across the 
Bridge to deliver the goods to their customers in the towns and villages on the Lao side. 
Many more such middlewomen arrived on the Saturday morning. Many of them shared 
a pick-up truck to go to Thailand and also shared the costs of the drive to Mueang Loei. 
Having arrived early in the morning, they were able to go to Mueang Loei and come 
back to the Bridge before the border market closed.  
Towards the end of my fieldwork, I extended my research to further inside Laos, 
visiting the markets of Paklay (approx. 60km away from the border), Mueang Phiang 
(approx. 190km away from the border) and Mueang Sayaboury (approx. 220km away 
from the border) in order to gauge the reach of daily necessities from Loei province in 
Sayaboury province. Most of the daily necessities sold at markets in all three of these 
places originated from Thailand, delivered by the Lao middlewomen from the border 
area. As described above, these middlewomen (who were often accompanied by their 
husbands) had emerged as a new actor in the trade of daily necessities across the Thai-
Lao border. In the provincial capital of Mueang Sayaboury, however, the amount and 
range of Chinese and Vietnamese goods was clearly much higher in comparison to all 
other towns. Chinese goods were delivered by Chinese middlemen directly from China 
while Vietnamese goods came into Sayaboury via Vientiane. Before the road 
infrastructure between Mueang Sayaboury and Loei province improved, most consumer 
goods came to Mueang Sayaboury from Vientiane via the Mekong River. Nowadays, 
according to a local shop owner, consumer products are still cheaper in Vientiane but 
the distance to Mueang Loei is shorter with lower travel expenses, making it more 
profitable to use the route via the Bridge
50
. Supporting this claim, an officer at the 
Provincial Department for Industry and Commerce in Mueang Sayaboury estimated in 
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 There is a vast literature on the persistence of wet markets in the fresh food retailing industry. 
Unfortunately, due to the scope of this thesis I am unable to discuss this in detail. See for example 
Goldman et al. (1999), Gorton et al. (2009). 
50
 According to an officer at Sayaboury’s tourist office, the decreasing water level of the Mekong River 
has also made it more difficult for boats to travel to Mueang Sayaboury all the way from Vientiane. 
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an interview with me that 60% of consumer goods in Mueang Sayaboury came from 
Loei province while only 40% came from Vientiane
51
.  
A major implication of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge was thus that the distribution of 
daily necessities between Loei and Sayaboury province via small-scale traders increased 
while becoming more diffuse. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s most daily necessities 
were traded via the border traders in Thali district. Traders situated further inside 
Sayaboury province used the Mekong River route via Chiang Khan to receive goods 
from Thailand. With the opening of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge in Ban Plee, 
however, traders from the Lao border area as well as from further inside Sayaboury 
province can travel directly to Mueang Loei and save the delivery costs and profit 
margins raised by Thai border traders.  
At the same time, several Lao shop and market stall owners also continued to receive 
goods from Thai border traders. In the Lao town of Ban Sawan, which was situated 
across from Ban Sing, most of the smaller retailers received their goods via delivery 
from Ban Sing. At the central market in Ban Sawan, many stall owners did not possess 
a car and were dependent on the delivery of wholesale goods directly to their stall. The 
wealthier traders who regularly went to Mueang Loei also maintained trade relations 
with the border traders in Ban Sing, as they could use them to fill any short-term gaps 
before their next trip to Mueang Loei. Most of the shops in the Lao villages across from 
Ban Plee also still received the bulk of their goods from border traders in Ban Plee. For 
the small amounts they required, the cost of travelling to Mueang Loei and the import 
tax issued there was higher than the delivery via the customary border checkpoint. From 
this it can be deduced that on the Lao side, the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge was in fact 
most beneficial to already well-to-do traders who owned vehicles for transport and who 
required large amounts of wholesale goods.  
To remain competitive in the wake of an increased amount of daily necessities traded 
across the Thai-Lao border, the shops in Ban Sing also started delivering large amount 
of goods to the Bridge where their customers would pick up the goods and take them 
back across the Bridge. In doing so, the shop owners in Ban Sing adapted to the new 
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 Although Laos does not have a strong consumer products manufacturing industry, there were several 
products that wholesalers also bought directly from Lao manufacturers. These included Beer Lao, Pepsi, a 
locally produced energy drink and orange juice. However, according to the Lao traders, their customers 
preferred consumer products from Thailand so the purchase of Lao consumer products remained limited.  
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border regulations and the redirected flow of people and goods by utilising a variety of 
distribution channels and strategies. With regard to buying goods themselves, the shop 
owners in Ban Sing regularly travelled to Mueang Loei and compared prices at Khubun 
Supercentre and the other wholesalers. This allowed them buy the goods they required 
in the shop where they were cheapest rather than paying a surcharge for the 
wholesalers’ delivery services.  
Apart from buying goods at the wholesalers in Mueang Loei, the shops in all three 
villages of my research area also received goods directly from manufacturers. This 
came to me by surprise during my field research as I had not expected Coca-Cola and 
Unilever delivery vans to drive into small border villages such as Ban Sing and deliver 
wholesale goods to the shophouses next to the customary border checkpoint where trade 
was conducted only at a small-scale level. While Khubun Supercentre had already 
started delivering goods to the border villages in the 1990s, Thai manufacturers had 
now adopted this strategy as well. These findings are also fully in line with Endo Gen’s 
study on Thailand’s retail industry. According to Gen, the major manufacturers in 
Thailand such as Unilever still channelled at least 50-60% of their goods via traditional 
retailers in 2006 (Endo 2013: 145)
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. 
In the meantime, Khubun Supercentre further adapted its strategy to accommodate the 
needs of an increased number of customers from Laos. In my interview with the owner 
of Khubun he reported that his customers consisted of approximately 70% Thai 
residents and 30% Lao residents. The latter came from all around Sayaboury province, 
including Ban Sawan, Paklay and Mueang Sayaboury. The owner had therefore created 
a separate division within the supercentre that worked towards the needs of Lao 
customers. This included an ordering system. As Khubun’s delivery system did not 
cover Lao territory, Lao customers were now able to order by phone and pick up their 
goods at the store where they were packed and ready for pick up on a specified date. 
Trusted long-term customers from Laos also received credit from Khubun, although in 
these cases the owner of Khubun would usually travel to Laos and personally assesses 
his customers’ credit-worthiness. Lao traders were given a free gift worth 1% of their 
total purchase, e.g. when buying goods worth 10,000 baht they could choose an 
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 Endo Gen also argues that the mosaic-structured consumer market in Thailand, which is due to the 
unequal income distribution, is an important factor when it comes to analysing the reasons why 
transnational retailers do not fully dominated the market.  
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additional product worth 100 baht. This offer did not apply to the Thai division with its 
delivery scheme.  
Most recently, the supercentre had also started delivering goods to warehouses along the 
Thai side of the border. This specific distribution channel emerged as an effect of the 
Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. In this scheme, Lao wholesalers could order goods from 
Khubun and have them delivered to a warehouse in one of the border villages close to 
the Bridge. The Lao trader would then pick up the goods in the warehouse and take 
them back across the border. However, I found only one case where the warehouse 
strategy was used. It involved a large-scale female trader from Mueang Sayaboury 
whose husband was a high-ranking official in the provincial government. The trader’s 
business consisted of seven large trucks with drivers who transported goods from the 
Thai side of the Bridge across the border to Mueang Sayaboury. In an interview with 
the trader’s mother, I was told that the trader’s husband’s position facilitated the trading 
process across the Bridge immensely. The only other case of large-scale consumer 
products trade I encountered was with a female trader at the central market in Ban 
Sawan. She reported that she had been transporting consumer goods from the Thai 
border to Paklay in a large truck until about six months ago when the Lao import tax at 
the Bridge had become so high that it was not worth continuing the business anymore. 
 
Figure 12: Distribution of daily necessities via small-scale (traditional) 
marketing channels from Loei to Sayaboury province in 2011/2012 (Source: 
Author) 
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These findings demonstrate the predominance of the traditional retail format in Loei 
province (Figure 12). In light of a growing modern retail system, the traditional format 
has been able to adapt to the increased economic cooperation across the border and stay 
competitive. These findings refute the claims of those who in the 1980s and 1990s 
believed that transnational retailers would disturb or even revolutionise existing retail 
and distribution structures (e.g. Reardon and Hopkins 2006). With the emergence of 
department and convenience stores (e.g. Carrefour), big supermarket chains (e.g. Tesco, 
7/11) and most recently hypermarkets (e.g. Makro), there was a widespread expectation 
that this would imply the disappearance of traditional wholesalers such as Khubun and 
border traders such as those in my research area. In contrast to this assumption, the 
Tesco and Big C supermarket as well as the Makro hypermarket that had opened in 
Mueang Loei just before my research were used mostly by retailers and consumers in 
the city and its surroundings rather than by border traders. The border traders in my 
research area mentioned that they only went to Tesco and Big C “for entertainment” as 
these consisted of restaurants and children’s play areas in addition to the retail section. 
With regard to Makro, my informants reported not ever utilising this format as it did not 
offer credits or a delivery scheme. This clearly came to the advantage of traditional 
wholesalers such as Khubun. 
On the one hand, the Bridge has driven economic growth and increased market access 
by facilitating transportation. Lao traders and consumers are now able to drive to 
Mueang Loei themselves and buy consumer products directly at the wholesalers in the 
city rather than having to order these goods from the Thai export shophouses and 
markets along the border. New distributors of daily necessities have emerged in this 
context such Lao middlewomen who supply shops and markets all over Sayaboury 
province. On the other hand, the impact on Thai border traders has been largely 
negative. Many have had to close down their shops and restaurants and seek other 
sources of income. The remaining traders have had to adapt their sales and distribution 
strategy accordingly. The distribution of daily necessities has become more diverse, 
more competitive, and with more actors involved. Among the range of actors involved 
in the cross-border trade of daily necessities, Lao actors are the ones who demonstrate 
the highest level of cross-border mobility in transporting goods across the border, 
reflecting the asymmetry within the Thai-Lao borderland.  
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With regard to the border itself, the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge has led to an increase in 
state regulation manifested by the Bridge itself and the downgrading of ports of 
toleration to customary border checkpoints. By facilitating transport between Sayaboury 
and Loei province, the Bridge has led many Lao traders to buy their goods directly in 
Mueang Loei, thereby bypassing traders in the Thai border area. At the same time, the 
border market in Ban Plee has grown in size and a new border market was established 
in Ban Donmai. Many Lao traders still use Thai border traders in my research area to 
gain access to daily necessities. Both wholesalers and manufacturers deliver goods to 
the border. In this respect, the border area remains a centre of trade that attracts different 
kinds of actors.  
The current economic cooperation between the Thai and Lao governments is based on a 
post-Westphalian logic that aims to reduce barriers to trade, tourism and labour 
migration while at the same time trying to decrease activities that fall into the categories 
of smuggling and trafficking. While I will discuss the blurry lines between legal and 
illegal, licit and illicit trading activities in Chapter 6, the main point here is that this 
post-Westphalian logic carries with it the layers of the Westphalian logic that aims at 
compartmentalising nation-states. It has aspects of facilitation and restriction. This 
paradox of increased regulation in a time of globalisation and market liberalisation is 
nicely summed up by one of the Thai shop owners in Ban Plee who remembered the 
years after 1975 as difficult but manageable. She laughed when saying: “It wasn’t 
convenient but it was fun! If you couldn’t go across here then you went there…and then 
you went here again…!” In a more serious tone, she added: “Now you can’t do the same 
anymore…” 
TRADE AS A CONTINUUM THROUGHOUT SPACE AND TIME 
This chapter has provided a glimpse into the changing manifestations of the nation-state 
border in my research area since 1975 and demonstrated how these manifestations are 
not only perceived by border residents but also how they have differently affected the 
population in my research area, particularly those involved in the small-scale trade of 
daily necessities. Compared to the historical becomings of the border before 1975, 
which my interlocutors remembered as having had very little impact on the local 
population, the history of the border since 1975 has been more turbulent. Daily 
necessities nevertheless continued to flow across the border, not only despite the 
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restrictions on cross-border flows but also because of the opportunities presented by 
these restrictions. According to the memories of border residents, the border has been 
rearticulated in different ways by different actors since 1975. The decision to increase 
state presence along the border and restrict cross-border flows after 1975 was a 
unilateral one made by Thailand based on its ideological rift with the communist 
government of Laos. Political refugees from Laos were welcomed into Thailand and 
reactionaries accommodated in the Thai borderland while commodities flowing into 
Laos were restricted and made illegal. By pushing important aspects of trade into 
illegality, Thailand created opportunities of clandestine trade that were highly 
profitable. The value of daily necessities from Thailand increased immensely. Trading 
practices that had been part of everyday life were therefore continued in defiance of 
state regulations. 
The power of trade and cross-border networks in my research area led to the opening of 
ports of toleration in the 1980s and later, permanent checkpoints. As restrictions on 
cross-border trade decreased, the Thai border villages flourished. Border markets were 
established and Thai border traders became the main suppliers of daily necessities to the 
Lao borderland. As state regulation on the Thai side shifted to a focus on drugs, cars, 
and timber smuggling, the Lao state increased its regulations by imposing an import tax 
on all goods coming into Laos, including daily necessities. As a result, cross-borders 
traders began to circumvent Lao border officials while bribing Thai border officials for 
turning a blind eye. Thai border villages flourished and the Thai border area became a 
centre for trade. Despite these exchanges, security concerns continued to pervade the 
area. The border war in Ban Rom Klao in late 1980s as well as the crackdown on drugs 
in Thali’s border villages in the late 1990s articulated the violence that comes with the 
Westphalian logic of bordering, aimed at defending the borderline against foreign 
powers and perceived threats to the nation-state. The security aspect of the border 
remains an important layer of the process of bordering even as regional agreements 
have led to a rise of the post-Westphalian logic.  
Despite Thailand and Laos’ rapprochement and economic cooperation, state regulation 
of trade has continued outside the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. Different parts of the 
border in my research area have been affected differently by the new border policies and 
have adapted to them in different ways. New actors have emerged in the trading 
business while distribution channels have diversified. While most trade is conducted via 
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the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, several border traders continue to use the former ports 
of toleration (now called customary border checkpoint) as well as unmarked border-
crossing sites for their trading activities. These sites will be at the core of the remaining 
chapters of this thesis.  
When reading the following chapters, it is important to remember what these first two 
chapters have demonstrated, namely that people’s memories and experiences of the 
border have shaped and informed how the border comes into being today, how small-
scale trade is practiced, as well as people’s perceptions and social practices. In the next 
chapter I will shift the focus from the border to the female traders who are engaged with 
it and who contribute to its construction and deconstruction in space and time. I will 
provide insight into the everyday lives of two types of female border traders as I 
encountered them during my field research and will explore the relevance of the border 
in these women’s lives.  
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CHAPTER 3 
MOTHERS OF TRADE  
INTRODUCTION 
Having so far provided the historical, political, and regional context that informs the 
nation-state border in my research area, this chapter zooms into the everyday lives of 
the female traders who engage with the border through their involvement in the small-
scale cross-border trade of daily necessities. By looking at different aspects of their 
everyday life, I explore how these non-state actors contribute to the production of the 
nation-state border. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are several different kinds of 
traders dealing with daily necessities and their experiences vary greatly according to 
their role as wholesaler, retailer, middlewoman, market stall owner, etc. Each of these 
roles brings with it different challenges that are further influenced by the economic 
asymmetry between Thailand and Laos, the trader’s social network, her age, marital 
status, and social positioning, etc.  
While the scope of this research does not allow me to cover all of these aspects, I seek 
to highlight the experiences and practices that are relevant to the articulation of the 
border. I focus on three aspects of everyday life in particular: the trader’s role in the 
household and the division of labour, her social networks with other traders, and her 
cross-border mobility. Each of the following three sections focuses on one of these 
aspects, beginning with a short literature review on the specific aspect of female traders’ 
everyday lives. As I will show, most academic works that study female traders in terms 
of their domestic situation, social networks, and mobility link these aspects to gender 
and social status.  
Here, I employ my ethnography on family life, social networks, and mobility to 
demonstrate how female traders contribute to the production of the nation-state border 
through everyday practices. The ethnographic examples I draw on include traders on the 
Thai side (shophouse owners at the customary border checkpoints and border market 
stall owners) as well as on the Lao side (middlewomen and market stall owners). Rather 
than comparing the experiences of all different types of traders in each section, I focus 
on the experience of those traders among which each aspect is most significant.  
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INTEGRATING ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND FAMILY LIFE 
It has long been noted among scholars working on Southeast Asia that small-scale (or 
petty) trade in Southeast Asia has been and continues to be dominated by women. 
Already in the 17
th
 century, travellers noticed the predominance of women in Siamese 
markets and saw women working in the fields while men were smoking or sleeping 
(Kirsch 1996: 14). Many researchers have confirmed this specialisation of women in 
economic activities, which encompasses not only small-scale trading activities but also 
controlling the household’s purse strings (De Young 1966; Kirsch 1975; Kusakabe 
2003). In Thailand, women are seen to have a fairly equal status to men when 
considering socio-economic indicators such as education and labour force participation 
(Wathinee and Guest 1998; Ockey 1999: 1034).  
With regard to their participation in the economy, however, women’s activities in 
Thailand are largely confined to the small-scale economic sphere while men dominate 
large-scale trade, politics, and the bureaucracy. This was also the case in my research 
area. It has been argued that this uneven division of labour is grounded to some extent 
in Theravada Buddhism – the region’s and my informants’ predominant belief system, 
in which women are “deemed to be more deeply rooted in this-worldly activities and 
secular concerns than are men” (Kirsch 1975: 191). This-worldly activities entail 
household as well as economic activities, which are deemed lower in status than 
religious or political activities. Theravada Buddhism is therefore often seen not just as a 
legitimation but as a foundation for the subordination of women in Thai and Lao society 
(see Keyes 1984 for a critical perspective).  
While I will discuss in the third section how women have been able to increase their 
social mobility through trading activities, the important point here is that women 
dominate the small-scale trading scene. In my research area, they dominated both the 
short-distance as well as the long-distance trade of daily necessities. Many of the female 
traders I encountered in my research, however, were not always entirely alone in 
conducting their business. Their husbands, parents, daughters and daughters- and sons-
in-law were often involved too, turning the trading activities into a family business. In 
some cases daughters were expected to help out their mother in the business and the 
household. This is expressed in the notion of the dutiful daughter, which is based to a 
large extent on the concept of bun khun. In Northeastern Thailand and Laos, the concept 
of bun khun describes the debt of gratitude, referring particularly to children’s 
109 
obligations to express their gratitude towards their parents. While sons are expected to 
ordain as a Buddhist monk for a short period, daughters are expected to contribute to 
their parent’s household by helping in the family business or through otherwise 
obtained material wealth (Patcharin 2010: 12f). The notion of the dutiful daughter is 
often referred to in the literature on migrant labourers, especially when describing how 
female migrant workers send remittances to their parents as part of their duties as a 
daughter (see for example Cook 1998; Rigg 2007; Engelmajer and Izuhara 2010; 
Patcharin 2010). In my research area, several daughters of cross-border traders felt 
obliged to become involved and continue the family trading business. A matrilocal 
residence pattern was conducive to the responsibilities of women towards their families 
and meant that their husbands sometimes also got involved in the family business. 
Northeastern Thailand and Laos are known for a tendency towards matrilocal residence 
after marriage, by which the married couple lives with the wife’s family (see Keyes 
1977; Ireson 1996; Sparkes 2005). Bowie (2008) argues not only that martilocality 
strengthens matrilineal ties but also that it may stir feelings of estrangement in the 
husband who must deal with a new home and family. Despite his formal authority as 
head of the household, the husband is nevertheless dependent on his wife’s family. This 
may even lead to drinking habits as Bowie suggests with regard to men’s drinking 
circles at village festivals: “Although alcohol consumption has various motivations, 
these drinking circles provide a form of escape from the alienation men may experience 
in their wives’ families” (Bowie 2008: 141). During the time of my research, the 
tendency towards matrilocality along the Hueang River was undermined by several 
factors including the nation-state border, which led Lao women to move to Thailand 
when marrying a Thai man. Couples also often moved to the husband’s family if the 
wife’s parents were already taken care of and also if the husband’s family conducted a 
business that required their son’s and daughter-in-law’s help. Among the trader families 
I worked with, furthermore, not all daughters were expected to take on the 
responsibilities of the family business and the household. It was increasingly the case 
that mothers allowed their daughters to achieve their own goals. 
Where women conducted their business together with their husbands and/or sons-in-
laws, women were the ones to serve customers while men carried out jobs such as 
transporting goods or setting up the border market stall. Due to the customer-facing role 
of women, it was often not immediately evident from the outside that the shop or stall 
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was a family business. In fact, the predominance of women when it comes to serving 
customers was backed up by my informants’ statements when asked why they were 
selling goods instead of their husbands: “My husband does not sell as well as I do” / “It 
has always been done like this, it’s our tradition”. Many of my female interlocutors also 
held the household purse strings and were responsible for the finances of the business. 
In fact, when women engaged in trading activities, they still maintained their domestic 
responsibilities, which included household chores and child rearing. In Thailand and 
Laos, the term used for female entrepreneurs (maekha) makes the link between 
household and economic activities very apparent. The term literally translates “mother 
of trade”. In his article on gender notions in Thai Buddhist culture, Keyes underscores 
the image of women as mothers and nurturers, arguing that it is especially the notion of 
the nurturer that has an effect on the role of the maekha because it implies that she 
should provide for her family through productive activities (1984: 229).  
The challenge of integrating work and family life impacts women’s ability to engage in 
trade. The long-distance middlewomen from Laos whom I encountered in my research 
area usually did not have any children who were in their infant years and who the 
women would have to care for during their travels. I also rarely saw infants at the 
central market in Ban Sawan where traders rented units from where they sold consumer 
goods during the opening times of the market. This was different in the shophouses 
located on the Thai side of the customary border checkpoints as well as at border 
markets in Thai border villages. The female traders in shophouses and border markets 
were able to integrate entrepreneurship and family life (to different degrees), which 
allowed them to sustain their businesses over several generations. In doing so, they were 
able to exploit the economic opportunity that their strategic location close to the 
borderline offered them. 
Thailand and Laos are well known for their ‘mom and pop’ stores (ran kha), which I 
refer to as shophouses because merchandise is sold on the ground floor while the top 
floor is used for accommodation. In the context of rural Thailand, such shophouses were 
considered the “mainstay of the Thai retailing system” from the beginning of the 19th 
century up to the 1950s (Mandhachitara 2000: 762). Although department stores came 
to the forefront in the 1950s and supermarkets were introduced in the 1960s, 
shophouses continue to prevail especially in Thailand’s rural areas (Chapter 2). In my 
research area there were many such shophouses throughout the area with those located 
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at the customary border checkpoints specialising in cross-border trade, selling daily 
necessities both at wholesale and retail level (khai plik khai song).  
In contrast to other shophouses in the area, the ones at the customary border checkpoints 
derived their income mainly from customers on the Lao side, including other shop 
owners, middlewomen as well as hundreds of villagers who came across the checkpoint 
on border market days. Their monthly sales volume was therefore much higher than that 
of other shophouses in the area, ranging between 100,000 and 240,000 baht (which 
roughly equates USD 3,000 – USD 8,000)53. This sales volume allowed for trading 
practices to be the household’s main income, although most of my informants owned 
agricultural fields for secondary income purposes. Despite conducting trade as their 
main income strategy, the owners of shophouses described their trade without exception 
as small-scale (gankha leklek / gankha raiyoi). 
Among the shophouses situated at customary border checkpoints in my research area, 
all but one family lived in the same house where they sold goods. While husbands often 
helped out with trading activities, their wives had to juggle their trading activities with 
their duties as mothers. Noon, a shophouse owner near the customary border checkpoint 
in Ban Plee, exemplified this as she had her first child after establishing her business. 
As Noon’s husband was a driver at the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, she sold goods in 
the shophouse by herself on a daily basis. She also shipped goods across the river via 
the local boat operators. In order to accommodate her responsibilities as a mother, Noon 
had built a bedroom in the back of her shop. The room had glass walls so that it was 
possible to watch over the shop while lying in bed (Image 5). This became a major 
advantage when Noon gave birth to her first child. Having spent seven days in the 
hospital to give birth (during which her husband took over the shop), she immediately 
continued her trading business. I was baffled by her ease of handling the situation as she 
simply carried her new-born daughter on her arm while sorting and fetching goods for 
customers. When her daughter needed to rest, she left her in the bedroom while being 
able to watch her from anywhere in the shop through the glass walls of the bedroom.  
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 It was particularly difficult to obtain numerical information on small-scale trade because traders did not 
calculate sales balances. They bought new goods whenever they received a payment and were able to 
afford it. Most of my informants were only able to tell me how much money they spent on wholesale 
goods per week, which was usually about 50-60,000 baht. One trader said she sold goods for 
approximately 100,000 baht per month. One of my informants estimated that her monthly profits 
amounted to 40-50,000 baht. 
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Image 5: Noon with her newborn in the bedroom at the back of her shop 
(Source: Author) 
Living and working in the same space gives such female traders the advantage of 
continuing their business and maintaining their main source of income while performing 
their role as mother and nurturer. Customers can rely on such shophouses to be open 
seven days a week. The female shop owners’ ability to adapt their opening hours to the 
needs of the customers also gives them a significant advantage over the larger 
wholesalers in Mueang Loei that have fixed opening hours. Due to the diversification in 
cross-border trade, however, female traders can rarely afford to close their shop, hence 
Noon’s husband’s help in selling goods while she was in hospital.   
Noon did not expect her new-born daughter to take over the shophouse when she was 
older. She held the same view as one of the shophouse owners at the customary border 
checkpoint in Ban Sing named Kew. Kew had one son and one daughter both of whom 
were already adults. Her daughter had in fact already set up her own business as an 
individual small-scale cross-border trader by transporting goods from Mueang Loei to 
the border and thereby contributing to her own family of three. Kew did not expect 
either of her children to take over the shop when she became too old to run it herself. 
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She said: “I want my children to do whatever pleases them. As long as I can still 
maintain the shop, I do not think of what will happen in the future.” 
Kew’s attitude towards her daughter stood in contrast to Khiat’s, another shophouse 
owner at the customary border checkpoint in Ban Sing. Khiat had one daughter and one 
son. Her son studied and worked in Bangkok but had recently returned to the village 
together with his wife who occasionally helped out in Khiat’s shop. Khiat’s 25-year old 
daughter helped in the shop on a daily basis although she previously wanted to become 
a nurse. Khiat explained: “She started her training as a nurse but then I asked her to 
come back home and help in my shop. It is better for her to stay in this village than to 
live out there in the city. You never know what will happen there.” Khiat not only 
expected her daughter to contribute to the family household but also expressed anxieties 
surrounding her daughter’s mobility and life in the city, an issue I will come back to in 
the section on cross-border mobility.  
While shophouse owners at the customary border checkpoints raised their children 
inside their homes where they engaged in trading activities, the situation was somewhat 
different for border market traders who travelled from one market to the next over a 
period of several days. Many of such traders take their young children with them on 
their travels although they must find a different solution as soon as their child is at the 
age when they must attend school on a daily basis. Similar to the shophouses, however, 
female traders at border markets also adopt the client-facing role of the business while 
their husbands work in the background. The following vignette will present the case of a 
family I engaged with during my research that sold clothes at several border markets 
throughout Loei province.  
My main interlocutor in the family was Mu, a 31-year old second generation trader from 
Ban Donmai who sold clothes at border markets along the Thai-Lao border together 
with her husband and mother, Mae Som. Together they sold clothes for women, men 
and children including jeans, shirts, blouses and underwear. Mu’s parents had bought 
the clothes stall with 24 racks about 25 years ago for 30,000 baht from a trader in 
Mueang Loei. At first Mu’s parents sold second-hand clothes, which they purchased at a 
market along the Thai-Cambodian border. After a while the smell of second-hand 
clothes became too disturbing for them so Mu’s parents decided to change to first-hand 
clothing, which they now purchased in Loei, Udon Thani, and Bangkok. Mu’s parents 
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had conducted their business together with Mu and Mu’s husband until the year before 
my research when Mu’s father decided to work solely on their cassava and rice fields. 
This was only possible after Mu’s husband started helping out with the stall as well. 
According to Mae Som, they could make up to 9,000 baht per day at the border markets, 
which provided enough money to build a second house for Mu.  
For a whole week, I accompanied Mu and her family on their travels selling clothes at 
markets along the Hueang River. Upon our arrival at a border market situated west of 
my research area, Mu’s husband was the one to lift the heavy poles down from the 
truck; then Mu helped him set up the poles and the tent roof for the stall in their 
designated area. Meanwhile, Mae Som started preparing dinner using an electric rice 
cooker and a small camping stove. After setting up the stall, everyone was able to use 
the public washing facilities at the market place to get ready for the night. We had 
dinner together on a mat on the floor of the stall. Sometimes Mu’s family shared food 
with the other traders whom they knew well. They went to sleep in the small tents they 
had brought with them and which they had set up next to their truck.  
The next morning, Mu, her husband and Mae Som woke up at 5.15am to arrange the 
goods in their stall, letting Mu’s son sleep in. From 5.30am on, the other traders at the 
market started playing music from the stereos in their trucks to attract customers from 
across the river in Laos. By 7am the market was a hustle and bustle of traders and 
customers, bargaining for the best prices. Mu’s husband also worked in the stall, 
assisting Mu and her mother. While the three adults took care of the customers, Mu’s 
son was happy playing with the other children at the market. In fact, several of the other 
traders had children whom Mu’s son could play with. They also often had small babies 
with them, letting them sleep in self-made baby cribs made out of cloth (Image 6). 
Female traders could also often be seen carrying their babies across the stall while 
serving customers. 
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Image 6: Baby crib made out of chequered cloth set up in front of a clothes 
stall at the talat nat (Source: Author) 
The above account of Mu’s family business highlights the common division of labour at 
border markets. Men are responsible for carrying heavy poles and for setting up the 
stall. Women are responsible for cooking, taking care of the children and serving 
customers. In fact, it took me several weeks of research at the border markets before 
even noticing that men were also involved in the trading business at border markets. 
This was mainly due to the predominance of women dealing with customers. When they 
were not travelling, Mu took care of the household while her husband often went out 
with his friends. Mu explained that he enjoyed getting drunk, which sometimes led to 
quarrels between Mu and him but she accepted this and seemed grateful for the division 
of labour between them: “Every person has both positive and negative qualities. My 
husband, for example, may like to get drunk and behave badly. But he is also a hard 
worker, helping out in the family business as well as in the cassava and rice fields. 
Without my husband I could not continue the business because it is impossible for me to 
set up the stall with the heavy poles by myself.” In other words, she accepted her 
husband’s negative sides so not to jeopardise his contribution to the family business. 
Having moved to Ban Donmai from another province, Mu’s husband’s behaviour must 
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also be seen in the context of matrilocality. His practices of meeting and drinking with 
his friends exemplify the drinking circles mentioned above among men who move in 
with their wife’s family. 
Mu herself exemplifies the notion of the dutiful daughter as she became a second-
generation border market trader despite initial reluctance. After finishing high school 
she helped her parents in their clothes stall although she had been hoping to study law 
one day. At the age of 21, Mu went to Bangkok where she worked as a labourer for one 
year. She recalled this time as “being naughty” (doe) and “running away” in a rebellion 
against her family’s expectations of her staying at home and helping out in the family 
business. In Bangkok she got to know her future husband. It was he who persuaded her 
to “do the right thing” and to return home to help her parents. Back home, Mu still 
hoped to study law at the local university on a part-time basis. Mae Som, however, 
discouraged her from studying, as she was afraid that Mu might “run away” again. Mu 
followed her mother’s decision and stayed at home. During my research, Mu had a four-
year old son and did not think about studying anymore. 
As described above, Mu was able to take her son along to the border markets along the 
Hueang River. Mu explained however that when her son entered primary school she 
would not be able to take him along anymore. Instead, Mae Som would then stay at 
home, leaving the family business to Mu and her husband. It is generally very common 
in Thailand for grandmothers to raise their grandchildren, particularly in the case of dual 
wage earners but also in cases of divorce, bereavement, and sickness (Mehta and Lang 
2011: 65f). In the case of border market traders, such an arrangement allowed for an 
uninterrupted continuation of the business as it was transferred from one generation to 
the next. As border market trade was the main income of the family, the household 
structure was adapted to the needs of the business. With respect to the more distant 
future, however, Mu was planning to sell the stall to someone else. She was tired of 
travelling, getting up early in the morning to set up the stall and taking it down in the 
evening. “It is a really tough job”, she said. Instead, she was hoping to rent a permanent 
stall at the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. She had heard rumours that a permanent border 
market would be established there in the near future.  
As it has become clear, the integration of entrepreneurship and family life involves a 
gendered division of labour within the household that allows shophouse owners and 
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border market traders in Thai border villages to maintain a regular income through the 
continuation of their cross-border trading businesses, themselves extending to more than 
one generation. Being able to adapt to domestic and economic pressures allows female 
traders to continue engaging in activities that transcend the nation-state border. By 
profiting from the economy asymmetry between Thailand and Laos, female traders also 
reconfirm the border as the divider of national economies. It must be emphasised that 
the border traders on the Thai side of the border were part of the economically stronger 
nation-state so that they benefitted from the dependence of Lao traders and villagers on 
access to the Thai market. At the same time, as trading practices have become more 
diversified since the opening of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, shophouse owners 
were also dependent on their social networks to the Lao side for the continuation of 
their business. I will address these social networks in the next section.  
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND HIERARCHIES 
While factors pertaining to the domestic sphere influence the way women conduct trade, 
several authors have also highlighted the importance of social networks for the survival 
of women’s trade (Walker 1999; Peberdy 2000; Muzvidziwa 2001; Desai 2009). 
Female border traders around the world make use of their social networks to get started 
in the business, for access to credit, as support networks, to facilitate transportation 
across the border as well as to reduce duty payments at the border itself (Rubesch and 
Banomyong 2005; Desai 2009; Yusuff 2014; Phadungkiati and Connell 2014). These 
networks include both kin and non-kin. In southern Zimbabwe, for example, female 
traders used kin relations in the initial stages of their business but once they had 
established a stable financial situation they distanced themselves from their kin, keeping 
them out of their business relationships (Muzvidziwa 2001: 72). This is not the case in 
Thailand and Laos where traders often maintain long-term trade relationships with kin 
as well as with non-kin.  
Kew, one of the shophouse owners in Ban Sing, provides for an interesting case study to 
demonstrate the significance of social networks with kin and non-king for the trading 
practices of shophouse owners in Thai border villages. Kew was born in a village on the 
Lao side. During the communist takeover in 1975, Kew’s parents fled to the Thai side 
with her and her sisters. Although many Lao villagers sought refuge in the refugee camp 
that was established in Loei province, Kew’s parents decided to stay with relatives in 
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Ban Sing instead. Kew therefore finished primary school on the Thai side. As a teenager 
she got to know her Thai husband in Ban Sing who was a farmer at the time. After 
marriage, Kew started selling fresh food at the local wet market to contribute to the 
family household. She would buy the fresh products in her hometown on the Lao side 
where these products were cheaper and allow for some profit when reselling them on 
the Thai side.  
After a few years in 2002 (2 years before the opening of the Thai-Lao Friendship 
Bridge), she and her husband decided to open a shop at the customary border 
checkpoint in Ban Sing as many Lao people were crossing over there to buy daily 
necessities. They rented a shophouse along the river at first and were then able to buy 
land closer to the checkpoint, where they built their current shophouse. Although Kew 
relied on her Thai husband to buy land for their shophouse, it was her vast social 
network of potential customers on the Lao side, which they could draw on to sell goods. 
While Kew focused on the sales aspect of the business and held the purse strings, her 
husband engaged in the travelling-related aspects of the business supplies. Their 
business soon flourished and by the time of my research they hired a worker from the 
Lao side to help Kew sort and pack goods.  
Most of the shophouse owners at the customary border checkpoints started off their 
businesses by making use of cross-border kinship relations and social relations, which 
they already had before the communist takeover in Laos. For Kew and her family, 
however, social networks had been all the more significant. When her family fled from 
their Lao village to the Thai side, their relatives in Ban Sing could provide temporary 
shelter before they were able to set up their own home. Later, when Kew lived with her 
husband, she regularly crossed over to the Lao side to buy fresh products from her 
fellow traders in order to resell those products at the fresh market in a Thai border 
village. Finally, when she opened the shop at the customary border checkpoint, she was 
able to build on her existing relationships with relatives and other traders in the town 
across the river: “I know every single shop on that side and everyone from [there] 
because I was born there. We are all related (pen yat kan)”.  
In fact, one of Kew’s most important and most regular customers was her cousin Jeng 
and his wife Dao who were shop owners in the Lao border town of Ban Sawan. Jeng 
drove across the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge almost every day to meet Kew’s husband 
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from whom he received a large amount of goods, which he then took back across the 
bridge. Jeng and his wife also received small amounts of goods from Kew’s shop via 
the customary border checkpoint. While several shopkeepers at the central market in 
Ban Sawan had started driving to Mueang Loei themselves, thereby bypassing traders in 
Thai border villages such as Kew, Kew herself could rely on her cousin’s loyalty to 
continue buying the bulk of his goods from her.  
 
Image 7: Kew gives change to a customer from Laos who just bought two 
packs of soft drinks (Source: Author)  
Kew and Jeng were kin but they respected each other as traders in that their 
arrangements did not differ from those between traders who were not kin. The close 
relationship between traders and customers – be it kin or non-kin – came with several 
social obligations. If one of her close customers in Laos or one of these customer’s 
family members was ill, Kew asked her husband to help them access health services on 
the Thai side by driving them in his car. Kew also granted her customers credit (the 
Thai word is also kredit), ranging from three days up to one year depending on how 
close their relationship and how strong their relationship of trust was. Kew did not take 
any interest on this credit and would accept a re-payment of the credit in goods instead 
of cash if needed. Such goods could consist of fresh products such as chicken or pork 
meat, but she had also received furniture, e.g. a sofa in the past. In order to maintain 
good relationships with her trading partners, furthermore, Kew occasionally went to the 
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Lao side of the border, crossing over the customary border checkpoint to visit them for 
a chat, collect money, and take up new orders. During the annual village festivals (ngan 
bun) she also crossed over the border to celebrate with her trading partners and invited 
them to her home during the festival in Ban Sing. 
While the conditions for Kew’s trade relations were based more on trust than on 
kinship, Kew did differentiate between kin and non-kin when describing her 
relationship with her customers. When referring to her relationship with her cousin 
Jeng, Kew used the term “pen yat kan” (we are related). In Thailand, the term yat is 
used explicitly for consanguineal and affinal relatives (Amara 1985) and Kew’s use of 
the term confirms this. When describing her relationship with most of her other 
customers, Kew referred to them as siblings (phinong). Both Walker (2012: 172) and 
Askew (2002: 218) describe phinong as a broadly inclusive kinship term that may not 
only include consanguineal and affinal relatives but also extend to fictive kin. This 
became especially clear in my research location when I asked how exactly people who 
had been described as phinong were related. In many instances, my informants would 
refer to kinship relations dating back to their distant ancestors or say that they have 
simply “been conducting trade with each other” (kha khai duaikan) for a very long time. 
One female trader’s mother had already conducted trade with the trader’s customer’s 
mother and they knew each other almost their entire life. The Thai term for customer 
(lukkha) was seldomly used by the traders at the customary border checkpoints.  
Although the term phinong can be loosely translated as siblings, it literally means “older 
sibling younger sibling”, which implies an unequal power relationship based on birth 
order and generation. In Thailand, one’s position in the social hierarchy is determined 
through a combination of age, education level, reputation of the family, and gender and 
children learn early on to respect their elders (Mattson and Stage 2003: 113). When 
people of a similar age meet each other for the first time, they usually establish in the 
beginning who is older and who is younger. The age hierarchy is then verbalised 
through the use of phi and nong (Bechstedt 2002: 242).  
Although the term phinong is widely used all around Thailand, it attains a certain and 
very interesting specificity when used for relationships across the Thai-Lao border. This 
is because it is also used in Thailand to describe the regional power relationship 
between Thailand and Laos (Pholsena and Banomyong 2006: 60). In Thailand children 
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in the third school year already learn the term ban phi mueang nong (the home of the 
elder sibling, the home of the younger sibling) in history textbooks to understand the 
historical (and inherently asymmetrical) relationship between Thailand and Laos 
(Mayoury 1994: 6). The term reflects Thailand’s patronising attitude towards Laos 
(Chapter 2) and its predominant view of Laos as “backward” and “peripheral” 
(McCargo and Krisadawan 2004: 231). Laos avoids using the term and pefers to 
describe its relationship with Thailand as ban kai hueang kieng (neighbouring 
countries), emphasising their equal footing and mutual respect (Mayoury 1994: 1)
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Walker describes phinong at the village level as implying a sense of localised solidarity 
and interdependence (Walker 2012: 172). This solidarity and interdependence seems to 
apply to the situation in my research area where a sense of localised solidarity may be 
seen to extend beyond the nation-state border. With regard to daily necessities, this 
interdependence can be seen in the fact that Lao traders depend on access to the Thai 
market while the shophouses at customary border checkpoint relied on their social 
networks in Laos to continue their business. When seen in the context of regional 
asymmetry, however, the usage of phinong in the border area implies exactly the 
opposite, namely the unequal status and one-sided dependence of Lao traders to the 
traders on the Thai side. From this perspective, the power relationship between the 
traders at the customary border checkpoints and their customers on the Lao side is not 
based on interdependence. Instead the regional inequality is experienced locally in the 
border area and finds its expression in the local usage of the term phinong. Thai border 
traders show empathy with their “underprivileged” counterparts by giving them credit 
and helping them access Thai health services.  
Rather than interpreting the phinong relationship as reflecting either solidarity or 
regional inequality, I suggest that term implies both simultaneously and that this 
ambiguity defines the relationship between Thai and Lao traders in the borderland. This 
becomes particularly interesting when considering that Kew was born in Laos and only 
fled with her parents to Thailand as a child after the communist takeover. Now a 
resident of Thailand she had easier access to the Thai market and could act as a supplier 
to her Lao relatives. Even though she was not a full Thai citizen (Kew owned a Lao 
migrant ID card that did not permit her to travel in Thailand without permission from 
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 At the same time, the Lao government promotes an image of Laos as the more authentic Tai country 
with a higher moral code while portraying Thailand as utterly decadent, more corrupt, and full of crime 
(Kislenko 2009: 153). 
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the authorities), she was married to a Thai citizen and had two children who were Thai 
citizens. She had stepped into the phi position of the regional Thai-Lao relationship 
while retaining her kinship relations and localised solidarity with the traders in her 
hometown. What further confirmed this ambiguity was the fact that some of my 
interlocutors on the Lao side used the term ban phi mueang nong themselves to 
emphasise their close, yet inferior relationship to the Thai side. This comes as no 
surprise as the Thai baht was the predominant currency in the immediate Lao border 
area and Lao villagers often travelled to the Thai side to access better health services as 
well as daily necessities. It brings to light how the border are simultaneously 
incorporates regional asymmetry with local connectedness and solidarity.  
While the social networks between shophouse owners and their Lao customers were 
strong and based on trust, they stand in contrast to the relationships between many 
border market traders and Lao visitors. Border markets are places where many short- 
and long-distance traders and other villagers from either side of the border come 
together. As described above, border market traders usually travel from market to 
market along the Hueang River as well as to markets throughout Loei province. During 
my research many of those selling goods at the markets in Ban Sing, Ban Plee, and Ban 
Donmai came all the way from Petchabun, Khon Kaen and other surrounding provinces. 
Most of these traders did not have any relatives or other social relations in Laos.  
At the border markets in my research area, traders and villagers from Laos strolled 
along the market and compared the quality and prices of goods before buying them at a 
particular stall. Thai traders sold their goods from within their stalls but did not 
normally take orders from their customers. This was only the case for the few traders 
who had long-standing relationships with traders across the border. But the majority of 
traders did not rely on such social networks. Instead, their sales success came down to 
offering the lowest prices. The competition between traders at the border market was 
very high. The competition was especially high among border market traders selling the 
same type of products such as clothing or cosmetics. Customers at the border markets 
bargained hard for the best prices.  
This was the case particularly at the border market in Ban Plee where there seemed to 
be a growing resentment of Thai market traders against Lao customers who liked to 
bargain down to the wholesale price. Bargaining takes place at all markets in Thailand 
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and Laos, even among relatives and close friends (Hartmann 1997). But at border 
markets, another component was added to the relationship between traders and 
customers, namely the fact that the market stall owners were Thai (khon thai) and the 
vast majority of customers was Lao (khon lao). The increased bargaining power of Lao 
customers in the wake of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge not only made trade at border 
markets even more competitive but also entrenched negative attitudes and stereotypes 
among Thai vendors of Lao people as a whole.  
When I asked one female clothes trader about her relationship with her customers, she 
complained: “The khon lao like to take advantage of me, they are deceitful (khigong) 
because they know the wholesale price from going to Mueang Loei and then they 
bargain down to that price. There is so much competition here that I can only get a 20 
baht profit for a piece of clothing worth 400 baht. In Nongkhai, I can sell clothes to Lao 
customers for the same price as to Thai customers.” Another trader felt that: “Lao 
customers like to bargain more and even invent prices that are just untenable.” It was 
especially at the Ban Plee border market where customers tried to bargain to the lowest 
price because many of them were traders who have been to Mueang Loei themselves 
and who therefore knew the wholesale price for many of the goods sold at the border 
markets. In Laos, they could resell these goods with a profit of up to 100 per cent.  
But the border market traders complained not only about Lao customers’ stinginess. It 
seemed to be a widespread assumption that they were thieves as well. One of the traders 
described a situation in which she saw one of her customers run away with a big bag of 
clothes without ever returning to pay. Another trader selling bread asked me to help her 
watch her stall one day while she and her husband were busy with their customers. It 
was a busy day at Ban Plee border market and I had asked to watch her and her husband 
bargain with their customers. Meanwhile, I was given the task of watching for 
“deceitful Lao customers”.  
The negative characteristics attributed to Lao customers were extended to Laos as a 
whole. On several occasions I witnessed how the term khon lao was used by Thai 
traders and other border residents to mock Lao customers and villagers. A case in point 
occurred during my travels with Mu and her family along the border markets. In the 
early afternoon just before traders were starting to pack up, one of the Lao customers 
asked Mu for some water after buying clothes from her. Mu asked her four-year old son 
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to hand the customer a cup of water. Later, Mu’s son mentioned to Mae Som that he 
gave water to someone and when asked to whom, he said: “To the khon lao”. Mae Som 
erupted in loud laughter and told the story to the other traders while packing up. It 
turned into the anecdote of the day. Back in the truck, I asked Mae Som why everyone 
thought the story was so funny. She said it was because of her grandson calling the 
customer khon lao, which nobody wants to be called. Even those who are actually from 
Laos would rather say that they simply come from somewhere in the Thai border area 
than from Laos itself. 
While the unequal relationship between shophouse owners and their social network of 
Lao customers is quite subtle and complex, it is much more pronounced at border 
markets along the Hueang River. I suggest that this has in part to do with location and 
economic factors. Shophouse owners have always been much more dependent on their 
social networks for survival and even more so since the opening of the Thai-Lao 
Friendship Bridge. Border market traders, in contrast, experienced a boom during the 
1980s and 1990s when setting up their stalls at the ports of toleration that channelled the 
flow of people across the border. The opening of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge has 
increased the bargaining power of Lao customers, much to the frustration of border 
market traders. To channel this frustration, I argue, border traders draw on negative 
stereotypes of Laos that re-establishes their superiority over their Lao customers. In 
doing so, Thai border traders reinforce the social boundary between the Thai and Lao 
people as a whole, which is in line with the Westphalian logic of the nation-state border.  
The final aspect I will discuss in relation to the way female traders contribute to the 
production of the nation-state border is cross-border mobility. As we have seen, female 
traders situated on the Thai side rarely went to the Lao side. Shophouse owners at 
customary border checkpoints either shipped goods across with the help of the local 
boat operators or exchanged goods on the Thai side of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. 
Border markets were situated on the Thai side and benefited from the customary border 
checkpoints as well as the Bridge that channelled the flow of customers directly to 
them. This does not mean, however, that all female Lao traders were highly mobile. As 
I demonstrate in the next section, their cross-border mobility varied according to 
location as well as the gendered division of labour of their trading business. 
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CROSS-BORDER MOBILITY 
It has been shown that the improvement of infrastructure and access to the world market 
increases the social mobility of female traders as it gives women a wider scope for 
getting involved in trade and raises their status in society (Suparb 1989). The 
construction of roads and highways in Laos, for example, has helped female traders in 
roadside villages to change their pattern of traditional activities and to increase their 
household decision-making power (Ireson 1996). When border regulations along the 
Thai-Lao border relaxed in 1990s, furthermore, Lü women in Sayaboury province 
started practicing their tradition of cotton weaving again, sold their products at the 
weekly border market, and later engaged in contract weaving. Their additional income 
led to a shift in hierarchies and priorities in the household (Kusakabe 2004). It seems 
that women’s positions in the household are changing over time through empowerment 
in the economic sphere. 
While women’s social mobility is increasing, taboos and anxieties around their 
geographic mobility still exist to some extent in Thailand and Laos. These taboos are 
based on the assumption that women’s responsibilities in the household are not 
compatible with travelling long distances. The sedentary role of women is often 
contrasted with an emphasis on men’s adventures and travels (Mills 1999: 97f). In the 
mid-1990s Mills reported about a phenomenon she calls the “widow ghosts scare”, 
which was a six week period during which rural communities in Northeastern Thailand 
were afraid of being attacked by deadly female spirits who were “looking for men to kill 
and take as ‘husbands’” (1995: 245). Mills finds that the scare came to the fore amongst 
a growing concern about “the unnatural and dangerous consequences of allowing 
women to roam freely, their bodies and sexual powers unconstrained by the controls of 
society or of men” (Mills 1995: 257). More recently, dangers associated with migration 
such as trafficking, slavery, and imprisonment when caught by authorities have 
perpetuated such anxieties about women’s mobility (Hewison and Young 2006; High 
2009). 
My own experience confirms that such anxieties still exist to some extent. As a young 
unmarried female researcher I had to explain my situation time and again amongst my 
interlocutors in Thailand and Laos. The first question I was usually asked after 
explaining my research objective was “How many people are in your group?” Having 
clarified that I was on my own, I often received reactions of bafflement. Because of my 
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social positioning, the teacher who accommodated me in her home in Ban Thong 
elucidated appropriate ways of behaviour that included limited mobility, e.g. that I 
should under no circumstances be out of the house on my own after dark. Some of my 
interlocutors were also surprised that I was riding alone on my motorbike from village 
to village, which included spaces of uninhabited forest and plantations where I could, as 
one female trader put it, get “kidnapped” or even “murdered”. It is interesting that the 
female trader who expressed these latter comments worked as an individual border 
trader who travelled to Mueang Loei on a regular basis to buy goods, delivering them to 
the customary border checkpoint in Ban Sing. She maintained an utterly mobile 
livelihood.  
For several of my interlocutors, household responsibilities did have an impact on their 
geographic mobility. Some types of traders have found ways of integrating motherhood 
with a mobile lifestyle as we have seen in the case of female border market traders. In 
his study on cross-border trade between Thailand and Laos, furthermore, Walker found 
that many small-scale long-distance traders were young and unmarried, or older and 
divorced or separated from their husbands (Walker 1999: 139). Large-scale traders, in 
contrast, conducted trade together with their husbands. In my own research long-
distance middlewomen who conducted small-scale trade were often accompanied by 
their husbands or travelled together with other women. When they had small children, 
they were only able to engage in cross-border trade when they had a relative who could 
take care while they were gone.  
Here, I look at the cross-border mobility of female traders with a particular focus on Lao 
traders. This is because traders on the Thai side generally crossed the border less often 
than Lao traders to whom cross-border mobility was often essential. Inspired by the 
typology of Ortiz and Contreras (2014) in their work along the US-Mexico border, I 
differentiate between traders to whom the act of crossing the border was a background 
aspect of their everyday life, and those traders to whom crossing the border was an 
integral aspect of their everyday life. While Ortiz and Contreras (2014) look at four 
different types of border experiences among border residents (the uncrossed border, the 
border as background, the everyday border, the transposed border), I use two of these 
categories to highlight the experiences of female traders in my research area. In their 
work, Ortiz and Contreras (2014) highlight the important point that not everyone who 
lives along the border also crosses it (see also Vila 2003). In addition to this, I suggest 
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that the necessity and regularity of crossing the border can change over the course of 
one’s life.  
The female traders to whom the border was a background feature of their everyday life 
experience includes the Thai shophouse owners, border market traders as well as many 
of the Lao female traders at the central market in the Lao town across from Ban Sing. 
These traders benefit from the border and the economic asymmetry between Thailand 
and Laos by buying and reselling goods at a profit. They do not cross the border as part 
of their everyday life, despite existing linkages with kin and non-kin across the border. 
As Ortiz and Contreras (2014) write: “This type of experience suggests that physical 
adjacency does not suffice to enable crossing, which also requires certain economic and 
social resources, particularly access to cross-border family networks. The border is 
experienced as a backdrop permeating the life experience of people who only 
occasionally cross the border” (2014: 47). 
In the case of the US-Mexico border, the people in this category did not cross the border 
because of the difficulties imposed by the US border controls. This resonates with the 
reasons provided by Mu, the border market trader mentioned above, for not crossing the 
border despite having kin in Lao border villages. Mu’s experiences with and perceptions 
of the Lao state and its border controls were echoed by many of the border residents on 
the Thai side of my research area as a reason for not crossing over. They either had bad 
experiences when crossing over the border or were of the opinion that Lao state officials 
do not adhere to the law. A common phrase was: “They are not the same as us. They 
don’t do what they say they will do. They do not have the same rules as us.” Mu and her 
family, for example, lived very close to the customary border checkpoint in Ban 
Donmai. But they hardly ever crossed over the border since the communist takeover in 
1975. In fact, the first time we spoke, Mu told me that she had no relatives on the other 
side of the river and that she never went to the Lao side at all. After getting to know her 
better, she explained that she did go to Laos occasionally for weddings and other family 
ceremonies.  
Mu explained that it is difficult to cross over to Laos “because of all the rules and 
regulations”. She not only had to pay a fee at the checkpoint but was also required to 
return the same day. She was not allowed to stay overnight. If she did stay overnight 
“they will arrest us”, she said (referring to Lao state officials). She also felt that Lao 
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state officials at the border-crossing were very suspicious of drug trafficking: “They 
stare at me, suggesting that I am carrying drugs!” This made her feel uncomfortable. 
Another trader said that the Lao state officials had not allowed her husband to cross 
over the checkpoint one time because he was wearing short trousers, which were against 
the accepted dress code set by the Lao government. These experiences cultivated a 
negative perception of the Lao state, underpinned by people’s memories of the time 
before the communist takeover, and the national discourse of distrust against the 
communist-led state in Laos. 
While the border was also a background feature for Kew, she did cross over the border 
sometimes, though not regularly, for many different reasons. One was to maintain good 
customer relations by visiting her customers in their homes. This also gave her the 
opportunity to collect money and take up new orders from them. She also attended the 
annual village festival in her hometown. As I will elaborate in Chapter 5, Kew did not 
experience the same difficulties of crossing over the border as Mu. This was due to the 
social relationships she had established with the border guards on both sides of the 
border. When she was away her shop assistant took over the shop rather than her 
husband.  
In contrast to Kew’s husband, her cousin Jeng who ran a business with his wife on the 
Lao side was also engaged in the customer-facing aspect of the business. He was 
responsible for the daily necessities in the inside area of the shop while his wife, named 
Dao, sold fresh foods in the outside area. Nevertheless, Dao was the holder of the purse 
strings and managed the finances of their business. Dao was also the one who had 
brought her husband into the business. Her parents had owned a construction company 
and when Dao’s younger sister took over the business, Dao opened a shop selling fresh 
vegetables and fish next door. When she married Jeng, he joined her business. 
When the government opened the central market in the Lao town of Ban Sawan in 
2009, all shops situated throughout the town that sold daily necessities, fresh foods, and 
clothes were forced to move their businesses to the central market. At the central 
market, Dao and Jeng continued selling fresh food and added daily necessities to their 
shop, which they received from Kew via the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge (they also 
received the fresh food from a Thai trader via the Bridge). Every day, Kew’s husband 
delivered a pick-up truck full of daily necessities to the Thai side of the Thai-Lao 
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Friendship Bridge where Jeng picked them up. This meant that crossing the border was 
in fact an integral part of Dao and Jeng’s business. However, it was only a background 
feature for Dao as it was her husband who crossed the border on a daily basis, which 
included lifting and packing the goods into his truck, and paying customs duties at the 
border.  
In both Dao and Kew’s cases it was their husbands that were responsible for the aspect 
of the business that required geographic mobility, and in Jeng’s case cross-border 
mobility. Nevertheless, Dao had been across the border a few times. She had been to 
Mueang Loei and visited the new supermarkets there. But she said she could not afford 
to go more often than once every few months because she had to keep the shop open 
twelve hours a day, seven days a week. When she and her husband went to Mueang 
Loei together, they had to close their shop, losing money on those days. When she was 
ill, she did not go to the Thai side but to the local clinic in Ban Sawan. Kew and Dao’s 
examples demonstrate that female cross-border traders can be restricted in their 
geographic mobility based on the gendered division of labour. This is very different to 
the female traders further inside Sayaboury who act as middlewomen, taking orders 
from traders and buying them in Mueang Loei on their behalf. Many of these 
middlewomen travel together with their husbands while others travel together with other 
female traders in order to minimise costs. To exemplify how the border can be part of 
the everyday life experience of female traders, I will elaborate the situation of one of 
these middlewomen.  
During my research, many such middlewomen crossed the border on a weekly basis, 
travelling across the border to Mueang Loei on a Friday and returning to the Thai-Lao 
Friendship Bridge to stay overnight in tents in front of the administration building. On 
the Saturday morning, they bought fresh food and any remaining goods at the border 
market and then returned to Sayaboury province to deliver the goods to their customers. 
One of the middlewomen who travelled to Mueang Loei on a weekly basis was a trader 
in her 30s named Lida. She was from a town further inside Sayaboury province. She 
had been engaged in this kind of trade for the past four years. She had started trading in 
order to complement her husband’s meagre government salary. Her husband was a 
high-ranking military officer who earned 5,000 baht per month. At the time of their 
marriage 20 years ago her husband earned 4,000 baht per month. Lida said that this was 
not enough for them and their three children to live on so she started engaging in trading 
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activities. At first she bought vegetables from the local farmers in the area and sold 
them at the market in her hometown but this did not increase their income by much. 
Four years ago, however, a friend introduced her to the trade in daily necessities 
between Loei and Sayaboury province. She started travelling together with her friend, 
thereby learning the ins and outs of the business, and then started conducting her own 
trade. At the time of my research, she was earning more money than her husband and 
was the main income provider for the family. 
When she started her business, Lida explained, the roads had not been improved yet and 
it could take up to three days to drive to the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. Trucks would 
get stuck in holes in the street, creating traffic jams and road closures. She had to sleep 
along the roadside then. Her three sons were already in school and could take care of 
themselves by the time she started her business, allowing her to go on extended 
journeys as needed. It was only in 2010 that the roads in Sayaboury province were 
improved so that it now only took her a few hours to travel to the Bridge.  
It cost Lida 2,300 baht for gasoline to travel to the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge and 
back. She charged 300 baht for any passengers who wanted to go to the border and 
another 300 baht for the ride back. Once she crossed the Bridge, it her cost another 
1,300 baht for a local driver to take her to Mueang Loei and back. She usually shared 
the cost of the driver with at least one other middlewoman. When crossing the border 
with a normal load of goods, Lida said paid a 200 baht fee for export documents on the 
Thai side and then 2,000 baht for Lao customs duties. She said that Lao customs 
officers usually made her pay too much but that she could usually negotiate with them 
by explaining that she would not make any profit if they made her pay too much. She 
complained: “The Lao customs officers are only there to take money off you, they only 
think about themselves and how they can get rich. They don’t think much about the 
hardships of others. They only want to build nice houses for themselves and their 
families and take the money off the traders at the bridge.” While I will discuss the 
negotiations and interactions between traders and state officials in more detail in 
Chapter 6, suffice to say here that Lida perceived Lao state practices at the border as 
arbitrary and predatory. Being married to a soldier did not help her case in this situation. 
As I accompanied Lida on one of her trips back to her hometown inside Sayaboury 
province one day, we stopped at a fresh food market where she bought a large bucket of 
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catfish. For this, she had to pay another tax at a duty station along the highway. Lida 
explained that this was a kind of “agricultural tax” (kasikam), which was not high but 
necessary. She remembered driving past the duty station by accident one day: “The 
officers rushed to their vehicles and raced behind me with a siren on, stopping me and 
making me pay the tax.” While it is unclear what kind of tax this was exactly, the story 
confirmed that the state was an important aspect of Lida’s everyday trading experience.  
The account of Lida’s trading practices confirms how women’s geographic mobility can 
increase their social mobility. Since starting her trading business, Lida had become the 
main bread winner in her family. It also shows how competitors work together in the 
business by sharing costs of travel. With regard to the border, Lida’s example also 
demonstrates how the border can be more present in the lives of female long-distance 
traders than in the lives of those who engage in localised trading practices in close 
proximity to the border. This confirms the diversity of trading practices as well as the 
diverse ways in which women engage in the small-scale trade of daily necessities across 
the nation-state border. As in the case of all female traders involved in such practices, 
Lida made a living through arbitrage, profiting from the scarcity of goods in Laos and 
the price differences between Thailand and Laos. By negotiating with the Lao customs 
officer, however, Lida also resisted the border to a certain extent.  
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I sought to highlight how female traders as non-state actors contribute to 
the articulation of the border throughout their everyday life. I covered the three aspects 
of integrating work and family life, social networks, and cross-border mobility. In each 
of these sections I have demonstrated how the border is produced, transgressed, and 
reinforced through different practices. In terms of family life, for example, women have 
found ways of integrating their domestic responsibilities with their trading activities. 
Both shophouse owners and border market traders on the Thai side of the border are 
able to raise their young children while at the same time engaging in trade. They are 
able to maintain long-standing businesses that sometimes last over generations. In doing 
so, they exploit and perpetuate the economic asymmetry between Thailand and Laos, 
and the dependence of Lao border villages on the Thai side of the border.  
When looking at the social networks that exist between traders across the border, 
however, it becomes clear how kin or kin-like relationships straddle the nation-state 
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border, thereby transcending the isomorphism of people, territory, and sovereignty of 
both nation-states. The maintenance of cross-border social networks is an integral part 
of the trading business for shophouses at customary border checkpoints. These social 
networks are built on trust and reciprocity, and extend to the private domain where 
traders invite and celebrate with each other at festivals. At the same time, the 
terminology used to describe these relationships (phinong) implies a power relationship 
that reifies the significance of the border.  
My findings further show that border markets are places where the negative stereotypes 
associated with Laos are cultivated and reinforced. While shophouse owners referred to 
their Lao customers as siblings (phinong), border market traders protected their goods 
from the thieves among their “deceitful customers”. The difference between 
maintaining regular relationships with other traders (as in the case of shophouse 
owners) and selling goods to strangers (as in the case of border markets) is a major 
aspect here. While shophouse owners sold goods to their regular trading partners during 
most of the week, they also encountered customers they were unfamiliar with on border 
market days. On these days, shophouse owners pulled up iron gates around parts of their 
shops to prevent theft.  
In terms of cross-border mobility, female Lao traders generally crossed the border to 
Thailand more often than Thai traders. In some cases, however, female Lao traders only 
crossed the occasionally border for purposes leisure while relying on boat operators or 
their husbands for the delivery of goods across the border instead. For long-distance 
middlewomen, however, cross-border mobility was an integral part of their everyday 
lives. By engaging in arbitrage, middlewomen took advantage of and perpetuated the 
economic asymmetry between Thailand and Laos that was upheld by the nation-state 
border. By being able to negotiate a lower customs tariff with Lao customs officials, 
they were also able to evade the fiscal aspect of the border, weakening the Westphalian 
logic of the border to a certain degree. 
The livelihoods of such middlewomen were deeply affected by the border even though 
they lived up to 200km away from the border. The business of buying goods in 
Thailand and reselling them to other traders throughout the province allowed them to 
contribute financially to the family household and increase their socio-economic status. 
In these cases, cross-border mobility came with social mobility. The same goes for the 
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Lao and Thai female shop owners living in closer proximity to the border. They were 
able to draw on social networks across the border throughout changing border policies 
as a survival strategy. Thai female border market traders were not so much affected by 
the border than shaped the border in important ways. As I discussed in Chapter 2, 
border market traders set up their stalls in Thai border villages on a regular basis as 
soon as trade restrictions along the border were relaxed in the 1980s. In doing so, they 
attracted hundreds and thousands of Lao villagers to Thai border villages across the 
checkpoints and prompted the opening of further checkpoints along the Thai-Lao 
border. 
Apart from the border, the lives of the women introduced in this chapter are shaped by 
many other factors that affect women in other more rural areas around Thailand and 
Laos as well. They include the gendered division of household responsibilities, the 
tension between being a “modern woman” who travels and works or studies in city, and 
being a “dutiful daughter” who stays at home and cares for the family. This rural-urban 
factor is interesting when applying it to the Lao side because to many female Lao 
women, the Thai side and Mueang Loei more specifically was considered the modern 
city rather than Mueang Sayaboury. Although I did not study this aspect in detail, I 
suggest that engaging in small-scale cross-border trade was a way of “being modern” 
while at the same time they were able to fulfil their duties at home.  
It thus becomes clear how different the experiences and everyday lives of female traders 
engaged in the cross-border trade in daily necessities in my research area were and how 
differently they engaged with the border. In the next chapter I will provide insight into 
the lives of the state actors in my research area and how they were embedded in the 
local culture and society of the borderland. As I will show, they also constituted a part 
of the social networks of female traders, which often blurred the lines between the state 
and society.  
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CHAPTER 4 
IN SEARCH OF THE STATE  
INTRODUCTION 
During the latter part of my research I went on a trip with a trader family who sold 
clothes at border markets along the Hueang River (Chapter 3). In the mornings while 
the family set up their stall I would wander around and observe how villagers from Laos 
crossed over the border to shop at the Thai border market. One morning at a market that 
was about an hour away from my research area I recognised a man who was buying 
pork at one of the fresh food stalls. He was dressed as if he was about to work in the rice 
field and I could not remember from where I knew him. It was only a few weeks later 
that I discovered why he had seemed familiar – as I met him again at one of the 
customary border checkpoints in my research area, clad in his black paramilitary Ranger 
uniform. The Ranger had noticed me at the border market as well and explained that I 
had seen him in his hometown during his eight days of leave that month. He had grown 
up in the border area and was deeply familiar with the kind of small-scale trade 
conducted at such border markets. 
Two months later I crossed over to the Lao side to attend the annual festival in Ban 
Sawan. I had got to know some of the female traders who sold daily necessities at Ban 
Sawan’s central market and followed them to the street parade. In the early afternoon I 
was invited to have food and drinks with them and their families. During my casual 
conversation with one of the traders’ husbands I came to understand that he was in fact 
a policeman. His questions about how I had crossed the border had not given me any 
indication of his occupation, as this was one of the first questions other villagers on the 
Lao side asked me as well. It was only when he emphasised the fact that people in the 
Lao borderland should be using the Lao currency throughout their everyday lives rather 
than the Thai baht, that I asked whether he was in fact an agent of the state.  
The fact that my relationships with female traders had led me to the home of a 
policeman was intriguing. But it reminded me that both the Thai paramilitary Ranger 
and the Lao policeman are not only agents of the state. In everyday life they are also 
“multiply positioned citizens” (Gupta and Sharma 2006: 27) with their own historical 
and educational background, ethnic and national identity, preconceptions and 
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prejudices, and intentions to act in a certain way. They are also part of a culture (or a 
multiplicity of cultures depending on one’s definition) that influence their way of 
thinking and acting. In fact, both individuals mentioned above were born and raised in 
the area where they now operated as agents of the state. As individuals they were 
embedded in the local culture and society of the border area.  
Having elaborated my approach to the embeddedness of state actors in society at length 
in the introductory chapter of this thesis, let me reiterate a few points. Acknowledging 
that state actors are embedded in local societies and cultures allows us to examine state 
practices at the micro-level. Rather than comparing the practices of state actors to Max 
Weber’s ideal-type bureaucracy, an acknowledgement and extrication of their 
embeddedness in society makes it possible to see how the state comes into being in all 
its forms, particularly where the line between the state and society is blurred. This 
implies a more localised approach to the state instead of seeing it as a monolithic, 
unitary entity. In her insightful work on bureaucratic migrants in Laos, Singh also 
argues in favour of what she calls a “personalised approach to the state” when saying: 
“[…] Awareness of bureaucrats as individuals, citizens and part of a broader society 
expands the view beyond characteristic assumptions that these people are only either 
honourable or dishonourable agents of the state” (Singh 2012: 120). 
The social embeddedness of state actors and the way it blurs the state-society dichotomy 
is an important aspect of my thesis. It helps us understand how the border is made and 
unmade, enforced, resisted, and rearticulated within this blurry realm between state and 
society. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, an exploration of how the border 
comes into being necessarily involves an enquiry into state practices as it is 
representatives of the state who implement border policies and maintain the sovereignty 
of the state at its territorial edge. Scholars such as Gupta (2006) use a similarly micro-
level approach by looking at the practices of different agencies, agendas, levels, and 
organisations that constitute the state. My approach goes one step further in considering 
the embeddedness of state actors in their everyday life and how this embeddedness 
affects their practices as agents of the state. This does not mean that state practice is 
determined by a reified local culture. Rather, what is of interest here, is the ways in 
which state actors are influenced by, and themselves influence, the complex interplay of 
state domination, the agency of non-state actors, and cultural norms through space and 
time (Bourdieu 1977).  
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In this chapter, I thus provide insight into the situation and lives of the most relevant 
actors that represent the state in my research area and who play a major role in the way 
the border comes into being. They include the village headmen in Thai border villages, 
the Thai paramilitary, as well as Lao state officials. My opportunities to research the 
everyday lives of these actors were limited, particularly on the Lao side, so my 
ethnographic findings are based on interviews, observations, as well as the information I 
was able to obtain through my work with female traders. The latter was particularly 
revealing with respect to practices of gift-giving between state and non-state actors, as 
well as the additional sources of income used by Lao state officials.  
In the final section of this chapter I look at how the Thai and Lao states were differently 
perceived by Thai and Lao border residents in my research area. The differences in 
perception became obvious very early on and impacted the inclination of Thai and Lao 
border residents to travel across the border. The study of how the state is perceived, how 
it is talked and thought about by non-state actors can be very revealing when seeking to 
understand how the state constitutes itself on the ground. Studying the state in this way 
provides insight into the way the border comes into being in everyday life as well. 
Using this approach in their research on Laos, High and Petit (2013) found an ambiguity 
between the “glorious” images of the Lao state as symbolised by billboards adverts 
while in more hidden settings, “horror stories” of the state emerged – stories of 
violence, corruption, and injustice. They conclude that “state-making in Laos today, 
[…] is as much about moral reasoning, local conceptualisations of authority, and 
conceptions of hope as it is about policy and procedure” (High and Petit 2013: 429). 
This ambiguity reflects the complexity of the everyday life of the state. While the 
everyday life of the state is subject to change on an ongoing basis just like any other 
social practice, there are also certain regularities that make it a very mundane affair. 
While on duty, state officials engage in worldly activities such as raising dogs, having 
afternoon naps and watching the evening news on TV. Instead of beginning with 
assumptions about the state in terms of its power, force, and violence, I seek to bring 
forward an account of the ordinary and routine aspects of state-making and bordering, 
whatever these may entail. 
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THE LOCAL THAI ADMINISTRATION: PHUYAIBAN
55
  
In “The Golden Peninsula”, Keyes describes village headmen (phuyaiban) as “agents of 
the state” and “local representatives of the state’s authority” (1977: 153). During the 
colonial period the Thai law was changed in that phuyaiban had to be elected by local 
villagers. However, Keyes states that such elections often still serve merely to confirm 
the right to office of a person who was appointed by a government official or whose 
claim may be based on kinship relations (1977: 154). In his research on local 
government elections, Walker (2008) further found that there was a higher preference 
for candidates who were from the local area or village. This was expressed as an 
inclination towards those who were from ban hao, which can be translated as “our 
village”. Walker remarks that while ban hao is an adjustable spatial referent, candidates 
were readily assessed in terms of their local linkages (Walker 2008). If villagers lose 
confidence, however, phuyaiban can be removed anytime. Although, as De Young 
reports, it is not uncommon for a respected phuyaiban to stay in office until his 
retirement or death (1966: 18).  
These scholarly findings are largely in line with my own findings. The only difference 
is that at the time of my research, local legislation was such that a phuyaiban had to be 
elected or re-elected every five years up to the age of 60 at which point he or she had to 
retire. Otherwise, all of the phuyaiban in my research area were born in the village 
where they were elected – this reinforces the preference for candidates from “our 
village” as Walker has noted. Also confirming De Young’s finding of phuyaiban 
staying in office for many years, one of the phuyaiban in my research area had been in 
office for nearly twenty years. He was born and raised in the village he now oversaw as 
headman. As a teenager he had lived and worked as a teacher in the Lao village across 
the river. He returned to Thailand after the regime change in Laos and became a 
middleman for consumer products, buying goods in Mueang Loei and selling them to 
villagers in Laos. During the time of my research, he continued this business as 
middleman albeit in smaller fashion while fulfilling his duties as phuyaiban. As a 
teacher and businessman, the phuyaiban was not only highly respected within the 
village but also seen as an approachable fellow villager. 
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 I will use the Thai term phuyaiban when referring to both village headmen and headwomen as the term 
is gender neutral. 
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However, in his work published in 1977, Keyes states that phuyaiban are always male 
(1977: 154). In contrast to this, one of the phuyaiban in my research area was female. 
She had been in office for four years. In one of my interviews with her she explained 
how she had become village headwomen: “I didn’t intend to be phuyaiban because 
society doesn’t accept women to be phuyaiban but the villagers encouraged me. I had 
been a village health volunteer and the villagers saw that I work hard so they pushed me 
to become their phuyaiban. It feels natural to do this kind of work.” This not only 
reinforces the aspects of origin and respectability for potential phuyaiban. It also 
demonstrates that these aspects may be even more important than gender. 
According to Keyes (1977) and LePoer (1989), the phuyaiban’s duties include 
arbitrating civil disputes and implementing the directives sent to him by the district 
administration (amphoe) (Keyes 1997: 154; LePoer 1989). At the same time, however, a 
phuyaiban also represents the villagers to the state. Keyes mentions that because of this, 
a phuyaiban may decide not to report a crime to the state due to the pressure put on him 
by fellow villagers. On the other hand, he may be ordered to recruit workers for the 
construction of local infrastructure despite the villagers’ unwillingness to contribute to 
the project (Keyes 1977: 154). In accordance with Keyes and LePoer’s findings, the 
phuyaiban of Ban Sing described his duties as twofold: "If there is a problem in the 
village, then I must take care of it. I also have to take care of the tasks from the district 
administration. If there are any problems that go beyond my responsibilities, then I have 
to report them back to the district administration."  
An important aspect of the phuyaiban’s responsibility was to represent the state to 
villagers while at the same time voicing the concerns of villagers to the state. The 
dilemma this often created for the phuyaiban themselves became particularly evident 
with respect to local border regulations. As elaborated earlier in this thesis, regulations 
along this part of the Thai-Lao border changed drastically after the communist victory 
in Laos in 1975 and again after the opening of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge in 2004. 
After the Bridge became the official border-crossing site, some of the local checkpoints 
were closed and others turned into customary border checkpoints. It became illegal to 
cross over the river outside the Bridge or the customary border checkpoints. When these 
border regulations were put into place, villagers were informed about this by their 
phuyaiban via the village loudspeakers. In fact, in all of the Thai villages in which I 
conducted research, the phuyaiban had access to a microphone that was connected to 
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loudspeakers, which had been installed along the main roads of the village. Every day in 
the early morning and evening, the phuyaiban would inform their fellow villagers of 
any important news and policies.  
Despite this communication of new policies, there were many local border residents 
who crossed over the river outside the official checkpoints on a regular basis. In an 
explanation of this situation, one of the the phuyaiban expressed appreciation of the 
new border regulations but seemed to side with his fellow villagers in terms of not 
complying with the regulations: “We told them [the villagers] not to cross over the river 
but over the Bridge instead. But before they used to cross here and so there must be 
some [villagers] who continue to do so right? It is impossible to just prohibit them from 
crossing over the river. From that side [Laos] they also sneak in but it is no problem – 
just try not to get caught.”  
The phuyaiban’s opinionated description of the border situation brings to light his 
position in-between the state and society. He is an agent of the state, yet at the same 
time he represents the people of his village to the state. With regard to the new border 
regulations that interfere with, or even impede, his own everyday life as well as that of 
his fellow villagers, he defended the act of crossing over the border outside official 
checkpoints, which to some may be seen as circumventing or even resisting the state. I 
will discuss this in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6, arguing that the enforcement of 
local border regulations depends on factors that go beyond the law, namely on history, 
regularity, familiarity and social relationships. It is on these grounds that state officials 
tolerate the act of “sneaking” or conducting small-scale trade among border residents to 
a certain extent. Instead, they focus on activities they consider to be illicit such as drug 
smuggling. 
As in many other border areas, possessing and/or dealing drugs is a common occurrence 
and punished on both the Thai and Lao sides. All of the phuyaiban I interviewed 
mentioned drugs as a major problem in the area. It was mostly teenagers who 
consumed, dealt and smuggled them across the border. Drugs in my research area 
consisted mostly of methamphetamine pills, which are produced in Laos and sold to 
Thai teenagers across the border (The Nation 2004). Several teenagers have brushed 
with Thai and Lao laws due to such activities. When encountered by Lao authorities 
while crossing the border with drugs they are usually sent to the local Lao jail. In such 
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cases, the local phuyaiban’s duty is to facilitate the Thai villager’s return. One of the 
phuyaiban described this process of facilitation, noting at the same time that he has 
never been permitted to see the Lao jail: “[We] just pay the fine over there [on the Lao 
side] and they will tell you when to come and pick him [the Thai prisoner] up. I have 
gone many times to get back the villagers who got caught but they won’t let you see the 
jail… I just tell him [the officer] the name and they will tell me to wait at the bridge and 
they will go and get them.” 
The phuyaiban’s duty of facilitating the repatriation of villagers from Laos is very 
specific to the border area. The duty itself underlines once more that despite being an 
agent of the state, the phuyaiban also represents the villagers vis-à-vis the state – 
although in this case, the Lao state. The fact that Thai phuyaiban are prohibited from 
viewing the local Lao jail, however, indicates a lack of trust between local Thai and Lao 
authorities. This lack of trust feeds into the common perception among Thai villagers of 
the Lao state as harsh, unruly and with an arbitrary law enforcement. All of the 
phuyaiban I spoke to also perceived the Lao state this way. This became particularly 
evident in their comparisons of local Thai and Lao states’ practices of punishment, 
which I will come back to in a later section. 
THE SITUATION AND LIFE OF THAI PARAMILITARIES 
On the Thai side of the customary border checkpoints, the state was represented by 
Thailand’s paramilitary border guards called thahan phran. The term literally means 
‘hunter soldiers’ but is usually translated as Rangers (Ball 2004). This paramilitary 
force was established as part of the Royal Thai Army in 1978 with the purpose of 
fighting the insurgency by the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) in the Northeast. 
After the Vietnamese invasion in Cambodia in 1978, thahan phran were sent to protect 
the Thai-Cambodian border and control refugee camps. Since then the thahan phran 
have replaced the army in many areas including the Golden Triangle. They generally act 
as a front-line force in Thailand’s more troubled border areas. 
In terms of recruitment, the initial idea was to employ civilians from areas around 
communist strongholds, give them weapons training, supply them with weapons and 
then send them back to their villages to fight against communist insurgents (Ball 2004: 
9). Many recruits were convicted criminals who were paroled upon becoming Rangers. 
Some were civilians drawn from existing organisations such as the Village Scouts. 
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Other recruits were enticed by the promise that they would receive land while others 
wanted simply to show their devotion to their country. By the end of 1981, there were 
13,000 thahan phran in 160 companies, which decreased to 10,600 Rangers in 2004 
(Ball 2004).  
The Rangers in my research area belonged to the 21
st
 regiment of Loei, which has ten 
companies. The company in my research area covered seven duty stations and at the 
time of my research was 70-80 men strong. Thahan phran are easy to spot due to their 
conspicuous black uniforms, the insignia of a bat on their vest and the phrase rau su (we 
fight) on their sleeve (Image 8). They often carry their M-16 rifles around with them 
while patrolling the area. One Ranger regularly carried his rifle around with him even 
while clad in civilian clothes. The duty stations in my research area included customary 
border checkpoints as well as the company headquarters. A group of 5-6 Rangers was 
stationed at each customary border checkpoint. Individual Rangers would usually 
change duty stations every 2-3 months, although in some cases they would stay up to 
several years. Over the course of my research, I would therefore sometimes get to know 
an individual Ranger at one customary border checkpoint and encounter the same 
Ranger as he worked at another checkpoint a few months later. One of the Rangers 
suspected that the objective of this rotation system was to prevent them from “getting 
involved too much and also to not get bored”. 
 
Image 8: Uniform of thahan phran at customary border checkpoint 
(Source: Author) 
Getting involved and socialising with the local population was often inevitable though. 
The vast majority of Rangers I met in my research area were from Loei province and 
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some of their homes and families were located merely 20km away from their duty 
station. Many of them would use one of their family’s motorbikes to drive around their 
duty area and to visit their family during their days off. As a paramilitary organisation 
within the Royal Thai Army, Rangers have the same working pattern as army soldiers, 
working 30 days in a row and then receiving 8 days of leave. The Rangers in my 
research area usually went home to visit their families during this period. They knew the 
local area well and spoke the local dialect. This allowed them to easily communicate 
with the local villagers from both sides of the border and become easily embedded in 
the area of their duty station, although this varied according to an individual’s 
personality as well (Chapter 5). 
This social embeddedness was reinforced as Rangers were often engaged in “worldly 
activities” (Ball 2004: 6). They could be seen growing vegetables and visiting local 
markets in both their uniforms and civilian clothes. At several of the customary border 
checkpoints in my research area, Rangers kept animals including Labrador dogs and 
songbirds
56
. While most of the Rangers resided in a shared house at their duty station, 
one of the Rangers I met was renting his own house across from the border checkpoint 
and staying there together with his wife and daughter. After he had worked at the same 
duty station for two years, his wife and daughter decided to move there as well. When I 
started my research, the Ranger’s wife had just opened a noodle shop in front of their 
home and their daughter had just started going to school in the local village. In fact, 
after a few months I was regularly having lunch at the Rangers’ wife’s noodle shop, 
visiting the Ranger and his colleagues at their duty station and teaching his daughter 
English during my voluntary English classes at the local school.  
The Ranger’s embeddedness in the local community stands in contrast to reports from 
other border areas where Rangers have become known and even feared for their 
involvement in political corruption and human rights violations (Ball 2004). The height 
of such atrocities was in the 1980s when Rangers were newly recruited to fight 
communist insurgents. More recently, Rangers have been criticised for their 
incompetence and brutality during their operations in Southern Thailand, which have 
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 In fact, training songbirds has recently become a more popular activity in the Northeast of Thailand and 
a few other villagers were raising such songbirds and training them to sing at competitions. Having 
originated in Southern Thailand, these competitions are now also held in Northeastern Thai cities such as 
Udon Thani and Loei. While there is no monetary prize at the competition itself, winning birds can be 
worth several hundred thousand baht (see also Anderson 2005). At the border to Laos, the birds are 
usually bought off a villager on the Lao side who catches them in the forest for around 100 baht. 
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increased since 2002. International Crisis Group reports on incidents of torture, rape and 
extrajudicial killings carried out by Rangers against Muslim civilians in the South (ICG 
2007). The report also mentions some of the reasons why the military prefers to deploy 
Rangers to troubled areas instead of commissioned soldiers, which include Rangers’ 
knowledge of the local areas and their local social networks but also the fact that their 
labour is cheaper. 
In fact, during one of my first interviews with a Ranger in my research area, he said that 
Rangers receive an initial salary of 8,000 baht a month, which then increases over time. 
Despite their low salary, Rangers are considered part of the military and therefore have 
a high social status, which is even higher than that of teachers (Ball 2004: 3). Within the 
military, however, they have a lower status than commissioned soldiers who not only 
receive a higher wage but also require higher educational levels upon entry. In fact, an 
army soldier who was helping out on a temporary basis at one of the customary border 
checkpoints had been made head of the duty station immediately upon arrival. 
Furthermore, quite a few of my informants mentioned that they had tried to enter the 
army. It was only after they failed that they applied to become Rangers instead. As one 
Ranger explained: “I come from a border village, just 30km from here. I finished school 
after Mor 6 (12
th
 grade) but then I did not want to work. I did not enjoy farming or 
working in the fields. I also did not want to work in a company. So I lived with my 
parents until I was 23 and then applied to become a soldier in Udon Thani. But I failed 
the test. So I went to Dansai [thahan phran headquarters in Loei province], applied to 
become a Ranger and I passed.” This particular Ranger was clearly enjoying his 
occupation as he could often be seen socialising with the boat operators at the 
customary border checkpoint, sitting and eating with them in their hut and singing Isan 
folklore songs with them. 
Another difference between Rangers and commissioned army soldiers is their initial 
training period. Most of the Rangers I interviewed had been a Ranger for 20-30 years. 
They had become Rangers during the height of the communist insurgency and said they 
had been attracted by the opportunity to fight for their country. According to their 
statements, the initial training period was only one month and then one additional 
month each subsequent year. This is even less than the 45 days mentioned by Ball in his 
insightful work on the thahan phran (2004). Indeed, the consequences of such 
minimalist training and induction was reflected by a discussion I had with a Ranger who 
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had just finished his training and was newly stationed in my research area. He was from 
Mueang Loei. When I spoke to him he was convinced that there were two Thai-Lao 
Friendship Bridges in the area. He explained that one Bridge could be reached when 
travelling on the road to the right of the customary border checkpoint and the other 
Bridge could be reached when travelling on the road to the left. In reality, both roads led 
to the same Bridge.  
The differences in-between individual Rangers, their knowledge, attitudes and actions 
within the various units throughout Thailand have resulted in a reputation ranging from 
“an elite-screening force guarding borders to a bunch of armed thugs in black uniforms” 
(Ball 2004: xv). But the Rangers’ attitudes and actions are also dependent on the 
location and level of conflict around their duty station. Many of my interlocutors had 
been stationed in Southern Thailand and more recently along the Thai-Cambodian 
border to assist in the conflict around the Preah Vihar temple. One Ranger had been 
directly involved in the fighting there. While I interviewed him inside the boat 
operators’ hut at one of the customary border checkpoints the boat operators listened in 
awe as he described how he had to find protection in bunkers while both sides 
exchanged fire for several days. He proudly showed us his scars from the bullets that hit 
his arm during the shooting. When I asked him how the Thai-Cambodian border was 
different from the border here, he responded: “The situation here is extremely 
peaceful…there is nothing here…it is very easy to live here”. Other Rangers mentioned 
a constant threat of malaria along the Thai-Cambodian border and that they had needed 
local translators to speak to the local Khmer population. All of the Rangers I spoke to 
preferred to work in the duty station where they were now and one of them clearly 
stated the advantages: “Well, I have my own home nearby so it is very convenient for 
me here. If I have the choice, I will always choose to work here.” 
The level of conflict in the border areas where Rangers are stationed also has an effect 
on the kind of work they engage in on a daily basis. According to one of the Rangers’ 
supervisors in my research area, their main objective was to protect (bongan) the 
villages and people along the border. He said that on a day-to-day basis, Rangers were 
mostly occupied with searching for smugglers of drug, cars and motorbikes. They 
patrolled the border by car, on foot or on the river by boat. At customary border 
checkpoints, Rangers were responsible for checking border-crossers, their documents 
and the goods they carried across. There were no official meetings or joint trainings 
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between Rangers and Lao authorities although the supervisors of each side of the 
checkpoints did communicate with each other by phone to discuss current matters. 
Rangers could also be seen at the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge where they provided 
security and searched arrivals from Laos for drugs and other illegal products. During the 
time of my research, Rangers were using a metal device with a long antenna when 
searching people for drugs at the Bridge as well as at customary border checkpoints 
(Image 9). Apparently, the antenna moves and points to wherever drugs are located. 
While this drug detecting device (GT200) and its effectiveness has recently come under 
international scrutiny (Saksith 2013), it still presents a visible manifestation of 
state/military power in the border area. 
 
Image 9: Thahan phran with drug detecting device (GT200) at Thai-Lao 
Friendship Bridge (Source: Author) 
With regard to their duty of patrolling the border for illegal trading activities, Rangers in 
my research area seemed to define “smugglers” (khon laklob) merely as those who 
transport motorcycles, cars and other high value goods across the river rather than 
consumer products and food. When referring to local villagers’ cross-border trade of 
consumer products, the Rangers often mentioned to me in informal interviews how they 
“give way” (anulom) to such practices as long as no drugs are involved. I will elaborate 
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and analyse this situation in Chapter 6. As I will argue, the local embeddedness of 
Rangers and their social relationships to the local population is part of what facilitates 
this kind of small-scale cross-border trade. This embeddedness in the local community 
was reinforced by the Rangers’ additional responsibilities of helping the community 
during floods and fires as well as with tasks like harvesting rice, building houses and 
providing for security during festivals. 
Another paramilitary organisation that was stationed in my research area was the Or Sor 
(Volunteer Defence Corps). Despite the vast and increasing number of paramilitary 
organisations that exist in Thailand (see Ball and Mathieson 2007: 23), the paramilitary 
organisations working in my research area were limited to Rangers and VDC. The latter 
could be seen working mostly at the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge and at checkpoints 
along the road. Due to their rather inconspicuous uniforms in light brown/grey, which 
they didn’t always wear, the Or Sor were not as easy to spot as Rangers. They were, 
furthermore, not part of the Royal Thai Army but deployed by the Ministry of Interior 
(MoI). While they are also in charge of maintaining security along Thailand’s border 
areas and assist the Rangers in doing so, their duties were much broader and included 
doing “anything and everything for provincial and district officials” (Ball and 
Mathieson 2007: 109). 
There were approximately 60 Or Sor who were stationed in my research area, 10 of 
which were working at the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. At the Bridge the Or Sor 
assisted the thahan phran but as they were not affiliated with the military, they were 
entitled to cross over the Bridge and exchange information with Lao officials about any 
instances along the border. In fact, the head of a local Or Sor group was known among 
villagers as the coordinator between the Thai and Lao districts of that area. In one of my 
personal conversations with this Or Sor, he explained that he set up conferences and 
meetings between the Thai and Lao provincial governors and district officials on a 
regular basis. For example, when Thai authorities arrested a Lao citizen it was the Or 
Sor who would deal with Lao authorities in arranging for the Lao citizen’s deportation.  
The Or Sor who was also the coordinator between the Thai and Lao border districts had 
many cousins on the Lao side. At the time of my research, he went to Laos almost every 
day to either visit his relatives or to discuss issues with Lao authorities. He possessed a 
special officer’s ID card that allowed him to travel across the border freely. During none 
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of my visits did he make any remarks about Laos or its state officials that implied fear 
or anxiety. He had joined the Or Sor three years after the communist takeover and knew 
about all that had been going on along this part of the border since then. His lack of 
anxiety with regard to the Lao state with what a higher-ranking Ranger explained to me: 
“Those people who don’t have any relatives or friends on the Lao side are scared of the 
Lao side since they don’t know anyone there. Those who have relatives and friends 
there go often and are not scared at all”. This confirms the findings I presented in 
Chapter 3 where I explained that those female traders who did not cross the border had 
many negative preconceptions about the Lao state.  
While Or Sor went to Laos more regularly, a few Rangers had also been to Laos before. 
When stationed at customary border checkpoints they occasionally crossed the border to 
socialise with the Lao officials on the other side or to attend village festivals. The 
supervisor at one of the checkpoints who was a commissioned army soldier, for 
example, had been to the other side of the checkpoint to celebrate with his Lao 
counterpart during the local village festival. Other Rangers sometimes visited the Lao 
traders and villagers they got to know during their everyday work at the checkpoints. In 
fact, it is important to note that the relationship of Rangers with Thai and Lao boat 
operators as well as with local border-crossers was much closer than that between 
Rangers and Lao authorities. As one of the Rangers expressed it: “We [the Rangers and 
border villagers] take care of each other (tulae kan)”.  
THE SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF THAHAN PHRAN  
Over the course of my research I spent many hours observing Rangers, boat operators, 
shop owners, traders and other villagers at the customary border checkpoints. A 
frequent observation was that of villagers, traders and shop owners providing the 
Rangers with fresh vegetables from the market, instant coffee and snacks. Villagers 
would randomly stop by the checkpoint on their motorbikes with a bag of cucumbers or 
fresh pork meat, greet the Rangers and hang the bag(s) on a nail at one of the wooden 
pillars of the Rangers’ hut. The Rangers would later take the bags back to their 
accommodation and use the food to make their dinner. On another occasion, a Ranger 
helped a female villager at the checkpoint start her motorbike. She later came back with 
a pack of instant coffee for the Rangers.  
148 
It was only during the latter part of my research that I came to realise that these 
occasional gifts were in fact part of a more regular gift-giving process, which implicitly 
contributed to the facilitation of trade across the river that marks the border. Shophouse 
owners regularly supplied both the Rangers and the Lao border guards with coffee, beer, 
snacks and other goods from their shops. The shop owners call these gifts khongfak, 
which literally translates into gift or present and is also used as a term for souvenirs. 
Since Thai shop owners provided the gifts on behalf of their customers as well, they 
included a part of the cost of the khongfak in their shopping bill. In this way, Thai and 
Lao traders shared the costs of the gifts. 
When asking for more details about this kind of gift-giving process, a female shophouse 
owner explained that the process was strongly individualised. She offered gifts to all the 
Rangers but “some will take them and others will not”. In all of the cases I was able to 
observe, Rangers accepted the gifts given to them. When I arrived at one customary 
border checkpoint on a border market day, the Rangers had already received energy 
drinks and mangosteen fruits from the traders who were selling goods to the Lao 
visitors at the checkpoint. Later, one of the watermelon traders brought the Rangers two 
watermelons in a plastic bag. The process happened completely without words – the 
trader merely smiled as she handed the bag over to the Ranger who nodded while taking 
the bag and placing it on his bench. Shophouse owners at checkpoints also invited the 
border officials to share food and drinks with them during festivities such as the yearly 
village festival or the Thai New Year. They would order homemade Lao whisky from 
across the border and ask the border officials to join in. 
While Rangers rarely rejected the gifts offered to them, they also rarely demanded any 
gifts. In most occasions they would merely accept what was given to them. A shop 
owner on the Lao side explained that traders provided border officials with gifts because 
they were graengjai (literally translated as “fear heart”) as the border guards were 
lenient in their enforcement of the law. The term graengjai has no English equivalent 
and it is often exemplified where a person of lower status defers to a person of higher 
status, demonstrating an acknowledgement of their higher position, their decisions and 
actions (even if they do not agree with them). According to Walker and Hallinger, 
graengjai means “to be self-effacing, respectful, humble, and extremely considerate” 
and “avoiding behaviour that would cause embarrassment to other people or imposing 
upon them” (2007: 265). According to the shophouse owner mentioned above, the 
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process of gift-giving must thus be seen as part of the cultural norm of graengjai. From 
this perspective, the border guards were provided with gifts out of respect for their 
position and to prevent them from feeling imposed upon.  
The practice of giving gifts to a person with a higher social status can be found in nearly 
all parts of Thai and Lao society. School students give presents to their teachers; 
employees provide gifts to their line managers. Some of my interlocutors even provided 
me with vegetables from the market when we met. The boat operators at one customary 
border checkpoint even ordered a sweet rice dish for me after I mentioned that it was 
one of my favourite dishes. When I asked what the gifts were for, they were confused 
and said: “We just want to give this to you because we like you”. Feeling graengjai 
about this myself, I started giving gifts to them as well. A similar situation happened 
when I was sitting with the Thai Rangers at a customary border checkpoint one day and 
received a watermelon from them. I reciprocated the following day by providing them 
with several cans of instant coffee. Over the course of my research I was quickly 
engaged in gift-giving practices with my all of my interlocutors including traders, shop 
owners as well as state officials.  
Based on these examples I suggest that we must differentiate between gifts exchanged 
between friends and acquaintances on the one hand, and gifts given to superiors on the 
other. The important difference here is the reciprocal exchange of gifts, which does not 
take place when gifts are given to superiors. The gift exchange that occurred between 
friends and acquaintances, which I was also involved in, is a typical case of reciprocity 
as Mauss (1970) described it in his seminal work. Mauss established that the gift obliges 
the recipient not only to accept it but also to reciprocate. Drawing on ethnographic 
examples from across the world, he argued that gifts are exchanged with the intention to 
develop or maintain reciprocal relationships and to establish alliances. They could also 
be a way of increasing one’s status by putting the counterpart in debt as in the case of 
the North American potlatch ceremony. While the debt factor may not be as prominent 
in the examples presented here, the intention of establishing and maintaining social 
relationships was certainly important.  
In the case of gifts given to superiors, the gift is accepted but not reciprocated. Here, the 
gift is an acknowledgement of another person’s higher status and power. I suggest that 
the khongfak given by traders and boat operators to state officials fall into this category, 
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which I will classify as a specific type of gift, namely that of tribute. Humphrey makes 
use of the term ‘tribute’ in her study on post-Soviet economies, defining it as “an 
acknowledgement of who rules the streets” (2002: 144). Since they are not reciprocated, 
tributes can also be seen as a one-way or free gift. Joana Cook (2008) has discussed the 
free gift with regard to alms donations in Thailand. However, such donations differ 
from tribute in that they are given as a “field of merit” (Cook 2008: 19), that the 
renouncer is not allowed to show gratitude and that neither the giver nor the recipient 
are recognised in the process. Tribute, in contrast, is given as a way of showing 
appreciation for the specific person it is given to. In my research area, the usefulness of 
the term tribute is substantiated by the comment made by the Lao shop owner who 
explained that gifts were given out of gratefulness for the border officials’ toleration of 
trade. Of course, the order to tolerate this kind of trade had come from higher ranks of 
government and not as a request from the traders themselves. The tributes must 
therefore be seen as a thank you rather than a bribe. 
In Pasuk and Sungsidh’s (1996) famous study on corruption in Thailand, they refer to 
similar types of gifts, which are called sin nam jai (gifts of good will). In Thailand, the 
attribute of nam jai (good will from the heart) is as highly valued as jai di (good-
hearted) and sin nam jai are gifts that reflect this attribute. According to Pasuk and 
Sungsidh, the intention of the giver plays an important role that allows us to distinguish 
this type of gift from a bribe. The gift must be the result of the giver’s wish to show 
compassion without any prior agreement or expectation. The recipient must also not 
deviate from their duties and responsibilities as a result of the gift. Pasuk and 
Sungsidh’s work is based on a study they conducted in the early 1990s. They found that 
the sin nam jai was considered acceptable among businessmen, officials and the lowest 
income categories including farmers. Among the middle class it was more often 
considered as a form of bribery.  
So when exactly does a gift or tribute turn into a bribe? Combe and Wee (2009) point 
out, in this respect, that a bribe is only then a bribe when it is given before the 
respective favour takes place. The longer the passage of time between favour and bribe, 
the more it can be seen as a gift, especially when it takes on the form of a festive gift 
(Combe and Wee 2009: 299). This is where the boundaries between gifts and bribes 
become blurred. In Pasuk and Sungsidh’s (1996) study on Thailand, survey respondents 
mentioned two further differences between gifts and bribes. Since a gift must be given 
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without any expectations to return the favour, it should not be demanded. As soon as a 
gift is demanded, it can be considered a bribe. The nature and value of the gift itself also 
played a role. Small amounts of gifts such as flowers, Buddha images, liquor, and an 
invitation to a good restaurant were perceived as sin nam jai in Pasuk and Sungsidh’s 
study while high value gifts such as a Benz car or a large sum of money was seen as 
corruption. 
In fact, far from being ignorant about the widespread gift-giving practices within the 
modern Thai nation-state, the Thai government has incorporated them into the law, 
drawing a distinct line between gifts and bribes. In the Notification of the NCCC 
Commission Concerning the Provisions of the Acceptance of Property or any other 
Benefit on Ethical Basis by State Officials B.E. 2543 (2000) (still valid in the 2007 
constitution) it is stated that state officials shall not “receive property or any other 
benefit from any person other than relative and the price or value of the thing received 
from each person and on each occasion does not exceed 3,000 baht” (National Counter 
Corruption Commission 2000
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). While the 3,000 baht rule acknowledges the existence 
of gift-giving practices, it has also caused some confusion because it does not specify 
what is meant by “each person” and “on each occasion”. In the case of my research 
area, gifts and tributes were given on an on-going basis. On each occasion, goods such 
as vegetables, coffee and alcohol did not exceed 3,000 baht but over the course of one 
or several days, the limit could well have been exceeded.  
What is even more interesting is that the 3,000 baht rule defines gifts as all goods apart 
from money. The transfer of money is considered a bribe. In most of the gift-giving 
cases in my research area, money was not involved. Instead, state officials received 
goods on an ongoing basis. There was no before or after anymore in this ongoing 
reciprocal relationship. Festive gifts were also involved when shop owners invited the 
border guards to share drinks and food in their homes. I argue that in most cases in 
which small-scale traders supplied state officials with khongfak, the gifts were a way to 
acknowledge the Rangers’ work along the border in which they focussed on drug and 
car smugglers while being more lenient with traders of daily necessities. I suggest that 
this was different in situations where state actors demanded gifts in the form of money 
or goods. Such demands revealed the predatory nature of some state actors in certain 
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 In July 2008 the NCCC was renamed to the National Anti‐ Corruption Commission (NACC). 
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situations that both reinforced and took advantage of their embeddedness in society (see 
further Chapter 6).  
THE SITUATION AND LIFE OF LAO STATE OFFICIALS 
Lao state officials are part of the state bureaucracy, which can be understood as the 
administrative arm of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party. Most bureaucrats are not 
members of the Party but those who are actively involved in it have a better chance of 
being promoted (Stuart-Fox 2006: 65). Lao state officials usually speak proudly of the 
Party, the system and their position and public representations of the state make such 
positions within the state a career path to aspire to. In this respect, Singh finds that there 
is a considerable divide among bureaucrats in terms of Party membership, rank, age and 
gender. Based on her research with marginal bureaucrats, her findings show that the 
lowest-ranking officials have limited linkages, education and family resources, marking 
them “solely as clients within the bureaucracy” (Singh 2012: 123).  
Patrimonialism seems to prevail among the political elite in Laos. Although lower ranks 
within the Party have begun to develop a technocratic culture, social ties are still the 
most important resource in the political field and, according to Rehbein, more important 
than knowledge and discipline (2007: 45-46). Linkages and social ties are therefore an 
important feature of the state and, as Stuart-Fox (2006) finds, civil servants are reluctant 
to carry out decisions without referring matters to their supervisors as they may 
otherwise be subject to criticism. However, Singh also found some private criticism 
among low-ranking officials, especially in terms of the little amount of compensation 
they receive. Minimal salaries among bureaucrats are mainly due to the political change 
in 1975, which reduced the availability of financial and human resources. Some of 
Singh’s informants also mentioned personal grievances with regard to their supervisor, 
which they would, however, never utter in public. Singh therefore concludes: “The Lao 
state’s internal dynamics perpetuates a system of patronage and inequity, which ensure 
the bureaucracy is marked by ambivalent loyalties” (2012: 125). 
Among my informants in Laos, local border officials were well known for their ability 
to make a lot of money, especially when working in the border area. At one of the 
customary border checkpoints, one of the Lao boat operators’ daughters was therefore 
aspiring to become a policewoman. She was 16 years old when I met her and had one 
year left at school. She said: “I don’t exactly know what you have to do as a policeman 
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but I do know that you earn a lot of money, especially when getting a placement at the 
[Thai-Lao Friendship] Bridge.” At the end of my research, the girl’s career plan was to 
study law in Luang Prabang for five years and receive a degree so that she would be 
able to work for the Lao state. In a similar vein, a female trader named Waan whom I 
got to know well over the course of my research was hoping for her son to become a 
policeman just like her husband. Waan explained that she would want her son to work 
at the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge as he could earn a lot of money there: “There is so 
much trade going on there and the traders don’t just pay tax but also the policemen”. In 
both of these cases, aspiring to work for the state was based not only on the social rank 
and status it would provide but also on the remunerative benefits of what has been 
depicted corruption by many scholars (e.g. Stuart-Fox 2006: 61).  
While the bureaucratic migrants in Singh’s study increased their meagre salaries with 
formally recognised “per diems” that were paid by development projects and private 
companies (2012: 123), many of the Lao state officials in my research area sought 
additional income by taking bribes for facilitating cross-border activities (see further 
Chapter 6). Many of them were also financially supported by their wives who engaged 
in different kinds of cross-border trade (see also Chapter 3). A female Lao trader named 
Waan, for example, told me that her husband worked for the district police (tamruat 
mueang) and earned 1 million kip per month, which at the time of my research equalled 
4,000 baht (or USD 130). She often bemoaned that it was not enough to support a 
family of three. As a family, they owned only one motorbike, which Waan used for her 
trading activities while her son drove to school with a friend every morning. She said 
she did not want to have another child because they needed a car first – it would be too 
difficult otherwise. In order to increase the family’s income, Waan had begun selling 
vegetables at the local market a few years ago. She also sold wildlife to customers on 
the Thai side such as moles, porcupines and squirrels. These were rare in Thailand and 
she made a high profit from this kind of cross-border trade, which is deemed illegal in 
both Thailand and Laos (see also Nooren and Claridge 2001; Singh 2008). Waan said 
her husband disapproved of her trading activities and preferred her to take care of the 
household. When my research ended in 2012, Waan was planning to cease her trading 
activities. 
Many of the Lao border officials working in my research area were from the local or 
surrounding areas and spoke the local dialect, which strengthened the familiarity 
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between them and the local population, and increased their embeddedness in the village 
or town where they were stationed. Lower-ranking border officials usually stayed at one 
duty station for many years. Many of them lived together with their wives and children, 
the latter of which went to the local school. As I will elaborate in the chapters that 
follow, these officials’ social relationships to local villagers, traders and transporters on 
either side of the border had an impact on the way small-scale trade was conducted, 
facilitated and restricted. The complex interplay of predatory state practices and the 
social embeddedness of state actors also impacted the imaginaries of the Thai and Lao 
states among border residents. As I will demonstrate in the next section, the imaginaries 
of Thai border residents with regard to the Lao state were dominated by rumours of 
strict penalisation and violence. In the imaginaries of Lao border residents the Thai state 
was often perceived as too lax and not in control of the country’s problems with crime 
and drugs.  
IMAGINARIES OF THE THAI AND LAO STATE 
When talking about local border regulations and their enforcement, I was immediately 
struck by the way several of the local phuyaiban contrasted the Thai and Lao states’ 
ways of penalising border-crossers who engaged in activities that were considered 
illegal such as drug smuggling and undocumented labour migration. Although this 
thesis is not primarily concerned with drug-related activities along the border and their 
prosecution, the discourse on the Thai and Lao states in relation to these activities sheds 
light on the way the Thai villagers including traders and state authorities perceived the 
Thai and Lao states. 
Two of the phuyaiban agreed that when border-crossers from either the Thai or Lao side 
are caught “sneaking” across the river by Lao authorities they may face a fine. One of 
them explained: “If they [border-crossers] say they come to visit their relatives they will 
have to pay 20 000 baht (approx. USD 650). If they cross without any reason or with 
drugs then there will be a tougher punishment. Then it will be at least 30,000 or 40,000 
baht (approx. USD 1300).” Interestingly, this phuyaiban mentioned that even those who 
cross over the border outside the checkpoints to visit relatives would be fined when 
getting caught by Lao authorities. Over the course of my research it became clear that in 
reality, border residents were rarely penalised for crossing the border outside 
checkpoints to visit relatives (Chapter 6). Statements like those of the phuyaiban as well 
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as those presented in the remaining part of this section, however, have a deterrent effect 
on Thai villagers, traders and state authorities, making many of them reluctant to cross 
over the border in the first place. 
With regard to drug smuggling, on the other hand, several border residents have indeed 
been caught and punished. When caught by Lao authorities, these are arrested and 
incarcerated in the local Lao jail. One phuyaiban described the local Lao jail as a kind 
of den made out of bamboo. Another compared the jail to a cage for animals and added: 
“It is very tormenting.” The phuyaiban of Ban Plee further explained: “It is underneath 
the ground. They have one hole in the ground like a cave”. None of the phuyaiban had 
ever seen the Lao jail before though. According to the phuyaiban of Ban Sing, in fact, 
none of the villagers had ever seen it even though some teenagers had been jailed 
before: “They don’t know because they get their eyes covered until they are inside so 
prisoners don’t know where they are. The ones who get caught don’t want to go there 
again”. 
Further elaborating on Lao prison conditions, the village headman passed on what he 
had been told: “They say that they [Lao authorities] built the ‘dark jail’ in a way that 
you cannot stand up in it but also not sit down because you must defecate there as well”. 
In jail, prisoners must pay for all services themselves including food and water. This 
was directly contrasted to Thai prison conditions: “In Thailand, if you don’t have 
money you have to stay in jail and your fine will decrease at a rate of 200 baht per day. 
In Laos you lose your money as well as your time!”58  
When speaking to the phuyaiban about their linkages to the Lao side, most of them had 
relatives there but only two had relations with Lao authorities. One phuyaiban knew a 
few district heads (jao mueang) whom he still knew from the time when he was a 
teacher in Laos. However, they were his generation and he did not know any of the 
younger authorities. Another phuyaiban explained that he had occasional meetings with 
the headman of the Lao village across the border. They would usually discuss current 
problems that concern them both such as cases of theft or those of Lao villagers who 
had been arrested on the Thai side. But it was the phuyaiban of the third village in my 
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 The phuyaiban’s descriptions of Lao prison conditions correspond with the U.S. Department of State’s 
investigation where Lao prison conditions are described as poor and food rations as minimal. Most 
prisoners must rely on their families for subsistence (2011: 2). Amnesty International has also repeatedly 
criticised Lao prison conditions, reporting on ill-treatment and even torture within larger prisons 
(Amnesty International 2002). 
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research area who stated most clearly why he had little or no relations with Lao 
authorities: “We don’t usually go over there because we are afraid of the law on that 
side. It’s different from here. We don’t know what they will do to you. Sometimes we 
didn’t do anything wrong but they still arrest us and say we did something wrong. […] 
They arrest us first and only later they will tell us what we did wrong”. 
This perception of the Lao state as deceptive and allowing for arbitrary arrests was 
common among Thai villagers along this part of the Thai-Lao border. During one of the 
village festivals along the border, one of the local Thai policemen suggested I be careful 
when going to Laos as: “They are not the same as us. First, they talk in one way and 
then suddenly in another way. Their law is very basic. The policemen have very low 
education, only until grade 4.” So apart from harsher practices of penalisation, poorer 
prison conditions and higher fines than in Thailand, the Lao state was also associated 
with arbitrary arrests. Searching for real cases of arbitrary arrests and assessing their 
frequency in my research area would go beyond the scope of this study
59
. Instead, it is 
interesting to note the way the Lao state is perceived by many Thai villagers, traders and 
local authorities alike as it has an impact on everyday life and cross-border activities in 
the border area. 
Not only did Lao traders and villagers cross the border more often than their Thai 
counterparts, most of my Lao informants also felt more positive about the Lao than the 
Thai state system. While Thailand was deemed more “developed” (jaloen), Laos was 
considered safer due to the state’s control over the population and its system of 
deterrence through ill-treatment. A female long-distance trader who frequently visited 
the village where I lived expressed this view most concretely when saying: “There is 
always news about drugs and murders in Thailand. In Laos there is almost none of that. 
It’s because people are afraid of the police. If the police catch someone doing something 
illegal, they will put them in jail for several months where they barely get anything to 
eat and they must pay a high fine. So those who have been to jail will never do anything 
again. Not like in Thailand where jail is very comfortable...you have enough food and 
toilets and showers and everything. People are not afraid to go there so they are more 
inclined to do something illegal.”  
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 Amnesty International (2002) has reported and condemned cases of arbitrary arrests in Laos. 
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This perception of Thailand among the Lao population is reinforced by the high 
popularity of Thai TV channels who report criminal acts from Bangkok and other 
provinces on a daily basis. It must also be seen in light of image promoted by the Lao 
government of Thailand. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Lao government not only 
resisted the Thai government’s patronising attitude towards Laos but also sought to 
improve its own image by contrasting its moral code and authentic culture with the 
pervasive criminality in Thailand. In fact, while Laos’ system of penalisation was well-
known among Lao villagers in my research area, they still contrasted Laos with the 
danger and criminality that they considered to pervade Thailand (see also Singh 2012: 
124). These findings demonstrate the complex interplay of practice and discourse 
through which the Thai and Lao state constituted themselves differently, which shaped 
the different ways in which the border came into being in my research area.  
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have provided a glimpse into the everyday lives of state actors in my 
research area and highlighted their embeddedness in the local culture and society. While 
cultures generally must be seen as constantly in flux, the local culture in my research 
area straddled the nation-state border in many respects including the local dialect, many 
customs and traditions, and a shared history. Most of the state actors I have presented 
here including phuyaiban, the Thai paramilitary, and Lao state officials were born and 
raised in the border area themselves, spoke the local dialect and knew the area well. 
Some even had relatives on both sides of the border and occasionally visited the other 
side of the border for personal reasons. 
The findings I have presented here not only reveal how the practices and attitudes of 
these actors were influenced by their social and cultural surroundings but also how their 
actions contributed to the constitution of the state itself, and particularly the becoming 
of the border. The Thai paramilitary, for example, was engaged in gift-giving practices 
with the traders and villagers around their duty stations while Lao state officials 
increased their meagre salaries through bribes or the trading activities of their wives. 
While Thai villagers considered Lao state officials to be deceptive and unlawful, many 
Lao villagers perceived a government job as something to aspire to. Village headmen in 
Thai border villages, furthermore, had a kind of mediating position between state and 
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society as they communicated government policies to villagers while defending their 
interests in front of the state where needed. 
The final point to be made here is that the findings I have presented had the purpose of 
highlighting the social and cultural embeddedness of state actors and revealing the 
blurry lines between state and society. The examples have been selected to work 
towards this purpose and do not provide the full array of state practices in my research 
area. In the following two chapters, for example, I demonstrate how the Thai 
paramilitary was also involved in the extraction of money and goods, as well as in 
larger corruptions schemes related to the smuggling of agricultural products across the 
border.  
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CHAPTER 5 
NAVIGATING MOBILITY IN THE BORDERLAND 
MALEE’S DIFFERENT ROUTES TO THE THAI SIDE 
On a Friday morning in July 2012 I called Malee, a Lao middlewoman from a small 
town near Mueang Sayaboury who owned her own pick-up truck and both a Lao and 
Thai mobile phone. I called her on her Thai mobile phone to ask whether she had 
arrived at the Thai border market next to the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge yet. I knew 
she would hire a driver there to buy goods in Mueang Loei. I wanted to make sure I was 
at the market when she came back from Mueang Loei, hoping for another interview. 
Indeed, Malee was in Thailand but neither at the border market nor in Mueang Loei. 
Instead, she was in Ban Thong, the small border village where I was living at the time. 
She was at Noi’s house, an elderly lady who lived along the river that marks the border. 
I knew Noi myself so I jumped on my motorbike and drove to Noi’s house, which was 
only a few streets away. Malee knew Noi from the time when there was still a 
permanent checkpoint nearby. She was already a middlewoman during this time but 
used to cross over by boat using Noi’s shuttle boat service. Now that the Thai-Lao 
Friendship Bridge in Ban Plee had become the official border-crossing site between 
Thailand and Laos, there was nothing left of the checkpoint.  
Malee explained that she had driven to the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge that morning as 
she usually did on Saturdays. She was equipped with a list of daily necessities that she 
planned to buy for her customers in and around Mueang Sayaboury, as well as the 
things she would need for sleeping over at the Thai immigration post that night. She 
was denied the right to cross over the Bridge though, as her passport was filled up with 
stamps. She would have to acquire a new passport before she could cross over the 
Bridge again. Fortunately, her son had accompanied her that day. He was a student in 
Vientiane currently visiting home and old enough to drive her car. So Malee asked her 
son to take the car across the Bridge, hire a driver together with three to four other 
middlewomen and –men, and go to Mueang Loei on her behalf. Before arriving at the 
Bridge, Malee’s son dropped her off in an area behind Ban Sawan where she walked to 
the part of the riverbank that was located across from Noi’s house. At the riverbank, 
Malee called Noi who then picked her up in one of her small wooden boats.  
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Now Malee was waiting at Noi’s house until her son came back from Mueang Loei. As 
soon as he was back in the late evening she would meet him at the border market next to 
the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. The market was about six kilometres away from Noi’s 
house and Noi’s husband had agreed to drive Malee there by motorbike. Malee and her 
son would sleep at the immigration post together with the other traders that night, 
watching their goods while they sleep. The next morning Malee and her son would shop 
for the remaining goods at the border market. Noi’s husband would take Malee back to 
Noi’s house where Malee could cross over to the Lao side again by boat. Malee would 
then wait along the main road for her son to pick her up on the way back to Mueang 
Sayaboury. 
In the end it was me who drove Malee to the border market by motorbike that evening 
and also the one who drove her back to Noi’s house the next morning. I had intended to 
visit the border market so I used the opportunity to spend more time with Malee. When 
driving back from the border market the next morning, Malee suggested we take a 
shortcut rather than drive along the highway – a narrow road with many potholes that 
exits the market area along the side rather than the front. The narrow path would avoid 
police patrols along the highway who may have asked for travel documents. Malee did 
not have any documents to show as she had crossed the border at Noi’s house. 
However, when I asked why she wanted to take the shorter route, which was bumpy and 
full of potholes, she said it was simply because of time constraints. She claimed that the 
police officers were unlikely to arrest her as we were only travelling from one border 
village to another rather than to the city.  
BORDER-CROSSING STRATEGIES AND ENCOUNTERS WITH THE 
STATE 
Malee’s story demonstrates the uneven landscape of sovereign power along the Hueang 
River that marks the nation-state border in my research area. During the time of my 
research, some places were under hypersurveillance, e.g. the Thai-Lao Friendship 
Bridge and some local checkpoints, while the remaining parts of the river were only 
occasionally patrolled. Malee was able to take advantage of the unpatrolled area at 
Noi’s house in order to reach Ban Plee from the Lao side. However, she was also well 
aware that if she travelled to Mueang Loei without travel documents she risked 
deportation and a fine as there were patrols along the highway that conducted ID 
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checks, particularly on border market days. She therefore stayed in the immediate 
border area while her son purchased the necessary goods on her behalf. The immediate 
border was not only familiar to Malee but also a space where she felt safe, even when 
moving around without travel documents. This lack of fear was preeminent also among 
many of the border residents along the Hueang River who made use of unmarked and 
rarely patrolled border-crossing sites.  
In this chapter I will explore this further by examining strategies of border-crossing 
amongst residents in my research area from an ethnographic perspective. The first 
objective of this chapter is therefore to understand where and how people cross the 
border and what risks are involved in the process for different people at different 
border-crossing sites. My main focus will be on Lao residents who cross over to the 
Thai side as they represented the vast majority of border-crossers. In my research area 
there were three types of border-crossing sites: the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, 
customary border checkpoints, and unmarked border-crossing sites. Unmarked sites 
could entail private properties that are used to transport people back and forth across the 
river (sometimes for money) on a regular basis, residential homes of villagers like Noi 
who own fishing boats that are occasionally used for family and friends to cross the 
border, as well as public spaces along the river with small dirt paths that villagers used 
as piers. In order to highlight the procedures and risks at each of these border-crossing 
sites, the chapter is subdivided into three parts that examine each site in more detail.  
The second objective of this chapter is to scrutinise more closely the encounters 
between state and non-state actors when crossing the border at different sites, focussing 
particularly on the role of travel documents, border performances, and social 
relationships with border guards. Drawing on observations and interviews with state and 
non-state actors as well as on my own experiences, I analyse the micro-level power 
relations between state and society and how the line between the two blurs in 
encounters along the border. My findings reveal that the experiences of border residents 
and the practices of border guards in my research area often contradict the state-centric 
narratives of cross-border mobility, which emphasise the legal and security dimensions 
of the border. In contrast to such narratives, I demonstrate how a social and cultural 
intimacy between border guards and border-crossers often trumps the necessity for legal 
documents at all border-crossing sites. I argue that we must pay more attention to the 
social and cultural dynamics of border-crossing strategies and encounters and how 
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“state regulatory practices are intertwined with those of local communities” (Walker 
1999: 17; see also Chalfin 2010; Reeves 2014). 
State-centric narratives of cross-border mobility tend to focus on the way states control 
movement. From this perspective, the mobility of human beings across nation-state 
borders is understood as a disturbance to the isomorphism of nation, state, and territory. 
Mobility can even be seen as a source of threat when considered within security 
frameworks such as the U.S.’ “war on terror” or the Thai former Prime Minister 
Thaksin’s “war on drugs” (Askew 2007). In the 1970s, Thailand’s anti-communist 
stance led to the militarisation of its border with Laos. Since the 1990s, this has changed 
to a focus on cooperation, resulting in an increase of state-led border passages and 
opportunities for documented cross-border flows (Chapter 2). At the same time, the 
influx of undocumented migrant labourers from Laos to Thailand has continued and an 
estimated 300,000 Lao people work in Thailand at any given time, 70% of which are 
undocumented migrants (ILO 2010). Thailand’s Immigration Act of 1972 classifies 
such undocumented migrants as “illegal immigrants” who face deportation upon their 
arrest. Officials are authorised to detain such migrants up to 48 hours before 
deportation, which can be extended to a total of seven days on the basis of legitimate 
reasons (UN-ACT 2015: 3)
60
.  
When seen as a threat, human beings can be exposed to violence and killings by the 
state, and these are undeniably a regular occurrence along many borders around the 
globe (Andreas 2000; van Schendel 2005; Doty 2007; Jones 2012; Perera and Traverso 
2013). Agamben’s work (1998, 2005) 61  on the state of exception is often used to 
understand the extralegal violence of the state against border-crossers and refugees 
(Decha 2006; Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2004). Indeed, some of the ethnographic 
findings presented in this chapter reveal elements of risk and even violence for border-
crossers along the Hueang River. But there are limitations to such an analysis that sees 
the state actor as a perpetrator on human life and that paints a picture of constant fear, 
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An influx of undocumented labour migrants is somewhat tolerated and amnesty-based registrations 
occur on a periodic basis (Balbo 2005: 39). 
61
 Focusing on the U.S. government’s anti-terrorism measures after 9/11 and the establishment of the 
prison camp in Guantanamo Bay, Agamben argues that “the voluntary creation of a permanent state of 
emergency […] has become one of the essential practices of contemporary states, including so-called 
democratic ones” (2005: 2). Dating back to 19th century France where the so-called state of siege was 
included in the constitution, the state of exception is now used to suspend the law in order to ensure the 
security of the state. Declaring a state of exception thus allows governments to operate both inside and 
outside the law (Agamben 2005: 11). 
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risk, and violence. With Walker (2009: 110), I argue that the state of exception is a 
situationally and temporally specific exception to the regular flows of people (and 
goods) across the Thai-Lao border. It does not reflect the current everyday life 
experience of the regular border-crossers who are not in a constant state of fear when 
crossing the border, as in the case of Malee. An exploration into the encounters between 
border-crossers and border guards along the Hueang River will underline this argument. 
I do so by examining the role of documents, border performances, and social 
relationships.  
As described above, identity documents are imperative to the legal movement across the 
Thai-Lao border. Under the law, undocumented migrants are “illegal” and face 
deportation. In his analysis of state-making projects in Southeast Asia, Scott (1998) has 
described such documents as a social engineering technique, which the state uses to 
make those aspects of society “legible” that it seeks to control. Identity documents not 
only come in various forms (passports, identity cards, permits, house registrations) but 
are also used to differentiate between different types of citizens with different rights 
(Torpey 2000; Ong 2006). While bureaucracy is part of every nation-state, a growing 
scholarly literature has stressed that identity documents should not be seen as universal 
or abstracted identities but rather analysed in their historical and cultural variations and 
the way they are perceived and experienced by their owners (Messick 1993; Kelly 2006; 
Navaro-Yashin 2007; Pelkmans 2013). While Navaro-Yashin examines documents as 
“affectively charged phenomena” (2007: 80), Jansen suggests looking at the hierarchy 
of different documents and the way in which persons come into being through them in 
particular ways (2009: 816).  
These authors place particular emphasis on the power of documents in producing 
particular forms of sociality. In this chapter, I stress a related but different aspect, 
namely the insignificance of identity documents in particular contexts. I argue that 
border performances and social relationships with border guards can have a stronger 
influence on one’s right of passage than legal documents. As Kelly has emphasised, 
documents create a separation between the legal and the physical person (Kelly 2006). 
Their congruence is assessed in the border examination. Here, the border-crosser must 
not only prove that their physical person matches their legal identity but they must also 
behave in a way that underscores this congruence. Following Khosravi (2010) I will 
refer to this type of behaviour as border performances. Acting in a way that a border 
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official finds suspicious may result in an extended examination period, an additional 
search by security personnel or even in an exclusion from the desired territory. 
Adopting a performative view of borders, Salter (2008) further highlights how the 
sovereign subject must act in accordance with what is considered the “norm” by the 
sovereign (in this case the border guard). If the “norm” is not enacted by the sovereign 
subject, it risks being considered a threat to the sovereignty of the nation-state. From 
this perspective, it is not only regimes of citizenship but also border performances that 
are key elements of differentiation and a defining feature of mobility across the border.  
An aspect of border performances that I would like to emphasise here is based on the 
fact that the state officials in my research area were socially embedded in the socio-
cultural environment of their duty stations (see Introduction and Chapter 4). In this 
chapter, I will explore how this affected the way border examinations were conducted 
and how it influenced the decisions of border officials in granting someone the right of 
passage. In this respect, I draw on the literature on the state, which has brought attention 
to the “unconscious desires of state officials” (Aretxaga 2003: 395) and the convergence 
of values between state officials and sovereign subjects (Herzfeld 2005). Herzfeld refers 
to this convergence of values as “cultural intimacy”, describing it more specifically as 
“the recognition of those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a source of 
external embarrassment but that nevertheless provide insiders with their assurance of 
common sociality” (2005: 3). Emphasising that the separation between the state and 
society is a symbolic construct, Herzfeld brings to light the way interactions between 
the sovereign and the subject are pervaded by the “tangled skeins of complicity” (2005: 
372). Following Chalfin (2010), I apply this literature to the border examination. In her 
study on the effects of neoliberal projects on sovereignty at the airport in Ghana, 
Chalfin finds how customs officials at Kotokha International Airport profiled travellers 
according to racial attributes rather than on standard procedures of risk management. 
The officers’ judgements were based on notions of criminality, which they associated 
with Africans in contrast to non-Africans. Customs procedures were therefore more 
personalised than technocratic.  
At border-crossing sites along the Hueang River, a cultural intimacy between border 
guards and border-crossers not only affected their decision-making in granting the right 
of passage but it affected the significance of identity documents. As I will demonstrate 
this cultural intimacy was based on regularity, familiarity, and social relationships. 
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While the effects of this intimacy were evident at all types of border-crossing, they were 
more pronounced at unmarked border-crossing sites than at the Thai-Lao Friendship 
Bridge and also depended on the individual state official in charge. Identity documents 
were particularly insignificant where social relationships between specific state officials 
and border-crossers were strong. In the following, I present my findings in this respect 
at each type of border-crossing site.  
TRUST AND RISK AT UNMARKED BORDER-CROSSINGS 
Crossing the border at unmarked border-crossing sites was not uncommon among Lao 
villagers in my research area. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, close networks of 
kinship and trade were maintained among many (though not all) border residents. A 
common language, history as well as a shared calendar of Buddhist festivities brought 
people from both sides of the river together on a regular basis. The regular border 
markets on the Thai side were particularly popular among Lao villagers, especially 
among those who could not afford to travel across the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge to 
the shopping centres in Mueang Loei. Most border markets were situated on the Thai 
side of customary border checkpoints so that Lao visitors mainly crossed over the 
respective checkpoint in order to attend a market
62
.  
For some villagers who lived further away from the checkpoint it was easier to cross 
over the river at unmarked sites. During one of my trips to the border market in one of 
the border villages, for example, I saw a group of women with shopping bags walk 
towards the riverbank on the far end of the village. I approached one of the women and 
was allowed to accompany her group along the dirt path to their small wooden boat. 
The boat belonged to the woman I had approached. She lived in the small village on the 
outskirts of Ban Sawan situated directly on the other side of the river. As her friends 
entered the boat she asked whether I wanted to come along. When explaining that I was 
afraid to get caught and arrested by the border guards, the entire group laughed. Another 
woman said: “It is easy to just cross over – everyone does it all the time!” With the 
customary border checkpoint located several hundred metres down the river, the women 
had chosen to cross the border at the unmarked border-crossing in their village for the 
sake of convenience. By using the boat of a local villager they were also able to avoid 
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 The border market in Ban Plee had been relocated from the customary border checkpoint to the Thai-
Lao Friendship Bridge. 
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both the transportation fee and the fee for crossing the border at the checkpoint. 
Familiar with the local border guards on either side of the border, they seemed so much 
at ease in crossing the border at their own discretion that they were able to laugh off 
anyone who had any fears.  
 
Image 10: Villagers crossing the Hueang River at an unmarked border-
crossing site (Source: Author) 
I had a similar experience during the annual village festival (ngan bun) in another Thai 
border village, during which hundreds of villagers from Ken Thao district come across 
the river via the customary border checkpoint and unmarked border-crossing sites. 
Together with their family and friends in the Thai border village, they attend the village 
parade, share food and drinks, and celebrate at the local temple. Walking down the main 
street of the village during the time of the festival, almost every home I could see was 
accommodating visitors with food and alcoholic beverages. Several visitors had arrived 
via the unmarked border-crossing at the far end of the village. I walked to the river and 
this time there was a young man operating a wooden boat using a large paddle (Image 
10). He was just arriving with another boat full of people. This time I asked the local 
residents along the river whether the border guards ever patrolled this area. They 
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laughed and replied that this happened only very rarely when the border guards were 
checking the area for drug smugglers. 
This not only reconfirms the mutual familiarity between the local residents and the local 
border guards, which gives the former a sense of security when engaging in shuttle 
migration. It also highlights the way the Thai Rangers interpret their duties and 
responsibilities. As I elaborated in Chapter 4, the Thai paramilitary was deployed to the 
border areas to protect (bongan) the border and the people who live along it, but not to 
disturb them in their everyday life. When new Rangers start working in the area, they 
quickly become familiar with the activities of the local population and distinguish 
between such activities and those they deemed to be a threat to the nation-state, such as 
drug and weapons smuggling as well as car and motorbike smuggling (see further 
Chapter 6). 
In fact, cross-border livelihoods were the norm for most of the residents of a remote Lao 
border village along the Hueang River on the outskirts of my research area. The 
villagers here were more closely connected to the residents of the adjacent Thai border 
village than they were to other Lao villages. When visiting the small Lao village for the 
first time I hired the driver of a samlo (a small motorised vehicle with three wheels, 
similar to the Thai tuktuk) from Ban Sawan to take me there. The driver had never been 
to the village himself and demanded an additional fee for driving me along the muddy 
road into the village, which was not paved and flooded in some areas. We picked up a 
friend of mine at the customary border checkpoint along the way. She had agreed to 
introduce me to some of her friends and relatives in the small village. We had lunch in 
the local noodle shop and discussed the border situation with several of the villagers. 
The group explained that most villagers had relatives and social relations on the Thai 
side, made use of the shops and medical services there more frequently than in any 
neighbouring Lao village, and also frequently worked as labourers on the Thai rice 
farms. When buying goods on the Thai side, they would simply cross the river by boat 
and when attending the border market at the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge on Saturdays, 
they would cross the river from their village to the Thai side and then ask a relative or 
friend in the Thai border village to drive them to the Bridge. The strategy that Malee 
(the middlewoman I mentioned above) used to cross the border in exceptional 
circumstances was apparently very common among border residents.  
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One of the women went on to explain that in case of a major injury the residents of the 
small Lao village would always cross the border and go to the hospital in Mueang Loei 
but getting there was not as easy as travelling the Thai border village across the river. 
This was due to the legal situation: “In order to go to Mueang Loei, we must cross over 
the customary border checkpoint, get a paper document from the soldier [the Thai 
Rangers are called “soldiers” in Thai], then get another paper from the district office [in 
Thali] and then we can go to the hospital in Mueang Loei. Some people don’t have such 
documents and just go. But I am not brave enough (mai ka) to go without documents. 
Normally, the Thai police along the road does not check our documents, but when they 
do and you don’t have any, they will make you pay a fine and that’s not worth it to me.” 
For the residents of the small Lao border village, the nation-state border only became 
relevant as soon as they had the intention of travelling outside of the confines of the 
Thai and Lao border villages they were familiar with. Well aware of the consequences 
they would face when being intercepted outside the border villages by state officials 
who would categorise them as “illegal immigrants”, they had to follow a formalised 
process that began with obtaining legal paperwork on the Lao side of the customary 
border checkpoint. To the villagers here, the Thai borderland and the border guards who 
patrolled it were part of a space of familiarity and trust. It was only when the intention 
of moving outside this space came into play that the legal framework of cross-border 
mobility became relevant. 
Before I left the small Lao village, the group of people at the noodle shop asked me to 
meet them at the next border market across the river. They suggested that I accompany 
them back to their village in one of their boats and stay for a few hours. They tried to 
convince me that there was no risk in crossing over the river in-between the two small 
villages as there were never any patrols there. And even if we did encounter border 
guards, the villagers maintained, they would know the border guards personally and the 
border guards would let us continue. Indeed I was tempted but there was an element of 
risk that stopped me from accepting the offer. I was not personally familiar with some 
of the Thai border guards and none of the Lao border guards in this area. I decided not 
to pursue this but would later attempt to cross the border at the customary border 
checkpoint instead.  
While I will come back to my personal experience, for now I would like to bring 
attention to the strategies of other Lao villagers who crossed the border for the purpose 
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of working in Thai border villages. Many of their experiences stand in contrast to those 
of undocumented migrant workers throughout Thailand who are known to face cruelty 
and violence by their employers and detention when intercepted by state officials 
(Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2004; Maniemai and Dusadee 2006; Pearson 2006; Pearson 
and Kusakabe 2012). In my research area, the Hueang River was part of many Lao 
workers’ daily commute to Thai farmlands. They worked there during the day and 
returned home in the evening. An elderly couple that lived along the Hueang River 
outside of Ban Sing regularly took such labourers across the river by boat for a small 
fee. The couple grew and sold flowers for a living and bred pigs and chicken for their 
own consumption. Their transport services were an opportunity to further increase their 
income. Not only did they take the labourers across the river by boat, they also drove 
them to their workplace by car or motorbike. In the evenings, they took them back 
across the river.  
This was far from being a clandestine activity that sought to resist state power. Instead, 
the Thai border guards in the area were well aware of the border-crossing site at this 
private property. According to the elderly couple, the guards occasionally stopped by 
the property in the mornings or evenings as the labourers were arriving or just about to 
leave. The Rangers would then write down the labourers’ names and addresses and then 
let them continue their journey. Once again, the notion was raised that the Rangers were 
merely interested in finding smugglers of drugs (ya saeptit) rather than interrupting 
border villagers’ everyday lives. In addition to this, I argue that by allowing the 
labourers to commute across the river without documents and writing down their names 
and addresses instead, was a form of state regulation that was only possible through the 
regular interaction, familiarity, and trust between the border guards, the elderly couple 
at the flower garden, and the Lao workers. It recognised the plight of these seasonal, 
undocumented workers who would be better considered border commuters (Buch et al. 
2009), while the sovereign subjects acknowledged the authority of the border guards 
and the territorial sovereignty they represent. Without the involvement of the local 
border guards in the process of border commuting, Lao migrant workers risked being 
intercepted at their workplace by an unfamiliar state official who could issue a fine of 
500 baht, according to the village headman of Ban Sing. The migrant workers would 
then be sent back to the Lao side via the nearest checkpoint. So far it becomes clear that 
the Thai Rangers’ embeddedness in the local border community allowed them to 
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regulate cross-border flows through a variety of means and processes including the 
cooperation with local border residents (Walker 1999).  
However, the Rangers’ constant search for drugs along the Thai-Lao border has also 
confronted local residents with a devastating incident. During my trip to a range of 
border markets with a Thai trader family, I got to know a women in a village west of my 
research area who was a friend of the female trader I was travelling with. While waiting 
for my friend to finish showering in the woman’s house after spending the night in tents 
at the border market, I spoke to the woman on her porch. Her husband was a farmer and 
currently in the field and she was pregnant with their second child. Her first child was 
not alive anymore. The woman explained that her first son had been shot at the age of 
15 by Thai Rangers who suspected him of smuggling drugs across the border. She did 
not know exactly how the incident occurred, only that her son was crossing the river 
after visiting family on the Lao side when he was shot. The boy’s innocence was soon 
established, however (I was unable to find out how this was established), the Rangers 
apologised to the woman but there was never any financial compensation for her loss. 
This was the only incident she knew of this kind in her area; it was an exceptional case. 
In other border areas such as the southern provinces of Thailand and the border to 
Malaysia, the paramilitary Rangers have assumed a notorious reputation for 
extrajudicial killings and violence (Ball 2004; ICG 2007). Having done my own 
background research on incidents such as this in my research area, it seems that such 
cases of violence inflicted on citizens were indeed exceptional along the Thai-Lao 
border. They do not confirm the border as a permanent state of exception, which an 
Agambean perspective would lead to (e.g. Salter 2008).  
There are other elements of risk when crossing the river at unmarked border-crossing 
sites, particularly for those border-crossers who have no regular interactions or maintain 
social relationships with the local border guards in the place they wish to cross. When 
crossing the border without paperwork, the risk is dependent on the familiarity with the 
border guards but also on the personality and attitude of the individual border guard. 
One of the Rangers in my research area, for example, always came across as rather 
serious and even secretive about his operations in the area. When doing some research 
in local online newspaper, I found out that it was this Ranger who arrested two Lao 
women for crossing the border without documents even though they were not engaged 
in any activities that could be considered a threat such as drug smuggling (Sue Issara 
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Loei 2012). According to a local online news article
63
 the Thai Ranger intercepted a 65-
year old lady with her granddaughter while they were crossing the river by boat in Ban 
Plee (Image 11). They possessed no documents of identification. The two women came 
from a small border village located a few kilometres east of Ban Sawan (outside my 
research area). The article further states that the two women committed an offense under 
the Immigration Act of 2522 [1979] and that they were therefore detained and handed 
over to Lao authorities at the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. 
 
Image 11: An elderly women and her granddaughter intercepted by a 
Ranger from Regiment 2103 while crossing the border without documents, 
8 December 2012. (Source: Sue Issara Loei 2012) 
While I was unable to obtain any context to the newspaper article’s story, the story does 
highlight the fact that the border in this area was neither completely porous nor 
unregulated, nor a place where the residents of any border village could move across 
freely. Legal documents were indeed significant in particular contexts, and mainly 
where familiarity and social relationships were lacking, as in the case of the two 
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 On the website of the local Sue Issara Loei newspaper, articles are regularly posted about crimes 
committed along the border in Loei province. They usually come with a photo of the state official who 
was responsible for intercepting the crime. The photos include drug smugglers with their products laid out 
in front of them, motorbikes and cars hidden in bushes, but also people who crossed the border 
“illegally”. 
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women. The fact that the women did not originate from one of the border villages that 
lay directly across from the customary border checkpoint could also have played a role 
in his decision-making
64
. In this case, the arrest could be seen as a public deterrent to 
other villagers who seek to cross the border at unmarked sites. What underscores this is 
the fact that the incident was published on the local news website. Without speculating 
too much about the reasoning behind the arrest, the example clearly demonstrates how 
some undocumented border residents were able to move across the border more freely 
than others. As I have shown, many Lao border villagers often rely more on their ties to 
the local authorities rather than on paperwork in the act of traversing unmarked border-
crossing sites. In the following section, I present my observations and interviews at 
customary border checkpoints. While there was some technocracy around legal 
documents here, border performances played an important role and social relationships 
often trumped both legal documents and border performances.  
THE (IN)SIGNIFICANCE OF DOCUMENTS AT CUSTOMARY 
BORDER CHECKPOINTS 
Customary border checkpoints (dan prapheni) are usually located between a Thai and 
Lao village that are situated across the river from each other. The checkpoints in Ban 
Sing and Ban Plee have prevailed as points of entry and exit for many local villagers 
despite the opening of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge as the official border-crossing 
site in Loei province. The checkpoint in Ban Donmai was created after the opening of 
the Bridge. The primary purpose of these checkpoints is to regulate the movement of 
people between the two villages. Border-crossers are not permitted to stay overnight on 
the other side and must return within the same day. At all three checkpoints in my 
research area, the Thai paramilitary was situated in a house or hut near the pier on the 
one side and specialised Lao border officials were located in a house or hut near the pier 
on the other side. Boat operators and labourers from both villages made money by 
transporting people and carrying goods across the river during the official opening times 
of the checkpoints. The three checkpoints in my research area differed in several ways. 
The checkpoint in Ban Plee was open every day and was used by the highest number of 
people (several hundred) on border market days. This checkpoint was equipped not only 
with the presence of Thai Rangers but also with CCTV cameras that recorded 
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 After the opening of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, cross-border flows were channelled across the 
Bridge. Customary border checkpoints were established for the border residents in the villages adjacent to 
the checkpoints and to decrease “illegal” flows across unmarked border-crossing sites.  
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movements across and along the border, which were monitored by the district 
administration in Thali. This was due, according to the village headmen, to the history 
of smuggling in this area. The checkpoint in Ban Sing was also open every day and was 
used by the second largest number of people (up to a few hundred) on border market 
days. The checkpoint in Ban Donmai was no doubt the most inconspicuous of the three 
and during my research I would sometimes drive past it by accident. It was only open 
on border market days twice a month and only a small number of Lao villagers used it 
(under one hundred).  
 
Image 12: Customary border checkpoint, showing the Lao side of the 
border with the border guards’ house on the right and the boat operators’ 
bamboo hut on the left (Source: Author) 
When crossing over the border at a checkpoint, Thai border residents had to leave their 
ID card with the Rangers and pay the boat operator for the trip across the river. Upon 
arrival on the Lao side, a fee called kha yiab din (step-on-the-land-fee) was payable to 
the Lao border official. When leaving the Lao side to go to the Thai border village 
across the river, Lao residents also had to pay the “step-on-the-land-fee” to Lao 
authorities (although it might then be better translated as “step-off-the-land-fee”). The 
amount of the fee varied from checkpoint to checkpoint and was usually different for 
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Thai and Lao residents. This variation reflected the economic asymmetry between 
Thailand and Laos as well as between the different border villages. At the checkpoint in 
Ban Plee, for example, the fee for Thai residents was 60 baht but for Lao residents only 
40 baht. In Ban Sing, the fee for Thai residents was 40 baht and 20 baht for Lao 
residents. In Ban Donmai, the fee for both Thai and Lao residents was 20 baht. The fee 
did not apply to people over 70 years of age. It is worth noting that the “step-on-the-
land-fee” on the Lao side was also paid in Thai baht, reflecting the power of the market 
over monetary sovereignty in Laos’ borderland. 
When Lao villagers crossed the checkpoint they were required, in addition to paying the 
fee, to tell the Lao border official their name, age and place of residence before their 
departure in order to receive a “temporary permit for crossing the border” (baisamoe 
kham daen chuakhrao), which they would have to submit to the Thai Rangers upon 
their arrival (Image 13). The fact that Lao border-crossers did not have to show any 
form of identification on paper but only verbally transmit their personal details to the 
Lao border official made due for the fact that many of the Lao villagers in my research 
area did not possess any form of paper identification other than their household register.  
 
Image 13: Temporary border permit at customary border checkpoint 
(Source: Author) 
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Keeping these formalised procedures in mind, the feel of the customary border 
checkpoints was less that of a technocratic state institution and more that of a place of 
sociability. In addition to the Thai Rangers’ duty stations, the boat operators also had a 
hut at each of the river piers where they could rest, eat, and socialise. With the Rangers’ 
and boat operators’ huts situated very close to each other at all of the checkpoints, the 
border guards, boat operators, and labourers could often be seen mingling with each 
other in one or the other hut (though more often in the boat operators’ hut), sharing 
food, drinks, and stories (Chapter 5). One of the Thai Rangers stationed in Ban Sing had 
become so well acquainted with one of the boat operators that the latter invited the 
Ranger to join him at the annual village festival in Ban Sawan. Walking along the street 
parade myself at the time, I met them as they were drinking whisky together, both clad 
in civilian clothes.  
Having spent much of my time at these checkpoints, particularly at the checkpoint in 
Ban Sing, I found that there were many adaptations of the formal procedures to 
accommodate the situation on the ground. On one of the border market days in Ban 
Sing, for example, I noticed that many Lao visitors were arriving without a document. 
They had paid the fee to the Lao border official but had not received a permit. When 
asking about this, the Ranger that I was sitting with quickly trivialised the situation by 
explaining that the Lao officer “must have run out of paper again”. The fact that it did 
not seem to be a major issue highlights not only the flexibility of state practices at this 
checkpoint but also the extent to which paper documents are insignificant at border-
crossing sites where there is a strong familiarity between the examiner and the 
examined. There were differences, however, between the adaptations of such state 
practices at the checkpoints in Ban Sing and Ban Plee.  
As several hundred villagers were traversing the customary border checkpoint in Ban 
Plee one border market day, they were also missing their permits from the Lao 
authorities. Unlike the Rangers in Ban Sing, however, the guards in Ban Plee noted 
down the information of all border-crossers in a register book while another checked 
their bags for illegal items. At the registration table, one of the elderly woman was only 
able provide her first name, explaining that she did not have a last name. The Ranger 
laughed understandingly at this response and told her to invent a name or choose that of 
a friend instead. Despite the differences in the degree to which technocratic procedures 
were flexible and adapted, the actions of state actors at both checkpoints confirm 
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Herzfeld’s statement that the state often makes use of a “language of kin, family, and 
body to lend immediacy to its pronouncements” (Herzfeld 2005: 2). In doing so, state 
actors are able to reinforce their authority. The adaptations thus demonstrate how the 
border comes into being in different ways at different checkpoints. 
While state actors often used the language of the non-state realm to reinforce their 
authority, non-state actors also reinforced the state’s authority by supporting them in 
their duties. When the Rangers were late for work in the morning or on a mission 
outside the checkpoints, for example, boat operators would act on behalf of the Rangers 
by taking the border permits from Lao arrivals and stacking them neatly on the Rangers’ 
table until the Rangers came back. By fulfilling the duties of state actors, boat operators 
not only blurred the lines between state and society but also took on the form of the 
state on a temporary basis. This shows how the cultural intimacy between state and 
society not only rests on the social embeddedness of the state but also on the intimacy 
of society towards the state. In the case of the boat operators, the cultural intimacy was 
reinforced by the strong social relationship that existed between border guards and boat 
operators at customary border checkpoints. 
Strong social relationships also existed between the local shop owners and the border 
guards at customary border checkpoints and facilitated the shop owners’ cross-border 
passage. When crossing over to Ban Sawan, they were neither required to leave their ID 
cards with the Thai border guards, nor did they have to pay the “step-on-the-land” fee 
on the Lao side. Kew, for example, whose shop was situated directly next to the 
customary border checkpoint in Ban Sing, needed merely pay the 10 baht transportation 
fee to the boat operators. Instead of stopping by the Rangers’ hut, Kew would walk 
straight to the pier and ask one of the boat operators to take her across. Sometimes she 
would have to wait in the boat operators’ hut for more people to arrive at the pier as the 
boat operators preferred to take several people across at once. On the Lao side, Kew did 
not stop by the border officials’ hut either. If a border official was sitting outside the hut 
and saw her pass by, the two would nod or smile at each other in complicit silence. But 
usually, border officials on both sides simply ignored Kew when she crossed over the 
checkpoint.  
Shop owners like Kew crossed over the checkpoint with ease because of their 
established relations with border officials on both sides of the checkpoint. Due to the 
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traders’ close proximity to the checkpoint, their daily trading activities across it and 
their daily interactions with the border officials, but also due to their engagement in gift-
giving practices with the officials (Chapter 4), these traders had established good 
relations with the border guards on both sides. “We know each other well” (rucak kan 
di) was the phrase that the traders usually used to describe their relationship with the 
border officials. Towards the end of my research, Kew explained in passing that she was 
also related (phinong) to the Lao border official on the other side of the checkpoint. 
They were members of the same extended family and therefore knew each other well. 
The trust and familiarity that existed between her and her relative further facilitated her 
cross-border mobility.  
While the other two shop owners in Ban Sing were also able cross the checkpoint 
without documents or fees, the daughter of one of them was still required to pay the fee 
on the Lao side of the border. Although she did not have to leave her ID card with the 
Thai Rangers, she bemoaned the fact that she had to pay the fee to the Lao official 
despite having helped her mother in the shop on a daily basis for several years and 
regularly crossing over the checkpoint to take orders from customers. It was taking her 
more time and effort than expected to establish the kind of relations that would lead to 
more flexible state practices. What is interesting here is that undocumented cross-border 
mobility was something worth striving for. It was not in the least deemed to be a 
dangerous or “illegal” practice. It was rather seen as a privilege, indicating not only a 
close relationship between the trader and the representatives of state power but also 
demonstrating the agency of the trader in this relationship. The daughter of the shop 
owner already had agency in her interactions with the Thai Rangers but not yet with the 
Lao authorities. 
There was a difference, however, between the shop owners who had established close 
social (or kin) relations with the border guards on both sides, and the villagers from 
Laos who only crossed the checkpoint a few times a month. The familiarity between the 
shop owners and border guards was much stronger that between most Lao villagers and 
the guards. Although one of the Rangers in Ban Sing told me that by having worked at 
this duty station for a year, he now recognised most people’s faces, the Rangers’ 
familiarity with the border-crossers was based more on the latter’s border performances 
during the border examination. This was particularly evident in the case of female 
visitors who came to shop at the border market. On busy border market days, the Thai 
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Rangers usually checked some of the Lao visitors’ bags and pockets for drugs and 
weapons. While sitting in the paramilitary’s hut watching them perform these duties one 
day, the guards visibly enjoyed checking the bags of women and girls whom they 
considered pretty (Image 14). The women and girls smiled and laughed consistently 
during this process. At one point, one of the guards laughingly turned around to me and 
said: “Aren’t they beautiful, these Lao girls?” Many of the younger women and girls 
had done their hair and make-up, and were wearing nicer clothes than their regular 
everyday outfits. Speaking to a Lao NGO worker in Mueang Sayaboury about this, he 
confirmed my observation and explained: “I will tell you a secret about Lao people, 
especially when they go to the talat nat [border market] in Thailand, they will dress 
especially nicely because they know that Thai people look down on them and so they 
want to look nice when going there.”  
 
Image 14: Thai Rangers search the bags of female Lao visitors at a 
customary border checkpoint (Source: Author) 
Aware of this stereotype, appearance was an important aspect of border performance for 
Lao visitors. Despite the fact that the women and girls were checked more often for the 
purposes of pleasure and sexual desire than for their potentiality as a threat, the women 
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and girls also behaved in a way that indirectly reaffirmed the Rangers’ authority. This 
often stood in contrast to the young men whom the Rangers checked. Those young men 
who wore jeans and T-shirts were more frequently checked than middle-aged men who 
wore suit trousers and collared shirts. If not dressed in accordance with the ‘norm’, 
however, one’s clothes may also impede on one’s ability to cross the checkpoint. This 
was not just the case for young, male visitors at the border market who wore jeans and a 
T-shirt, thereby raising suspicion on the part of the Thai Rangers, but also the case for 
Thai border villagers who crossed the checkpoint to visit the Lao side.  
Another example of border performances of Lao villagers on the Thai side involved my 
own encounter with two female traders who were sitting on blankets at the top of the 
pier next to the customary border checkpoint. They were selling fermented fish in small 
buckets for visitors to the border market to take back across the border. At the Thai 
border markets, Lao petty traders were tolerated by authorities to sell their own products 
as long as they only stayed for a short amount of time and if they sold only a small 
amount of goods. Wondering whether the two female petty traders were in fact from 
Laos, I approached them and after introducing myself, I asked where they came from. 
They simply smiled and responded: “From here! From the village here!” Later, I spoke 
to one of the workers at the customary border checkpoint and asked about the two petty 
traders. The worker explained that the two women were from a village in Ken Thao 
district. She then approached the women together with me and asked them the same 
question I had asked before, to which they responded that they were in fact from the 
Lao side of the river. I experienced a similar situation a few times during my research. It 
seems that many of the Lao villagers I met, and particularly those who were 
undocumented, felt compelled to switch their identity when speaking to me as a 
foreigner, thereby depicting me as a border examiner, but not so when speaking to Thai 
traders from the same border area with whom they were familiar and whom they 
trusted. This made the cultural intimacy that existed among people of the borderland 
further evident.  
Border performances were also important at checkpoints on the Lao side. One of the 
female Thai border market traders in Ban Plee spoke of an incident with a Lao state 
official who did not allow her husband to cross over the checkpoint because he was 
wearing short trousers. When entering Lao territory, the border guard had maintained, 
men would have to wear long trousers. In this case, admission was refused on the basis 
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of wrong dress. Not only does this confirm the importance of performing according to 
the ‘norm’ in border examinations, it also demonstrates that what the ‘norm’ entails 
may be different on the Thai and Lao sides of the same checkpoint. While short trousers 
worn by Thai residents were unacceptable to Lao border officials, long jeans and T-
shirts worn by Lao residents raised suspicion among Thai Rangers. 
While it was clear that the “norm” was different on either side of the border, Thai 
border residents were generally more reluctant to cross over to the Lao side than vice 
versa. This was not merely due to the fact that Lao border residents were largely 
dependent on access to the Thai market but it was also based on Thai border residents’ 
perceptions of Laos as well as the act of crossing the border itself. Mu, the female 
border market trader I introduced in Chapter 3, for example, had relatives on the Lao 
side whom she rarely visited. One of the reasons for not visiting them was because she 
felt that Lao state officials at the checkpoint were very suspicious of Thai border-
crossers: “They stare at me, suggesting that I am carrying drugs!” which made her feel 
uncomfortable and afraid of the consequences in case they did accuse her of being 
involved in the drug trade. She also feared that the border official might impose a higher 
fee at his own will, which she would not be able to pay. Mu’s reasons for not crossing 
over the border coincided with those of many of my other Thai informants whose 
trading activities did not involve crossing over the border regularly. Mu had not 
established any social relationships with border officials. She was especially 
discouraged to cross over the border, however, by her presumption of Lao officials’ 
arbitrary law enforcement. Her and other Thai border residents’ experiences with Lao 
authorities had, over many decades, cultivated a negative perception of Laos that was 
fuelled by their memories of the time before, during, and after the communist takeover 
in Laos (see Chapters 2 and 4). Among many Thai residents, the Lao state was seen as 
unlawful and deceitful. In other words, the Lao state was seen to be in a constant state 
of exception made way for arbitrary demands, incarceration, and even violence.  
My own personal experience of crossing the border at the customary border checkpoint 
in Ban Plee reconfirms the importance of familiarity and social relationships. But it also 
demonstrates the important (and by scholars not often highlighted) fact that a 
checkpoint has two sets of authorities (one on either side) that can not only be very 
different in their practices but also that there can be differences in attitude and practice 
among the individual officers within these sets. During the height of the village festival 
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season in May 2012, I had been invited by my interlocutors to attend several festivals 
on the Lao side but state regulations stated that I had to cross over the Thai-Lao 
Friendship Bridge and acquire a Lao visa for USD 30 on every visit. Having lived along 
the border for more than nine months and having spent numerous hours in and around 
the customary border checkpoints in three Thai border villages, I decided that it was 
worth trying to cross over the checkpoint instead.  
A local female trader who was a friend of mine accompanied me during this process in 
order to reaffirm my social relations with the local community. The Thai Rangers on 
duty that day knew me well and did not hesitate to grant me way of passage. They 
suspected however, that the Lao border officials would not be as flexible in their 
decisions. Indeed this was the case. Having crossed over by boat, we walked to the Lao 
border officials’ hut, which was situated approximately 100 metres away from the pier 
where we arrived and on a small hill. We introduced ourselves. Unfortunately, my 
friend did not know the officials personally. After some friendly discussions and offers 
to pay a higher fee than the usual, the officials still rejected my request to enter their 
territory on the grounds that I was a third-country national.  
Instead of walking back to the pier along the river, we walked along the street in the 
village. In doing so, we passed by the house of my friend’s friend and my friend 
persuaded to pay her friend a visit before returning to the pier. In this way, I would at 
least get a sense of the festival atmosphere on the Lao side. Eventually we ended up 
inside her friend’s house who turned out to be a wealthy and influential factory owner. 
At the time of our arrival, she and her husband were attending to several male guests 
around a large table and were drinking beer with them. Immediately, we were invited to 
join in. It turned out that the male visitors were all members of the Lao police and the 
man we were sitting next to was in fact the district head of the police. I felt extremely 
uncomfortable in this situation and to my shock and horror, my friend immediately told 
him our story. He listened, smiled and suggested that it was better for us to go home – 
but only after we toasted to another beer with him. He explained that he did not want to 
interfere with the local border officials’ decisions but now that we were here, we should 
have a drink together.  
While my citizenship status as a third-country national and my unfamiliarity with the 
Lao border guards restricted my cross-border movement across the customary border 
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checkpoint, my newly built social relations with the influential factory owner and the 
act of socialising with the district head of the police facilitated this movement at least 
for a certain time period. Once again, this reconfirms the argument made in this chapter 
that familiarity and social relationships play a more crucial role for cross-border 
mobility than legal documents. In my case, drinking beer with the district head of police 
was an act of building rapport with a state actors that both respected his authority and 
facilitated my presence on a territory that I had previously been denied access to. The 
act of drinking beer may be also seen as a border performance that was imperative to 
this facilitation. In the following I will demonstrate how my argument stands its ground 
even at the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, which is the only border-crossing site along the 
Hueang River that entails immigration and customs offices and where the act of 
crossing the border is most formalised and technocratic.  
DECISION-MAKING AT THE THAI-LAO FRIENDSHIP BRIDGE 
Every Saturday thousands of people attend the border market in Ban Plee, which is 
situated next to the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge at the far end of the village. Most of its 
visitors come from Sayaboury province via the Bridge although many visitors also use 
the customary border checkpoint for the sake of convenience, familiarity, but also due 
to the fact that many do not have ID cards to present to the immigration officials at the 
Bridge
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. Those who cross over the Bridge are not permitted to walk but must either 
hire a samlo (three-wheeler, see Image 15) for a fee or drive across the Bridge in a car 
themselves.  
When traversing the Bridge, Lao citizens are required to show their ID or passport to the 
Thai immigration officials. With their ID, they can acquire a one-day temporary border 
permit (similar to the one at the customary border checkpoint) that allows them to 
attend the border and requires an immediate return. They can also acquire a three-day 
Border Pass, which allows them to work and travel throughout Loei province for three 
days and two nights and which may be extended up to three times
66
. With a passport, 
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 According to my interlocutors in Laos, Lao citizens must go through a lengthy procedure to receive an 
ID card that entails several visits to the district administration as well as a fee, which many are not able or 
willing to pay.  
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 By extending the right to work and travel in Loei province to Lao citizens, the Border Pass may be seen 
as a type of “flexible citizenship” as described by Ong (2006) and also Pitch (2007). While Ong focused 
on the way citizenship rights are expanded to include non-citizens, Pitch also focuses on the 
disadvantages that go along with this expansion. He describes how Burmese labour migrants are allowed 
to work in Thailand, but are denied any labour rights that could provide a secure working environment. 
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Lao citizens can also obtain a visa that allows them to travel throughout Thai territory 
for up to 30 days. The Border Pass can also be acquired by Thai citizens who wish to 
visit Sayaboury province for up to three days. They must follow the same procedure on 
the Thai side as Lao citizens on the Lao side by showing their ID and paying a fee. The 
Border Pass is an important type of citizenship especially for Lao migrant labourers as it 
gives them the right to work within Loei province for up to nine days. It is also 
important for Lao traders as it gives them the right to cross over the border and buy 
goods anywhere within Loei province. Foreigners from outside Thailand or Laos are not 
eligible for this kind of citizenship. For Thai and Lao citizens, however, a valid ID card 
proving full citizenship status is a prerequisite to acquire the Border Pass.  
 
Image 15: Three samlo (three-wheelers) in front of the Thai-Lao Friendship 
Bridge, Thailand (Source: Author) 
Along with this paperwork, social relationships also had important implications for 
proceedings at the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. This became evident during one of my 
                                                                                                                                               
The same can be argued for the Border Pass along the Thai-Lao border as it allows Lao labour migrants to 
work within Loei province but does not provide them any further rights. Having said this, I suggest 
further research be conducted on the situation of Lao labour migrants in Loei province as it goes far 
beyond the scope of my own study. 
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visits to Laos via the Bridge. Having received a departure stamp on the Thai side of the 
border, I was on my way across the Bridge to the Lao immigration desk. I was sharing a 
samlo with two other women, one of whom was a migrant labourer who was on her way 
home after three days of work on the Thai side. The other woman was a trader from Ban 
Sawan, as she told me, and it was her who had loaded the samlo full of goods including 
vegetables and daily necessities. In fact, the three-wheeler was so full that the three of 
us had to sit in front next to the driver, holding on to the railings in order to not fall off. 
In the middle of the Bridge, the samlo stopped in order for us to show our documents to 
the Lao border official. The official checked my passport and the migrant labourer’s 
Border Pass. He completely ignored the female trader who was also with us. Before he 
turned around to walk back and let us continue, however, the trader held out a bag of 
mangosteen for the official to take. The official thanked her for it and left. As we 
departed, she shouted out to the other officials as they waived and thanked her for the 
bag of mangosteen. As I later found out, she was the wife of another border official and 
was able to move (or had the privilege of moving) across the border without documents.  
Malee’s story from the beginning of this chapter stands in contrast to the trader’s ability 
to move freely across the border without any documents. While Malee was denied 
admission to Thai territory on the basis of her invalid citizenship documents, the female 
trader mentioned above could draw on her social relationships based on her husband’s 
work connections and her gift-giving practices with the border officials to gain access 
despite her apparent lack of documents. In fact, I would argue that she probably owned 
legal documents that would have allowed her to cross the border but that she was given 
the privilege to not need them. The very confident way in which she interacted with the 
border officials at the Bridge can also be seen as a border performance enacted to 
facilitate her way of passage. Not only did social relationships trump legal documents in 
the decisions of state officials to give or deny entry at the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, 
such relationships also led to a blurring of state and society. A final example shall 
further illustrate my argument on the various ways in which the state and society 
become blurred in the act of crossing the border.  
It concerns one of the Lao middlewomen I became friends with named Vattana. She 
was from a small town near Mueang Sayaboury. She travelled across the border every 
week in her pick-up truck to buy goods in Mueang Loei for her customers in and around 
her hometown. She would drive her truck across the Bridge on a Friday evening and go 
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to Mueang Loei the following morning. On Friday evening, she would not stay in a tent 
next to the Bridge like the other middlewomen but instead she would visit a member of 
the Thai Volunteer Border Militia (Or Sor) and his family in their home. My personal 
relationship with the Or Sor allowed me to participate in their get-together one Friday 
night. There was much drinking and gossiping involved. Over time, Vattana had 
established such good relationships with the Or Sor that she and her friends were able to 
stay over in one of the Or Sor’s huts that were situated next to the Bridge. While other 
middlewomen had to stay in tents in the entrance area of the immigration building, this 
trader was offered her own single hut in the Or Sor’s compound, which she usually 
shared with a friend or her son. Although her relationship with the Or Sor did not allow 
her to move across the Bridge without documents, it did facilitate her cross-border 
mobility by allowing her to use the accommodation facilities normally restricted to the 
state. At the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, cross-border movement is thus regulated on 
the basis of identity documents that include the passport, the Border Pass and the 
temporary border permit. A closer look reveals, however, that these manifestations of 
the border are interwoven with other forms of knowing based on familiarity and social 
relationships.  
THE SOCIAL LIFE OF SOVEREIGNTY  
The micro-level perspective offered by my ethnographic findings provides an insight 
into the diverse practices of the state and interactions between state and non-state actors 
in the act of crossing the nation-state border. It demonstrates the extent to which legal 
documents are significant in gaining access to Thai territory at different border-crossing 
sites. Drawing on social relationships, familiarity, and gift-giving practices with state 
officials, non-state actors are able to navigate and influence the uneven landscape of 
sovereign power in a way that facilitates their cross-border mobility even without 
identity documents. In this way, the documents that Navaro-Yashin so eloquently 
analyses as “psychically charged phenomena” (2007: 95) become meaningless, are 
often ignored, and instead trumped by the familiarity and cultural intimacy between the 
authority in the borderland and the temporary visitor. Social relationships and border 
performances should thus be seen as complimentary aspects to citizenship along the 
border. 
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It must be noted, however, that Lao border-crossers at the customary border checkpoint 
had to submit their temporary permits (and only identity documents) to the Thai 
Rangers upon arrival. In doing so, they were merely protected by the authorities they 
had been granted entry by and not by those authorities located outside the confines of 
the village. From the perspective of state regulation, this not only delimits the visitor’s 
movement but also the temporariness of their stay. This is also the case for many other 
villagers who live along the Hueang River, for whom crossing over the border is an 
integral part of everyday life that does not entail border examinations but who build on 
the trust with the border guards that are in charge of their area. When crossing over the 
Hueang River in residential areas or even at the customary border checkpoint, such 
villagers must stay within close proximity of the border or could otherwise face fines or 
detention. It is therefore important to acknowledge not only how social relationships 
and border performances facilitate movements across the border but also how this 
seemingly free movement without documents is restricted to the immediate border area.  
By becoming familiar and engaging with border residents, by gaining their trust, but 
also by blurring the lines between state and society, Thai border guards are also able to 
monitor and better regulate cross-border movement. This allows them to gain access to 
most if not all border-crossing sites along the Hueang River. In contrast to a 
conceptualisation of the state as oppressor, this type of regulation is more collaborative 
in nature (Walker 1999). Border residents who are unfamiliar to them and those who do 
not perform according to the “norm”, on the other hand, are checked with higher 
scrutiny and may face detention, fines, and deportation. Individual border guards and 
state officials with different ranks and responsibilities may also differ in the way they 
interact with the local population, which may influence their decision-making and 
regulation of the border as well. 
Highlighting the flexibility of state practices on both the Thai and Lao sides of the 
border thus provides not only a more differentiated view of borders. It also questions the 
simplistic conceptualisation of borders as sites of control where the state exerts power 
over its subjects (Salazar and Smart 2011: 75). Such a conceptualisation does not take 
into consideration the complexities of decision-making processes at border checkpoints 
and how these decisions may be influenced by social relationships and border 
performances. The social life of the (representative) sovereign (or “petty sovereign” as 
Judith Butler (2004: 56) would say) strongly contributes to the way the border is 
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regulated and how it comes into being in different places and at different times. Along 
the Hueang River, the state of exception may be seen as an exception to the border 
residents’ everyday lives.  
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CHAPTER 6 
INTRICACIES OF REGULATING SMALL-SCALE TRADE  
 
“Legality and illegality are […] 
simultaneously black and white, and 
shades of gray.” (Heyman 1999: 11) 
 
FIFTY SHADES OF TRADE 
Small-scale cross-border trade has withstood changing border policies, ranging from 
highly restricted trade during Thailand’s economic embargo against Laos from 1975 to 
the 1990s to the more recent cooperation efforts between the Thai and Lao 
governments. The latter efforts have been epitomised by the construction of a Thai-Lao 
Friendship Bridge in Loei province in 2004, which has facilitated and increased the 
overall cross-border trade in the area. However, the new border policies that followed 
the opening of the Bridge have also rendered trading activities across all other border-
crossing sites illegal. Despite the new border policies, female traders have continued to 
trade daily necessities across local checkpoints outside the Bridge as well as across 
unmarked border-crossing sites. In contrast to drug traffickers and vehicle smugglers 
who operate clandestinely, most of the trade in daily necessities is conducted openly 
and visibly under the gaze of state officials who tolerate and facilitate this kind of trade 
to a large extent. At these sites, the Thai state’s control is not merely restrictive with 
regard to cross-border flows but characterised by a flexibility that facilitates some kinds 
of trade over others. The goods included in the small-scale trade of daily necessities 
were diverse, ranging from a can of iced coffee to several boatloads full of liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG). Many of these commodities were subject to different limits of 
toleration by Thai and Lao border guards when traded across the nation-state border. In 
this chapter, I will analyse these limits of toleration in relation to notions of legality and 
licitness, and how such limits on the Thai side differed from the Lao side. 
Although small-scale trade is often categorised as part of an informal “shadow 
economy” (Schneider and Enste 2003) of the border, the public and formalised 
character of small-scale trade that took place outside the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge 
makes it difficult to apply such a simplified category. In order to understand the 
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intricacies of this kind of trade and its regulation, I examine the “micro-geometries of 
regulation” (Walker 1999) – the complex power relationships that bring order and 
stability to what may otherwise be seen as an unruly, chaotic, and porous border. 
Following Walker (1999) I argue that if we wish to unravel the complex realities on the 
ground, we must broaden our understanding of regulation to include the agency of 
different non-state actors and acknowledge the interrelation and blurred boundary 
between state and society. Several studies have shown how trade is regulated by social 
norms beyond state policies (Titeca and Herdt 2010; Schoenberger and Turner 2008; 
Harris-White 2009). In her study on informal trade in India, Harris-White acknowledges 
that forms of social regulation “bring order and stability to a rich complexity of forms 
and scales of production, ownership, contract and exchange relations” (2009: 156). By 
distinguishing state and social regulation, however, she reproduces the state-society, and 
formal-informal dichotomies. While formal trade is regulated by the state, the latter is 
supposedly regulated solely by social norms. The way small-scale cross-border trade is 
regulated in my research area challenges such a perspective. As I will demonstrate, it 
blurs not only the state-society dichotomy but also the legal-illegal and formal-informal 
dichotomies that are so often used when describing small-scale trading activities.  
Although there is no accepted definition of the informal economy, it is usually 
described as covering all economic activities that operate outside the regulatory 
framework of the state (Portes et al. 1989: 12). Due to its presumed evasion of state 
regulation, Portes and Haller suggest that the informal economy is “capable of 
subverting the economic and political order of nations” (2005: 403). When taking on 
such a perspective, small-scale trade is often equated with the resistance of the local 
population against a malfunctioning or weak state (Tagliacozzo 2001; Little 2005; 
Turner 2010; Eilenberg 2012; Gauthier 2012). As such, small-scale trade is often 
equated with illegal activities. Some studies, however, distinguish between the informal 
and the illegal. The International Labour Organisation (ILO), for example, argues that 
informal activities involve legal goods and services (such as clothing) while illegal 
activities involve illegal goods and services (such as drugs) (ILO 2013: 4). In the 
introduction to their edited volume on small-scale trade and smuggling, furthermore, 
Bruns and Miggelbrink (2012) consider small-scale trade to be legal and smuggling to 
be illegal.  
As many scholars have duly noted, simplified classifications of the informal and/or the 
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illegal usually do not adequately capture what happens on the ground. Galemba argues 
that trading activities can be “simultaneously formal, informal, legal, and illegal” (2008: 
20) and along the Thai-Malaysian border, Suparb found that “trading activities in border 
areas are often inseparable from smuggling and involve the state and its public servants 
in various ways. Conflicts, co-operation, corruption, even sometimes violent 
confrontation can all occur” (1989: 114). However, Suparb conceptualises any kind of 
trade that is not recorded by the state as either smuggling or informal trade, no matter 
how state officials were involved in such practices. Pitch, on the other hand, made 
similar observations along the Thai-Burmese border and comes to the conclusion that: 
“smuggling at Mae Sai [Thai border town] has been institutionalized by being 
informalized in such a way of being part of the formal border trade system“ (2007: 268 
italics in original). Although he uses the simplified classification of the informal 
throughout his thesis he clearly states that it does not adequately capture what is 
happening on the ground (2007: 263). In the case of the Thai-Lao border, researchers at 
the Development Analysis Network (DAN) estimate that informal trade may account 
for 20-30% of overall trade (2005: 11). But they also finds that the formal sector has 
strong ‘non-formal’ characteristics, “making bipolar categories like formal-informal not 
always meaningful” (2005: 12).  
One of the barriers to making sense of small-scale trade across borders is the 
terminology used within the social sciences, which is confined to the territorial structure 
of the nation-state (van Schendel and Abraham 2005: 38f). Although advances have 
been made in studies on migration, transnationalism, cross-border flows, as well as 
studies on space and place, the social sciences still lack the tools to fully overcome 
methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002) that takes for granted an 
isomorphism of nation, state and society. Several studies use emic terms to describe the 
kind of traders that operate in the muddy waters of the legal and illegal, and the formal 
and informal. They include “suitcase traders” (Miggelbrink 2014: 153), “tourist traders” 
(Hann and Hann 1992), “shuttle traders” (Yukseker 2004; Holtom 2003), “baggers” 
(Ribeiro 2009), and “ant traders” (Gauthier 2012). 
In my research area, the term for female small-scale traders specialising in border trade 
was the same as all other types of female traders (mae kha). Nonetheless, the practices 
of female cross-border traders covered a spectrum of formal to informal, legal to illegal, 
and licit to illicit aspects. This latter classification of licitness has not been used widely 
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in studies on small-scale trade but I find it useful in that it allows us to gain a deeper 
insight into the perspectives of the actors involved in the trade themselves. Van 
Schendel and Abraham (2005) employ this classification to understand what people 
who are involved in transnational networks consider to be legitimate (licit) vis-à-vis 
what states consider to be legitimate (legal). The concept of licitness thus brings 
attention to conceptualisations of legitimacy that go beyond the state and the law. In the 
ethnography presented here, however, the differentiation between legitimacy from the 
perspective of transnational traders and that of the state begs the question: What 
happens when the state itself is involved in transnational networks that fall outside the 
realm of the state? What do state actors perceive to be licit and illicit?  
In order to answer these questions we must not only account for the perspective of state 
actors with regard to their involvement in such trading practices but also look at the way 
they interact with non-state actors in the regulation of trade. Border studies have been 
much concerned with such interactions and have brought to light different types of 
interaction ranging from predatory state practices (DAN 2005, Kusakabe 2009) to more 
collaborative forms of regulation (Walker 1999, Jakkrit 2006, Phadungkiati and Connell 
2014). Where the negotiations and transactions between state and non-state actors 
involve money, they are often labelled as bribery and corruption (Fadahunsi and Rosa 
2002; Endres 2014). In order to gain a better understanding of corruption, several 
anthropologists have studied it with a particular focus on practice (Gupta 1995; Bubandt 
2006). For Ruud, the simple act of corruption is “only one among many outcomes of 
habitual practices“ as it “involves habitual networking, negotiation and manipulative 
application of ideas and moral arguments” and “just happens to involve a holder of a 
public position” (Ruud 2000: 1). I argue that by beginning with the premise that they 
are dealing with corruption in the first place, these studies reinforce the state-centric 
perspective they are aiming to debunk. In my own analysis that makes up the latter part 
of this chapter, I argue that we must differentiate between gifts, tribute, and bribes in 
order to understand the variety and complexity of such transactions. I then take a closer 
look at different kinds of bribes and suggest that we must distinguish collaborative and 
predatory forms of bribery.  
The analysis in this chapter builds on the findings of previous chapters, particularly with 
regard to the involvement of state actors in small-scale trade and their social 
embeddedness. In Chapter 4, I described the situation and everyday lives of state actors, 
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explaining how Thai Rangers interpreted their duties along the Hueang River in a way 
that excluded the restriction of small-scale trade of daily necessities and instead focused 
on finding drug and car smugglers. I also demonstrated how their social embeddedness 
in the local community was undergirded by gift-giving practices that involved villagers 
offering tributes as a symbol of deference. I distinguished gifts from tributes and also 
mentioned how my interlocutors perceived tributary gifts to be different from bribes. An 
important aspect of both gifts and tributes was that they reinforced social relationships 
between state and non-state actors who were involved in small-scale trade. In Chapter 5, 
I highlighted how such social relationships often made it unnecessary for villagers and 
particularly traders to carry identity documents when crossing the border at the Thai-
Lao Friendship Bridge and customary border checkpoints. Social relationships with 
Rangers also allowed Lao villagers in more remote areas to cross the river unmarked but 
more convenient border-crossing sites. On the other hand, a lack of social relationships 
with state actors was disadvantageous to many traders. This includes many Lao 
middlewomen who lamented the high and often arbitrary amount of tax demanded Lao 
customs officials at the Bridge.  
As I will demonstrate in this chapter, the multitude of social relationships, gift-giving 
practices and bribes are part of what makes the nation-state border appear porous 
despite forms of regulation that create order and stability on the ground. Through an 
investigation into the grey areas of the legal and illegal, and the formal and informal, 
and how these intersect with each other, we can come to see how, when, and where the 
border unfolds. I begin this chapter by uncovering the flexible legality that existed on 
the Thai side of the border with regard to small-scale cross-border trade and how this 
differed from the Lao side. I then discuss how Thai and Lao border guards tolerated 
trade on the basis of what they deemed to be licit and how Thai border guards were 
often complicit in traders’ attempts to circumvent Lao state officials. The second part of 
the chapter explores the tributes and bribes given to Thai and Lao border guards in more 
detail. I argue that due to the lack of legal flexibility of the Lao side, bribes were more 
prominent among Lao than among Thai border guards but also that many bribes were 
more collaborative than predatory in nature. Such an analysis of how trade is regulated 
through the practices and interactions of state and non-state actors reveals the 
multilayered and multifaceted nature of the border.  
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FLEXIBLE LEGALITY AROUND SMALL-SCALE TRADE 
At the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, small-scale traders who transported goods from 
Thailand to Laos had to go through immigration and customs. Although the Thai 
government had lifted export duties on most goods by 2012 (Thai Customs Department 
2015), traders still had to follow customs procedures. On the Thai side this involved 
hiring a broker to issue an export declaration. On Saturdays when the border market 
took place next to the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, a female broker from a local export 
shipping company situated herself next to the immigration counter. Traders who had 
shopped at the market had to show her the goods they were exporting (as they had no 
receipts) and provide her with an estimation of the value of their goods. Traders who 
had bought goods at the wholesalers in Mueang Loei provided the broker with their 
receipts. Based on this information the broker filled in the export declaration form and 
sealed it with a stamp. The export declaration form provided the basis of negotiating the 
import duty with customs officials on the Lao side. The cost for the broker’s service 
was graduated according to the amount of goods exported. For a pick-up truck full of 
goods it was usually around 300 baht. For a samlo (three-wheeler) full of goods it was 
approximately 40 baht
67
.  
While the bulk of daily necessities was traded across the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, a 
considerable amount continued to be traded across the three customary border 
checkpoints in my research area. As described in Chapter 2, customary border 
checkpoints were previously ports of toleration (jud phon pron) – temporary border 
checkpoints established as part of the rapprochement of the Thai and Lao governments 
in the 1980s. The ports of toleration were open on border market days and overseen by 
the Volunteer Border Militia (Or Sor) and later Thai Rangers as well as customs 
officials. In addition to the ports of toleration there was also a permanent checkpoint for 
the purposes of large-scale trading activities, which went through customs. With the 
opening of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge in 2004, the ports of toleration were 
transformed into customary border checkpoints and all trading activities were redirected 
to the Bridge. At the same time, the permanent checkpoint was shut down and an 
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 Interestingly, all my informants used the term “tax” (phasi) to describe the cost for the broker’s 
services even though the money went to a private company. This reflects local conceptualisations of 
governance that mix the public with the private, thereby problematising the state-society dichotomy (see 
also Walker 2012; Singh 2012). 
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additional customary border checkpoint opened
68
. The Thai side of a checkpoint was 
guarded by a group of paramilitary Rangers and the Lao side by specially trained 
policemen, which I will refer to as border officials. On each side of a checkpoint there 
was an additional hut for the boat operators and labourers (kamakon) who transported 
the goods from the Thai to the Lao side in motorised and unmotorised wooden boats. 
Upon my arrival at one of the checkpoints, the local Thai paramilitary explained to me 
that these border-crossing sites were for the use of the residents in the adjacent Thai and 
Lao villages only. The villagers could cross the checkpoints to visit each other. Lao 
villagers were also permitted to cross over them in order to buy daily necessities at the 
local Thai border markets for their own personal consumption (chai eng). It quickly 
became clear, however, that the local border officials were tolerating the transportation 
of larger amounts of goods across the checkpoint than merely for personal consumption. 
At one of the checkpoints, the sole responsibility of the labourers (kamakon) who 
worked alongside the boat operators was that of packing, carrying, lifting and loading 
wholesale goods from the shops at the checkpoint into the boats along the river. On the 
Lao side, another group of labourers unloaded the goods and used motorbikes to deliver 
them to the shops in the Lao villages. 
According to a member of the Thai Volunteer Border Militia (Or Sor), all departments 
and levels of government were aware of the small-scale cross-border trade conducted 
across these checkpoints. The local head also reported that the provincial governor of 
Loei had ordered the local state officials to “tolerate a little bit [of trade]”. Indeed, one 
of the village headmen (phuyaiban) explained that the regulation of cross-border flows 
was, in practice, not the provincial government’s but the local authorities’ 
responsibility. The village headman of a neighbouring village explained that the Thai 
government (rathaban) tolerated this kind of trade because the sales and export of 
goods was beneficial to the local economy. He contrasted the situation on the Thai side 
with that on the Lao side where the import of such goods was subject to customs duty 
(see ASEAN 2014). The regular trading practices across the customary border 
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 Several terms were used to describe the checkpoints. Some informants called them dan prapheni 
(customary border checkpoint) while others called them jud tha kham prapheni (translated literally as 
“customary place to cross over”). In an interview with a Thai customs official, furthermore, he remarked 
that these checkpoints were “not real ports of toleration” (jud phon pron mai cing) but not illegal either. A 
Lao tourism website makes a clear statement, namely that the term dan prapheni is the Lao term for such 
checkpoints and that there is no Thai equivalent of the term. In Thailand, according to the same website, 
there is only one official checkpoint category, which is the permanent checkpoint (jud phan daen thawon) 
(Louangprabang.net 2013). In my research area this was the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. 
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checkpoints that involved the wholesale of daily necessities were therefore subject to 
occasional scrutiny by Lao customs officials. Traders who had been intercepted by 
customs officials outside the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge reported that the officials not 
only issued a fine but also seized their goods. In the case of a trader who was exporting 
a box of live fish across the river, according to my interlocutors, the Lao customs 
officials confiscated the fish by setting them free into the Hueang River. In another case 
that involved fresh chicken eggs, the customs officials destroyed them on the spot. 
This means that any cross-border trading activities outside the Thai-Lao Friendship 
Bridge were de jure illegal on both the Thai and the Lao side. On the Thai side, 
however, small-scale trading activities can be described as de facto legal as they were 
tolerated by all levels of the Thai government. On the Lao side, such activities were de 
facto illegal as made evident by occasional checks and penalties by customs officials, 
but tolerated by local border guards. While I will come back to these contradictions 
within the Lao state, I will focus on the legal flexibility on the Thai side for now. The 
duality of de jure illegality and de facto legality on the Thai side was highlighted in 
several comments made by traders and Thai state officials alike. For example, the same 
village headman who had explained why small-scale trade outside the Thai-Lao 
Friendship Bridge was tolerated by the Thai government also lamented that it was 
illegal. He explained that this forced border villagers into smuggling (laklob). Among 
the traders and boat operators involved in small-scale trade, this duality was also 
apparent. They were very clear in their understanding that only small-scale trade 
(gankha leklek) was tolerated, as one Lao shop owner explained: “The Lao policeman 
and Thai soldiers [Rangers were called soldiers in Thai] don’t allow goods to be sent 
across the checkpoint in high amounts on a daily basis since that would be tax evasion 
(ni phasi)”. During a visit to the boat operators on the Lao side, furthermore, one of the 
workers justified their practices while carrying boxes of fertiliser to the local houses: 
“Everything we are doing is legal you know!” 
As the Lao shop owner already noted, only small-scale trade (gankha leklek) was 
tolerated. What kind of goods and how much trade this entailed, however, was at the 
discretion of the local border officials. As I will demonstrate, the conditions under 
which small-scale trade became de facto legal on the Thai side were based on 
conceptualisations of licitness but also on a familiarity between individual Rangers and 
the traders involved in small-scale trade. While this benefited those traders who had 
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established relations with such border guards and who knew how to negotiate with 
them, it was to the detriment of those traders who could not draw on such relations and 
who were turned away at the customary border checkpoints and redirected to the 
Bridge.  
The conditions for a de facto legality were also not the same among the individual Thai 
border officials. The answers I received from Thai Rangers with regard to how much 
trade they tolerated ranged from “a little” (noy / nit noy) to any amount of goods at all. 
An example for the latter was a Ranger who had been stationed in the area for two 
months and was already familiar with many border-crossers from the Lao villages 
across the border. It was a border market day and the boat operators had just transported 
a full boatload of watermelons across the river for a female Lao trader. Asking the 
Ranger how many more watermelons the trader could transport across this checkpoint 
he replied that it would not make a difference to him whether someone carried ten bags 
of watermelons across the river or even one thousand. He explained: “I am good-
hearted” (jai di); I give way (anulom) to any amount of trade”. The attribute of being 
good-hearted is highly valued in Thai culture
69
. It was therefore more important for this 
Ranger to be recognised as good-hearted than to impose his power on the cross-border 
traders in this area by delimiting their amounts of trade.  
While the Thai border guards’ flexibility was conducive to the Thai and Lao shop 
owners who traded across the customary border checkpoints, such traders seemed to 
have their own agenda with regard to the limitations on trade. The shop owners located 
on the Thai side of the customary border checkpoints, for example, provided a 
comparatively narrow definition of the small-scale trade that was allowed to pass 
through the checkpoint. Initially, they merely distinguished between the “large-scale 
trade” that must pass through international customs, and the “small trade” that may pass 
through the customary border checkpoints. But on the question of how many wholesale 
goods exactly the border officials would tolerate at such checkpoints, some traders 
mentioned “a few boxes” while others said that the trading activities of four to five 
shops was considered “small-scale”. It thus seems that the answers given by such 
traders legitimised their own trading activities. Due to the limited capacity of the 
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 In the Thai language, the heart (jai) is an important idiom for the linguistic expression of emotions and 
used in a variety of ways including staying calm in the face of distress (jai yen), being deferential 
(graengjai) and demonstrating good will (nam jai) (Cassaniti 2015 footnote 3).  
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wooden boats used to transport goods across the river, each shop could only ever send 
“a few boxes” of goods across at a time.  
On the one hand, the shop owners’ definition of small-scale trade was broad enough to 
accommodate the amount that was currently being traded across the customary border 
checkpoint. On the other hand, this definition delimited the extent of small-scale trade. 
It would not allow any further shops to engage in this kind of trade. It may thus be 
argued that the shop owners themselves have a vested interested in delimiting and hence 
regulating this kind of border trade (see also Walker 1999). By defining “small-scale” in 
this way, the local traders not only participated in regulating cross-border flows but also 
in rearticulating the border to their own advantage. This reconfirms Grimson’s 
statement when he concludes that traders “do want state borders but they want them on 
their own terms” (Grimson 2002: 168).  
THE IMBRICATION OF THE LEGAL AND THE LICIT 
Not only did Thai Rangers differ in how much trade they tolerated but also in what 
kinds of goods they tolerated. This was strongly intertwined with their 
conceptualisations of licitness. Generally, the goods that fell into the category of daily 
necessities were considered to be licit, as one Thai Ranger explained: “We [the 
Rangers] allow (anulom) people to trade daily necessities (khrueang ubpaphok 
boriphok) because these are the goods they need for everyday life. There is a problem 
with methamphetamine pills (yaba) and marihuana (gancha) though. They are 
smuggled (laklob) from Laos to Thailand…also with cars and motorcycles, which are 
smuggled across from Thailand to Laos at night”. Daily necessities were thus defined as 
items that people needed for everyday life. They were contrasted to drugs and vehicles, 
which were not only illegal but also illicit. At a closer look, however, it became clear 
that daily necessities themselves could entail a spectrum of licit to illicit goods.  
One example of goods that were considered fully licit were small amounts of non-
timber forest products (NTFP) such as vegetables, fruits, coconut rice desserts as well as 
edible worms, all of which were sold by Lao female traders in Thai border villages. 
Such female Lao traders usually travelled across the customary border checkpoints in 
the early mornings and sold their goods to villagers at morning markets, and by going 
from door to door through the village. Most of the Lao women selling NTFPs were 
established traders who had been conducting this kind of trade for many years, who had 
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strong social and kinship networks, and a regular customer base. They were well-known 
among Thai Rangers and often left a small bag of peanuts or worms with the Rangers as 
tribute upon arrival on the Thai side. One female vegetable trader usually borrowed a 
motorbike from a relative on the Thai side, which she used to travel from door to door 
in several Thai villages. According to the Development Analysis Network (DAN 2005) 
the import of NTFPs from Laos to Thailand must undergo the procedure of obtaining 
both export and import licences specific for NTFPs. At the customary border 
checkpoint, however, such items were clearly seen as part of the category of daily 
necessities. Local border officials tolerated their cross-border trade on a “small scale” 
basis.  
The goods that were traded from Thailand to Laos across customary border checkpoints 
and unmarked border-crossing sites included a wide range of products including soft 
drinks, instant coffee, instant noodles, crisps, shampoo and washing detergent but also 
clothing items, liquid petroleum gas (LPG) used for cooking, petrol, and during the rice 
planting season, fertilisers and pesticides. While Thai Rangers tolerated most food 
items, they restricted certain goods including sugar, LPG, and petrol. With regard to 
sugar, the head of a group of Rangers in one village made clear that they tolerated only 
very small amounts, i.e. one kilogramme of sugar. Sugar was restricted because it was 
subject to a higher import tax in Laos and because it stood in competition with the local 
sugar production in Laos. According to the shop owners, it was thus not only the Thai 
Rangers who restricted the transportation of sugar across the customary border 
checkpoints but primarily the Lao customs officials who occasionally came to patrol the 
area. In response to the limitations on sugar, shop owners and traders at the customary 
border checkpoints packed strategically by putting the sugar at the very bottom of a bag 
of goods and other items above. Sometimes a pre-packaged box of wholesale goods was 
also unpacked and its lower half refilled with bags of sugar and the upper half with fully 
licit goods. Such practices of re-packing were not hidden practices. In fact they were 
often conducted in front of the shops where Rangers could easily see them but usually 
paid little attention to. It can therefore be summarised that sugar was considered less 
licit (or more illicit) than food items such as instant noodles and soft drinks but also not 
fully illicit. 
Thai Rangers at customary border checkpoints also tolerated small amounts of LPG. 
One Ranger explicated that he tolerated one litre of LPG per person while another told 
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me he tolerated five litres per person. According to a shop owner, however, the local 
Thai Rangers tolerated an amount of ten litres of LPG, highlighting once more the 
varying limits of toleration among the individual border guards. The reason for 
restricting LPG, according to a border resident, was that it could be used to build 
explosives and bombs. Despite these restrictions, the local traders and boat operators 
regularly exported larger amounts of LPG from Thailand to Laos in the early mornings 
before the customary border checkpoints opened and sometimes during lunchtime when 
the guards on both sides of the border were out for lunch. When observing this traffic 
during lunchtime one day, the boat operators exclaimed “phit godmai!” (this is illegal) 
as they were passing bottles of LPG to each other over my head. Because border 
officials only tolerated a small amount of LPG to be traded across the border, boat 
operators had to resort to circumventing the officials when transporting larger amounts. 
This makes clear how thin the line is between the legal and illegal, and the licit and 
illicit.  
I also learnt during one of my later visits to the Lao side that quite a few of the shops in 
one of the border villages were selling canisters of petrol to the small petrol stations in 
the Lao village across the border. When staying with a family of boat operators in a Lao 
village for a few days, I was able to observe how the group of boat operators transported 
petrol canisters from the Thai to the Lao side already in the early morning. When I had 
previously asked the Thai shop owners about these activities they had continuously 
denied them. The fact that the Thai shop owners never felt comfortable enough to speak 
to me about their involvement in the petrol trade highlights the illicit status of petrol. 
While LPG in small amounts was considered licit by border officials and could be 
traded under their gaze, larger amounts of LPG as well as any amounts of petrol were 
considered illicit. Traders and boat operators resisted the restrictions on LPG and petrol 
by trading them clandestinely. In spite of such clandestine activities, I argue that border 
officials were able to maintain control over small-scale trade to a large extent by 
tolerating certain types and amounts of trade and delimiting others. I suggest that if de 
jure illegality of all kinds of trade outside the Bridge was de facto enforced, it would 
only increase smuggling and also bribery.  
This is substantiated by the way trade was conducted in relation to Lao state officials, 
particularly to Lao customs officials but also to local border guard to a certain extent. 
Lao border guards generally turned a blind eye to the small-scale trade of daily 
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necessities across the customary border checkpoint but demanded regular monetary 
payments in return. While I will discuss these payments in a later section, it is important 
to note that there were also differences between Lao border guards with respect to the 
amount and the kinds of goods they tolerated in return for bribes. According to Thai and 
Lao shop owners, some Lao border officials restricted the import of sugar (as discussed 
above) but also of several fresh products from Thailand including eggs, fresh pork, 
chicken meat, and fish as well as NTFPs such as mushrooms and vegetables. This was 
to protect local Lao producers.  
As a consequence of these restrictions, Thai shop owners helped their Lao customers 
circumvent Lao border officials by bringing restricted goods to unmarked border-
crossing sites where her Lao customers picked them up by boat. One Thai shop owner, 
for example, regularly brought eggs to an unmarked border-crossing site. The same 
shop owner explained that the local Thai Rangers were aware of this practice. Even 
though she had offered to compensate them for tolerating this practice they simply let 
her continue without further mentioning it. The different tolerations on the Thai and Lao 
side meant that the same goods that were considered to be licit by Thai Rangers could 
turn into smuggled goods from the perspective of Lao state officials as soon as they 
touched Lao soil. By tolerating the cross-border trade of goods that were restricted on 
the Lao side, furthermore, Thai Rangers not only sustained the survival of Lao border 
residents but were also complicit in circumventing restrictive Lao state officials.  
So far I have highlighted the flexible legality on the Thai side of the border and 
provided a nuanced view of what types and amounts of commodities are tolerated by 
Thai and Lao border guards across customary border checkpoints. While I have 
emphasised how this toleration is based on individual conceptualisations of licitness, in 
the next section I bring attention to the important role of social relationships and gift-
giving practices in the regulation of small-scale cross-border trade, and how these are 
interlinked with conceptualisations of licitness.  
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS, TRIBUTES, AND BRIBES 
I have demonstrated extensively in previous chapters (particularly Chapter 4 and 5) how 
social relationships between state and non-state actors were part of everyday life in my 
research area. At customary border checkpoints, Rangers often sat in the boat operators’ 
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huts and shared food with them. As part of their social embeddedness in the local 
community, Thai Rangers received gifts from traders at the customary border 
checkpoints and other villagers on a regular basis. Shop owners on the Thai side called 
such gifts khongfak (gift, souvenir) and shared the cost of these with their customers on 
the Lao side. The reason for providing border officials with gifts was not described as 
bribery or corruption but simply as a way of respecting a person of higher status 
(graengjai). Thai Rangers, it was reported among my interlocutors, never asked for such 
gifts after all but only accepted them as a token of appreciation. In Chapter 4, I 
discussed the difference between gifts that were given as part of a reciprocal gift 
exchange, and those that were given as tribute to people with a higher status. While I 
was personally involved in a reciprocal gift exchange with shop owners and also 
Rangers, I argue that the khongfak given to Rangers by shop owners should be seen as 
tribute as these gifts were not reciprocated by the Rangers but merely accepted. Tributes 
differed from bribes in a variety of ways including their nature and the way they were 
given. Where tributes usually consisted of food or drinks and offered in public, bribes 
consisted of money and were paid in secret. 
Lao state officials were also socially embedded in the local community where they lived 
with their families. They maintained social relationships with traders and their families 
on a reciprocal basis but also accepted tributary gifts. Social relationships between Lao 
state officials and traders were particularly helpful to traders when it came to paying 
import duties on the Lao side of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. Lao middlewomen, for 
example, who had bought goods in Mueang Loei and who drove their pick-up trucks 
filled with goods across the Bridge had to stop their vehicles at the Lao customs office. 
The officers there would then make a rough estimate on how much tax should be paid 
based on the export declaration that had been issued by the Thai broker and also by 
inspecting the trader’s vehicle from the outside. Sometimes the customs official 
inspected the goods more closely. The import tax (phasi) for a pick-up truck full of 
goods usually amounted to 2,000 or 3,000 baht.  
According to my informants, negotiations with customs officers were possible but only 
if they knew them well. A shop owner on the Lao side explained: “If you know each 
other, then they will lower the cost down to 1,000 or 1,500 baht…if you are relatives 
(pen yat kan), if you are close friends (pen phuean sanit kan) or if you help each other 
out (suay luea sueng kan lae kan), if your families help each other out”. The shop owner 
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said his family knew the family of one of the customs officers who worked at the 
Bridge well. The two families often invited each other for food and festivities. Several 
of the other shop owners who travelled across the Bridge in their own pick-up trucks 
also knew the customs officials well and received discounts on customs duties. Some of 
the middlewomen from further inside Sayaboury province also mentioned that they 
received discounts due to the frequency of their journeys across the Bridge.  
While social relationships could results in tax reductions at the Bridge, they were also 
conducive to small-scale trading practices across customary border checkpoints. Here, 
the small-scale trade of licit goods was undergirded by regular tributary gifts given to 
Thai Rangers. However, Thai Rangers also received gifts in exchange for turning a 
blind eye to the cross-border trade in less licit goods. Such cases differed from those 
involving more licit goods in that they would be traded across unmarked border-
crossing sites and that the gifts were given in a less public setting. At the market in one 
of the Thai border villages, for example, there was a female Lao trader who sold fresh 
pork every morning. She had grown up in a Lao border village not far from there and 
came to live on the Thai side ten years ago in order to live with her current Thai 
husband. Her father still lived in her hometown on the Lao side. Every morning he 
bought fresh pork at the central market in his Lao village and delivered it by boat to the 
Thai riverside at 5am where his daughter waited for him. She would then sell the meat 
at the Thai market and share the profits with her father.  
On some days, Mae Gung would encounter a Thai Ranger who patrolled the riverbank. 
The encounter was accompanied by a gift-giving ritual, which she described in the 
following way: “Sometimes I must share some of my pork with the soldiers as a thank 
you for being able to take it across the border. They will not ask for anything, but 
sometimes they will stop me when I pass by and then I know already that I must share 
some pork with them. This doesn’t happen very often. If I gave them a share every day 
then I would not earn enough money to make a profit.” At the international checkpoint 
the import of fresh pork to Thailand was subject to import permits, phytosanitary and 
sanitary certificates (GAIN 2009). Not only did the Thai Rangers allow small amounts 
of meat to enter the country without such permits and certificates, they also did so 
without specifically demanding any money that could point to bribery. This suggests 
that Thai Rangers deemed this kind of trade to be licit. However, in the trader’s 
description of the gift-giving process, she described how the Rangers implicitly 
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demanded a share of her goods (even if they did not use any words) so that the share of 
meat could also be seen as a kind of bribe rather than tribute. Clearly, there is a vast 
grey area between tributes and bribes that further blurs the boundaries between the legal 
and illegal, and the licit and illicit.  
Keeping this grey area in mind, there were also cases of gift-giving that can be 
classified more clearly as bribery. In such cases, Thai Rangers demanded gifts in 
exchange for turning a blind eye to the clandestine trade in more illicit goods. Such 
goods included larger quantities of LPG as well as petrol. These were usually 
transported across unmarked border-crossing sites and sometimes across customary 
border checkpoints outside the border guards’ working hours. According to my 
interlocutors, not all Thai Rangers made monetary demands for the toleration of such 
trade and some did not tolerate it at all. Monetary demands, furthermore, were also a 
new development in my research area. According to one of my interlocutors: “They 
[Rangers] used to be satisfied with goods like coffee and snacks but now they want 
money too. How much they want depends... If a new soldier [Ranger] starts working at 
the checkpoint then he might want food instead of money. It depends on the person.” 
When describing how much she gave the Thai Rangers, a Thai shop owner used the 
term kin ngen (lit. translation: to eat money). The Rangers usually “ate” 200 to 300 baht 
per day but it really depended on the person: “some eat a lot, some don’t eat”, the 
woman explained.  
In Laos, the term kin ngen is often used colloquially in the context of corruption. But it 
also has resemblance with the term kin mueang, which denotes the style of governing in 
19
th
 century Thailand. In this system, bureaucrats treated their public office as a private 
domain, generating revenue and receiving gifts for personal gain (Pasuk and Sungsidh 
1996: 3). This laid the groundwork for patron-client relationships (Hanks 1962) that are 
still an important part of Thai society today (see Arghiros 2001 for a critical discussion 
of this). The term kin ngen also resembles the term kin sinbon (lit. translation “eat a 
bribe”), which is commonly used to describe corrupt practices in the modern Thai 
nation-state. These connections suggest that the trader was using a more subtle 
expression to describe the corrupt practices of local border officials. Since the money 
was demanded before the trade in LPG and petrol took place, such transactions also fit 
in with the characterisation of bribery based on other scholars’ findings (Pasuk and 
Sungsidh 1996; see discussion Chapter 4). 
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As a term that was born out of Western conceptualisations of the law, corruption is 
always (even if implicitly) placed in contrast to Weber’s ideal-type bureaucracy that is 
seen as the prerequisite for a functioning nation-state (Bierschenk and Sardan 2014: 
10ff). As we have seen, bribery on the Thai side of my research area occurred more 
often where a specific kind of trade was not only de jure illegal but also considered 
illicit. The trade in LPG, for example, became more illicit the higher the amount of LPG 
was involved. Watermelons, on the other hand, could be traded in unlimited amounts. In 
other words, corrupt practices were more strongly connected to conceptualisations of 
licitness than to de jure legality. While an assessment of the difference between tributes 
and bribes may be particularly relevant to policy makers, it also has important 
implications for the study of the state. It not only allows us to understand the different 
ways in which the state enforces its power but also how this is negotiated in the context 
of trade. As Humphrey has eloquently expressed it: “The bribe is not in essence just a 
payment for a commodity or service but is also a recognition of a person’s socio-
political, nonmarket status. This idea may provide a start for us to rethink bribery too, 
seeing it not so much as “corruption” and more as providing insight into the articulation 
of socio-political hierarchies of the people who make up “the state”” (Humphrey 2002: 
146). In other words, when studying exchanges that may be interpreted as corruption, it 
is worth looking at the power constellations they represent, create, and rearrange. This is 
the aim of the following section, in which I take a closer look at how different parts of 
the state are differently involved in bribery. 
COLLABORATIVE AND PREDATORY FACES OF THE STATE 
As I have argued in the previous sections, a de facto illegality of trade gave rise to the 
smuggling of goods and bribery of border guards. As in the case of LPG and petrol, de 
facto illegal trade had to be conducted clandestinely, even where Thai Rangers turned a 
blind eye to them in return for money. It must also be noted that not all border guards 
were equally involved in such trade and a local online newspaper regularly displayed 
photos of Rangers who had intercepted smuggled goods hidden along the riverbank 
and/or the smugglers themselves (Sue Issara Loei 2012). This display of a de facto 
illegality of certain kinds of trade in the local online newspaper is an important 
manifestation of state power but must be seen as only one of many “faces of the state” 
(Navaro-Yashin 2004). From the perspective of traders, other faces of the Thai state 
included those of individual border guards with whom they could negotiate bribes for 
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the facilitation of such trade. As noted in the previous section, however, one of my 
interlocutors mentioned that monetary demands raised by Thai Rangers were a fairly 
new development in my research area and perceived as an additional burden to trading 
activities that were a continuum throughout the history of the area. Bribes to Thai 
Rangers in return for tolerating the trade in illegal and illicit goods were thus 
ambiguously perceived as collaborative and predatory.  
On the Lao side, in contrast, monetary payments to state officials and border guards 
were an institutionalised part of the trading process for both legal and illegal goods and 
across all border-crossing sites. In fact, according to Stuart-Fox (2006: 60), payments to 
disregard illegal trade and arrangements with officials to underreport trade volume to 
reduce tariffs and duties have long been the most prominent and prevalent forms of 
corruption in Laos. In my research, however, I found that there were differences in how 
bribes were demanded by state officials, how they were given, and also perceived by 
traders. At the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, for example, Lao customs officers not only 
lowered the tariffs for traders whom they knew well and maintained reciprocal 
relationships with. They also increased tariffs on an ad hoc basis for their own personal 
gain. Traders who did not maintain social relationships with customs officials at the 
Bridge reported that duty rates were decided on ad hoc basis and depended on the 
officer’s attitude but also on the negotiation skills of the respective traders. For such 
traders, duty rates varied every time they crossed the Bridge and were not predictable. 
For example, small-scale traders who did not own a car and who used the samlo (three-
wheelers) to cross the Bridge paid customs duties of between nil and 300 baht. The 
long-distance middlewomen who regularly transported a full load of goods in their pick-
up trucks usually paid between 2,000 and 3,000 baht, again depending on the official on 
duty, their negotiation skills, and the relationship they had with the officer. Most of my 
interlocutors who were subject to varying duty rates lamented their unpredictability, 
perceiving them as extortion. 
At customary border checkpoints, on the other hand, bribes to local Lao border guards 
were a more predictable part of the trading process. At one checkpoint, bribes were 
negotiated directly between Thai shop owners and Lao border officials and the cost 
shared between the Thai shop owners and their Lao customers. One of my interlocutors 
on the Lao side described how Lao border guards demanded both goods such as instant 
coffee as well as money. The line between tributes and bribes became negligible here. 
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In terms of monetary value, it was reported that Lao border guards demanded up to 500 
baht per day for the toleration of the daily trading activities across the customary border 
checkpoint.  
Even though Lao border officials did not rotate from one duty station to another as often 
as Thai Rangers, they did occasionally get assigned to another location. When a new 
official began his duty, it could not be taken for granted that the official would engage 
in such bribes. A Lao shop owner explained in this respect: “When there is a new guard 
at the border then you must talk to him first…get to know him. You can’t do this with 
somebody that you don’t know. But most of the border guards are from this area 
anyway. But if they aren’t then you must get to know them in another way.” This 
expresses the notion that bribes were based on social relationships. Only when these had 
been established was there a possibility of using money to facilitate trading activities. 
Otherwise, the small-scale cross-border trade in daily necessities could be compromised 
on the Lao side and traders would have had to resort to strategies of circumventing Lao 
border officials. In this case, traders perceived the bribes to Lao border officials not so 
much as extortion than as an opportunity for the facilitation of trade that would 
otherwise be restricted.  
At another customary border checkpoint, bribes were not paid directly by shop owners 
to border officials but via the local boat operators who acted as intermediaries between 
traders and the state
70
. The predominantly Lao boat operators had strong social 
relationships with the Lao border guards, which they had established over many years. 
At the end of each working day, the group of boat operators came together, counted and 
divided out their earnings. Every worker received an equal share, no matter whether 
they were operating a boat or carrying goods from the riverbank to a customer’s house. 
The Lao border official’s demand, as one of my interlocutors explained, was based on 
the boat operators’ earnings each day and usually amounted to about 10%, e.g. a 1,000 
baht share out of 10,000 baht earnings. Given that there were usually about twenty 
people in the group of boat operators, the money given to the border official was an 
unequal yet predictable share. This underscores both the fact that social relationships 
were a prerequisite for bribes and the notion of the bribe as an institutionalised part of 
the trading process.  
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 A shop owner explained that they paid money to the boat operators who then “cleared” the situation for 
them with the Lao border guards (khau ja khlia hai). 
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From this assessment of institutionalised bribes to Lao border officials, it could be 
argued that the trade in daily necessities was de facto legal on the Lao side after all. 
While on the Thai side, this kind of trade was tolerated at all governmental levels and 
by all state departments, this was not the case in Laos, as the following example will 
demonstrate. The bribery of Lao border officials was always a very much secret affair, 
not only vis-à-vis the public in general but also vis-à-vis other parts of the Lao state. 
More concretely, bribes to border officials had to be kept out of the sight of higher-
ranking state officials such as Lao customs officials, which occasionally come to patrol 
the checkpoints. This became blatantly clear on one morning of my research when I was 
visiting one of the customary border checkpoints in my research area. At about 10am 
the Rangers’ hut was empty and according to the shop owners, the Rangers had not 
been there for a few days as they were investigating a potential case of drug smuggling 
along another part of the border. On the Lao side of the checkpoint, the border guard 
was situated at his usual spot in front of his house, not paying much attention to the 
workers and boat operators who were transporting the goods across.  
Suddenly, the workers rushed to the Rangers’ hut and the shops along the street. 
Suspending all trading activities, they stood there watching the Lao side, discussing 
whether to continue or not. Apparently, a Lao customs officer had appeared around the 
Lao checkpoint. He was looking for cases of tax evasion and, having found any, would 
issue heavy fines after confiscating all respective goods. A few Lao villagers who had 
bought shampoo and milk in the Thai shops for their own personal consumption were 
waiting at the riverside to be taken back to Laos. The boat operators took them across 
while the other workers decided to rest in their bamboo hut. Just after 11am, the trading 
activities continued. The small wooden boats were once again fully loaded with goods 
and taken across. Explaining the situation, one of the local shop owners said that the 
Lao customs officer had now gone for lunch so they were able to continue their 
activities. Over the course of my research and the many hours I spent at various 
customary border checkpoints I encountered this kind of situation only once. According 
to my informants Lao customs officials only rarely carried out these kinds of 
inspections – they were exceptional. Nevertheless, the boat operators always kept an eye 
out for such officials along the Lao border villages and informed each other as soon as 
one approached the checkpoint.  
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In Laos, border guards are considered low-ranking bureaucrats (nay noy) while customs 
officials are high-ranking officials (nay yay). They differ in their responsibilities as well 
as their monthly salaries. With regard to bribes, one of my Lao informants said sternly: 
“Money must never be given to border officials in the presence of a nay yay”. 
Considering that Lao customs officials themselves were the recipients of bribes at the 
Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, I suggest that Lao border officials at customary border 
checkpoints kept their own practices a secret from higher-ranking officials because they 
would otherwise have had to share their gains with them. As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
Lao state is characterised by patrimonialism and patronage as well as ambivalent 
loyalties (Rehbein 2007; Singh 2012). According to Stuart-Fox (2006: 61), personal 
gains made by Lao customs officials from underreporting goods at international 
checkpoints were likely to be paid up the local hierarchy of the Lao People’s 
Revolutionary Party (LPRP). Based on the case described here, this seems to have led 
lower-ranking officials to employ strategies that prioritise their personal gain over that 
of other officials and the constraints of the Party.  
In my research area, bribes to Lao border officials not only contributed to the 
facilitation of small-scale trading practices across customary border checkpoints but 
also across unmarked border-crossing sites. On the Lao side, I visited a business along 
the river, which villagers referred to as the local checkpoint (dan) because the workers 
there also transported villagers across the river by boat against a small fee
71
. During the 
time of my research, the business was exporting rice to Thailand illegally
72
 by 
circumventing Thai Rangers and bribing Lao border guards. The business owner 
reported that Thai Rangers had caught them before and had confiscated all the rice. 
“You can’t negotiate with them or pay them any money”, the owner said. “I have to 
smuggle the goods across (laklob), which is why I don’t send goods over the river every 
day. On the Lao side, you can pay the policeman to avoid any problems.” In order to 
circumvent Thai Rangers, local villagers on the Thai side were paid to keep an eye out 
for them. If a Ranger was spotted, all activities ceased immediately. At this unmarked 
border-crossing site Lao border officials thus turned a blind eye to the cross-border 
trade in rice in exchange for bribes. Thai Rangers, however, prohibited this kind of 
                                                 
71
 Once again, a government term (dan) was used to refer to a private establishment, similar to the 
situation at the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge where traders used the term “tax” to refer to the fee of the 
export declaration raised by the broker of the private shipping company. 
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 The Lao government had issued a ban on rice exports along its border areas in order to reduce price 
increases in the domestic rice market (see Vientiane Times 2012, World Bank 2013: 68).  
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trade, which they ostensibly considered to be both illegal and illicit.  
According to my interlocutors, Lao border guards and other Lao authorities also turned 
a blind eye to the smuggling of motorcycles across the border in exchange for money. 
Some Lao motorcycle dealers were able to sell such smuggled motorcycles after 
“clearing” (khlia) this with authorities. In fact, some of my interlocutors in Lao villages 
had bought their motorbikes for an affordable price from a dealer who had not paid an 
import tax. Thai Rangers criticised Lao authorities for tolerating such trade. These 
findings underline the arguments I have made so far regarding the different 
conceptualisations of licitness among authorities on the Thai and Lao sides but also the 
prioritisation among Lao border officials of their own personal gain over that of the 
Party. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that the decisions of state actors along the Hueang 
River with regard to the facilitation and restriction of cross-border trade were based on 
and influenced by their social embeddedness in the local community, by their individual 
conceptualisations of licitness, and their social relationships with non-state actors. On 
the Thai side, small-scale trade was tolerated by all levels of government, which led to a 
de facto legality of the trade in daily necessities. Thai border guards differed in what 
and how much they tolerated, but their regulation of trade was not arbitrary. Certain 
patterns could be identified, such as the way gift-giving practices changed according to 
the types and amounts of goods, their licitness, and the location in which they were 
traded. 
Bribes to state officials were generally more prevalent on the Lao side where they were 
an institutionalised part of the trading process at all border-crossing sites. At the Thai-
Lao Friendship Bridge, bribes were often perceived as extortion while at customary 
border checkpoints, traders made use of them to further their own interests. On the Thai 
side, bribes were more exceptional and ambiguously perceived as predatory and 
collaborative. As I have mentioned, these differences in the behaviour of state actors on 
either side of the border must not only be considered at the micro-level but also in the 
context of state formation in Thailand with its constitutional monarchy and post-
socialist Laos with its single party state.  
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With this in mind, taking a closer look at the differences between individual state actors, 
state departments, at different forms of legality, licitness, and at different types of gift-
giving practices has led to an investigation into the vast grey area between (or rather 
strong overlap of) the state and society. This kind of approach also challenges the 
usefulness of the framework of informality for the study of small-scale trade as it 
focuses on trading practices that circumvent state regulation. In the cases presented 
here, the so-called state was very much involved in the regulation of small-scale trade. 
Not only did state actors tolerate certain kinds of trade but they also engaged with non-
state actors in its regulation. This brings to light the agency of non-state actors in the 
regulation of trade. Those who maintained social relationships with state actors were 
able to engage in tributes and bribes that facilitated the cross-border trade in both licit 
and illicit goods. Social relationships were the basis for such negotiations between state 
and non-state actors. Border-crossers who could not draw on such relationships were 
exposed to risk and uncertainty when encountering state officials at all types of border-
crossings.  
While Thai and Lao governments and institutions cooperated with each other at 
different levels, furthermore, Thai and Lao border officials did not always do so at the 
micro-level. The cross-border trade in goods that were considered to be licit by the Thai 
paramilitary could therefore turn into an act of smuggling when entering Lao territory as 
in the case of eggs, and vice versa as in the case of rice. By facilitating such trade, Thai 
and Lao state officials essentially assisted the local traders in the subversion of each 
other throughout space and time. Such power plays also occurred on the Lao side itself, 
as lower-ranking border officials collaborated with traders in the circumvention of 
higher-ranking customs officials.  
As I have shown, the interactions between state and non-state actors in the regulation of 
trade could involve acts of collaboration, circumvention, resistance, and even extortion. 
Focussing on collaboration alone would have limited our ability to grasp the intricacies 
of small-scale trade just as much as the state-resistance paradigm would. In a similar 
vein, depicting all gift-giving practices with state officials as acts of corruption would 
skew our understanding of why and how they are carried out, just as much as a mere 
focus on cultural norms around gift-giving would. In order to understand the complex 
reality of the border, we must look more closely at the interface of state and society, the 
legal and illegal, and the licit and illicit.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
“[…] Even in the case of particular kinds of 
border, such as state borders, there is little that 
could be called inherent about their 
characteristics as borders” (Green 2012: 575). 
 
MULTIPLE BUT UNEVEN LAYERS 
This thesis set out to study the becomings of the nation-state border between Thailand 
and Laos in a particular locality along the Hueang River that is situated between the 
provinces of Sayaboury and Loei. Building on the work of scholars who have studied 
borders in mainland Southeast Asia, I consider cross-border flows to be part and parcel 
of the borderland rather than an exception or anomaly. Instead of assessing how flows 
perforate or resist a preconceived border, I have set out to explore how the border comes 
into being in the context of such everyday flows. I have paired this approach with the 
most contemporary theoretical literature on borders, on the basis of which I 
conceptualised the border as multilayered, historically contingent, and constantly in 
flux. This has allowed me to assume a perspective that looks beyond state-centric 
categories and dichotomies; one that focuses on practices of bordering at the micro-level 
rather than taking on preconceived ideas of how the border should or should not be. In 
this conclusion, I will spell out the multiple layers, historical contingency, and constant 
change of the border more concretely based the findings of my research. 
Situated in the valley between the mountains of Loei and Sayaboury, the Hueang River 
was an easy choice for the demarcation of the borderline in this area. But this seemingly 
natural separation line did (and still does) not coincide with the livelihoods of many of 
those who live along it. In fact, it was because of this natural landscape that the relations 
between those on either side of the border became so close-knit. The Hueang River 
connected people rather than separating them. Its residents used it among many other 
things for fishing, bathing, playing, and also for access to the grand Mekong River
73
. As 
a river in the landscape the Hueang River can thus be seen as a natural border while at 
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 Access to the Mekong River is also what distinguishes the inhabitants of Thali from those of Chiang 
Khan who had and still have much stronger connections with other places along the Mekong River such 
as Paklay and Vientiane. 
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the same time it has a history of connectivity and bringing people together. As a border 
the Hueang River also has a separating force as it divides the territory-based nation-
states of Thailand and Laos from one another while at the same time it connects those 
people who take advantage of it by engaging in arbitrage. These seeming paradoxes are 
part of the ontology of the border not only in my research area but also elsewhere 
(Bruns and Miggelbrink 2014). While paradoxes exist everywhere, their specificities in 
each location arise out of the uneven and intersecting layers that inform that location, 
making each border unique in its own right.  
Examining the layers of the border is different from identifying from a 
conceptualisation of borders as multiple. Reeves (2014) has argued for the multiplicity 
of borders, conceiving the line on a map as intrinsically different from that of the border 
guard or that of the trader. While I agree that these are different spatial entities, I do 
consider them to be part of the same project. With its roots in Europe, the project of the 
nation-state border has been transferred to other parts of the world where local 
conceptualisations of space and borders already existed and where it is carried out in 
different ways and at different times. The concept of the layered border allows us to 
examine how historical, social, cultural, and political factors feed into the way the 
border comings into being in a specific locality.  
Throughout this thesis I have referred to a plethora of layers that play a role in processes 
of bordering along the Hueang River. I have already recounted above the different 
epistemologies of space that have informed the border’s historical trajectory. They 
include the centre-periphery logic, the Westphalian logic, and the post-Westphalian 
logic, each of which can be seen as a separate layer that feeds into the becomings of the 
border. These layers are based on a state-centric perspective, which we must take into 
account when examining the border. It was the ideological and security aspects of the 
Westphalian logic after all, which led to the restriction of movement and which still 
have very real effects for people on the ground. But I have also uncovered a range of 
non-state-centric layers such that of the social embeddedness of state actors, blurring the 
lines between state and society. Another one is that of cultural norms such as gift giving 
and the expression of graengjai – the expectation to be humble towards those of a 
higher status. My interlocutors justified their gift-giving practices with state officials by 
referring to graengjai, thereby embedding culturally the practices that might otherwise 
be considered in the context of corruption and as unlawful.  
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In fact, the law was also an important layer of the border in my research area. Border 
policies around small-scale trade pushed many trading activities into legality. However, 
on the Thai side, a legal flexibility was practiced that brought other layers such as that 
of licitness to the fore and was intertwined with them. I have juxtaposed the layer of the 
law with that of alternative geographies of knowing based on social networks. Malee, a 
Lao middlewoman who was denied access to Thai territory at the Thai-Lao Friendship 
Bridge, was able to draw on her social networks and knowledge of the area in order to 
cross the river elsewhere, thereby circumventing those who enact the law and gaining 
access to Thai territory. In other cases, the layer of the law and its manifestation in 
citizenship documents was trumped by social relationships and familiarity.  
At customary border checkpoints, Thai Rangers often tolerated the cross-border 
movement of people without documents because they knew them or maintained social 
relationships with them, e.g. local traders. As mentioned previously, Thai Rangers 
claimed to be quite familiar with the regular border-crossers at the various border-
crossing sites after having served at a duty station for only a few months. The Thai 
Rangers’ decision-making process was thus not only based on the law but also on social 
and cultural factors, which facilitated the cross-border movement of undocumented 
migrants but also had a restricting effect on those border-crossers who did not perform 
according to what border officials considered to be the norm.  
The layer of cultural norms as manifested in border performances, gift-giving, and 
graengjai was strongly intertwined with the layer of (albeit changing) social hierarchies. 
Where the social hierarchy between state and non-state actors was based on power and 
authority, the social hierarchy between traders on the Thai and Lao sides was (in part) 
based on the economic and political asymmetry between Thailand and Laos. Thai shop 
owners at the customary border checkpoints thus referred to their relationship with Lao 
customers as phinong, which reflects power relations at the governmental level. This 
underscores Pholsena’s work summary of the relationship between residents on either 
side of the Thai-Lao border when stating: “Thailand’s cultural and economic 
ascendancy over Laos generates ambiguous and deviating effects, oscillating between 
attraction and repulsion” (2006: 53).  
This leads me to reiterate that nation-state borders only attain meaning through the 
social practices of state and non-state actors, which always entail power struggles, 
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contestations, social hierarchies, cultural norms, and a historical context, all of which 
inform how the border comes into being throughout space and time. With regard to non-
state actors, I have shown how non-state actors contributed to the becomings of the 
border in different ways that are not immediately visible to a stranger’s eye including 
their participation in the regulation of trade. I suggest that if we come to understand that 
regulation is not only the prerogative of the state then the porousness or permeability of 
the border cannot equate to non-regulation, disorder and chaos. As we have seen, in real 
terms the border has been proliferated rather than weakened along the Hueang River.  
VICISSITUDES AND CONTINUITIES 
A look at the historical context of the border in my research area reveals changes and 
continuities, which inform the way it comes into being today. My research area has seen 
the implementation of different border logics, which did not simply replace one another 
over time but have rather accumulated and still overlap in certain ways, resulting in 
regularities as well as contestations and paradoxes. In have discussed the centre-
periphery logic, which characterised the mueang kingdoms of 19
th
 century Southeast 
Asia. In such kingdoms, the ruler was based at the centre and had diminishing power 
towards the periphery. Power was not based on territorial claims but on the governing of 
the subject population situated around the centre. Throughout the waxing and waning of 
such contest states, territorial borders existed albeit at the local level. With the 
encroachment of the French and British, the centre-periphery logic was gradually 
replaced by territory-based nation-states.  
In 1893 the Thai-Lao border was mapped along the Mekong River (with the full 
demarcation yet to be completed today) and with Sayaboury as part of Siam. This 
changed three times over the following decades. Sayaboury was handed to the French in 
1904, back to Thailand in 1940, and again to France in 1946. The Hueang River thus 
switched back and forth between embodying a provincial and international border. The 
line it represented did not have an effect on the livelihoods of the border population 
until 1975 though. Due to its mere existence on maps rather than on the ground, the 
border between Loei and Sayaboury became a popular route for Lao refugees and anti-
government insurgents before the communist takeover in 1975. At the time of the 
regime change in Laos, most border residents along the Hueang River engaged in cross-
border activities and the adjacent Thai and Lao villages were perceived and lived as 
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single rather than divided units. While the Thai nation-state had assumed a Westphalian 
logic, the nature and functions of the Thai-Lao border along the Hueang River 
continued to operate more according to a centre-periphery logic.  
This changed abruptly in 1975 when Thailand placed an economic embargo against 
Laos and restricted cross-border trade. With an emphasis on the ideological boundary 
between the Thai and Lao governments and securitisation pushed forward due to border 
disputes erupting in the 1980s the Westphalian logic had gained momentum. Many 
border residents discontinued their cross-border activities including trading practices 
although several traders seized the opportunity to continue trading daily necessities 
across the river more or less clandestinely for a large profit. According to my 
interlocutors, Thai officials were stricter in their enforcement and punitive measures 
(although this varied from one guard to another) than Lao officials, with the latter often 
on the receiving end of the trade in daily necessities. 
As the Thai and Lao governments began to cooperate with each other in the 1980s, 
withdrawing their troops from the border, local checkpoints were established for the 
benefit of the border population. The paramilitary and volunteer border guards remained 
stationed along the border in addition to immigration and customs officials. The small-
scale cross-border trade of daily necessities flourished during this time (as did the large-
scale agricultural trade, the illegal timber and drug trade), which was beneficial 
particularly for the population on the Thai side who opened specialised border markets 
and shops for customers from Laos. The function of the border thus became less 
focused on security and more on economic cooperation. This focus on economic 
cooperation led to the opening of the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge across the Hueang 
River in 2004, symbolising a post-Westphalian border logic (see also Green 2012) that 
emphasises and facilitates transnational flows. The Bridge allowed Lao labour migrants, 
traders, and villagers to enter Thailand by public transport and their own private 
vehicles., which increased exports to Thailand and imports from Laos.  
During the time of my research, it became clear how the post-Westphalian logic 
overlapped with bordering practices based on other logics. Upon the opening of the 
Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, for example, several local border checkpoints were closed 
and border residents have been discouraged from using checkpoints and unmarked 
border-crossing sites for travel and trade, which is very much in line with a Westphalian 
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logic. Traces of the centre-periphery logic can also be found in the fact that the Thai 
paramilitary has been given the decision-making power over the regulation of small-
scale cross-border in places outside the Bridge, which resembles the kin mueang style of 
governing in the mueang states. Local border traders also refer nostalgically to the time 
“when there was no border” before 1975, thereby drawing on the centre-periphery logic 
to justify their continued trading practices. The historical trajectory of the Thai-Lao 
border along the Hueang River has thus resulted in a border that combines different 
epistemologies of space, including the centre-periphery, Westphalian, and post-
Westphalian logics. The historical context further reveals that restrictions on 
movements across the Hueang River have been the exception rather than the norm.  
Despite the political, regional, and economic changes as well as the proliferation of 
borders throughout time and space, trade across the Hueang River has continued, 
although the involvement of different actors has changed. In the aftermath of the 
Bridge, many traders on the Thai side had to close their shops and resort to other 
sources of income. At the same time, new forms of Lao traders (i.e. middlewomen) 
emerged, making use of the new policy and infrastructural changes in their own right. 
Although the newest border policies aimed at increasing opportunities for trade and 
tourism, they have an inherently regulative character, facilitating some processes, and 
restricting others (Walker 1999). In contrast to the period after 1975, Lao border 
officials were perceived, during my research, to be stricter than Thai guards with regard 
to the enforcement of the border and the regulation of immigration and trade but also as 
more corrupt.  
Differences between the Thai and the Lao side became more pronounced after 1975, not 
only in terms of the ideology of the respective central governments and their attitude 
towards the nation-state border but also in terms of the different national identities that 
were promoted on either side of the border. By the time of my research, the vast 
majority of inhabitants along the Hueang River in Thali and Ken Thao districts 
identified with either the Thai or Lao ethnic majority in the respective nation-states. 
There was a social hierarchy between Thainess and Laoness, however, which became 
most apparent in the mocking of Laoness among Thai border residents. As the number 
of Thai border residents crossing the border to Laos decreased, so did their connections 
and identification with people across the river. Among my interlocutors on the Thai 
side, it was those actors who maintained strong cross-border relationships and travelled 
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across the river regularly themselves who emphasised the existence of a cross-border 
culture. While over the centuries, the sense of belonging of border residents changed, a 
cross-border culture still continued to exist.  
Although the cross-border culture in my research area must itself be seen as in a 
constant state of flux, it was characterised by a specific local dialect that most border 
residents shared. This included the local state officials who were embedded in the local 
community and culture. I have demonstrated how this embeddedness affected the way 
they governed the border outside the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. Border officials 
tolerated the flow of certain goods and people across customary border checkpoints and 
unmarked border-crossing sites. Which and how many goods were tolerated depended 
to a large extent on their own conceptualisations of licitness as well as on their social 
relationships and gift-giving practices that included both goods and money. The act of 
giving gifts to authorities can be seen as an affirmation of their authority – a practice 
that can be traced back to the kin mueang system of the premodern Southeast Asian 
states. This is not to suggest, however, that the border guards in my research area 
governed in a premodern way but rather that their way of governing was informed by 
historical practices that have been adapted over time and are now applied at the local 
level of the nation-state where the state meets society.  
In order to capture this blurry interface of the state and society I have drawn on the 
anthropological literature that focuses on the everyday practices of the state in the 
enactment of authority and de facto sovereignty. In this respect, I have followed Weber 
and Biersteker who have argued that sovereignty is a social construction so as to bring 
attention to: “the ways that the practices of the state and non-state agents produce, 
reform and redefine sovereignty. […] Rather than proceeding from the assumption that 
all states are sovereign, we are interested in considering the variety of ways in which 
states are constantly negotiating their sovereignty” (Biersteker und Weber 1996: 11). In 
highlighting how authority and sovereignty are played out in the borderland, my 
findings contribute to the literature on the state in Southeast Asia. Thai Rangers not only 
exerted power by drawing symbolically on their uniforms and practically on their 
weapons. In order to fulfil their duties and responsibilities they also used their social 
embeddedness.  
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I have argued that by engaging with the local community inside and outside working 
hours and in both uniform and civilian clothes, as well as by establishing trust through 
the toleration of cross-border movement, Thai Rangers were able to gather more 
intelligence about activities along the border than if they remained estranged 
technocrats. Non-state actors who were involved in trade benefited from this kind of 
cooperative regulation with Thai Rangers. By engaging in social relationships and gift-
giving practices with state officials, local non-state actors had a say in the regulation of 
trade themselves. Traders and border-crossers who had not established such 
relationships, however, were subject to the sometimes coercive decisions of border 
guards as in the case of the two Lao women from a border village further away who 
were arrested for crossing the Hueang River without documents.  
In the midst of changing border regulations and increased cross-border movement in my 
research area there has thus been a continuity of flexible state practices that is embedded 
in the history and culture of the borderland and which provides a sense of regularity and 
security to the local border population. Attending to the vicissitudes and continuities of 
the border helps gain a better understanding of the multiple layers that “make” the 
border what it is today. Just as Bierschenk and de Sardan (2014) have suggested 
analysing modern state bureaucracies as “transversal objects” (2014: 21) that have been 
transferred in the context of European colonialism, so should nation-state borders be 
considered in the way they attain meaning in different locations (see also Agnew 2007). 
When we move away from comparing nation-state borders around the world to an ideal-
type that does not exist, we will not only come to appreciate their diversity more but 
also gain a better understanding of the different becomings of borders and the struggles 
along and across them as they arise in different parts of the world.  
DREAMING AND WORRYING ABOUT THE FUTURE 
During my fieldwork some of my interlocutors also spoke about their hopes and dreams 
as well as of their worries about the future. Mu, the border market trader from Ban Plee, 
was tired of travelling from one border market to another even though her business was 
the main income of her family that included three generations. She was hoping to open 
a permanent market stall at the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge as she had heard rumours 
about a permanent border market being established there that would be similar to the 
Indochina Border Market in Mukdahan (Nakhon Phanom province). Many of the border 
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market traders selling goods at the weekly border market along the Thai-Lao Friendship 
Bridge were anxious about the future of the market as the administrative buildings 
around the Bridge were due to expand. They feared that the market would be forcibly 
closed, which would greatly affect their livelihoods.  
Some of my other interlocutors mentioned their hopes and dreams about the upcoming 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). This vision of an integrated community 
throughout Southeast Asia was set up by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and was widely advertised within the schools in my research area. Students 
were encouraged to learn the official languages of the other member countries within 
ASEAN and to embrace the diversity in people, cultures, and languages that was 
announced to come their way. What exactly this meant for the border, however, was 
unclear. Several of my interlocutors spoke of the “open border” that would come with 
the AEC and expressed excitement about this. Another interlocutor asked me for advice 
on how to best take advantage of the influx in tourists and business people that she 
imagined would occur in 2015. According to ASEAN the AEC will integrate Southeast 
Asia’s economies by establishing a space with the following characteristics: (a) a single 
market and production base, (b) a highly competitive economic region, (c) a region of 
equitable economic development, and (d) a region fully integrated into the global 
economy (ASEAN 2015). The AEC was scheduled to become a reality from early 2015 
but the deadline was rescheduled to December 2015. According to the most recent 
reports, the new deadline is attainable (Kynge 2015). 
Despite the postponement of the AEC to December 2015, much has changed along the 
Hueang River since I ended my fieldwork in 2012. In April 2014 my good friend and 
occasional translator from Thali came to visit me in the UK. She reported that the new 
administrative buildings at the Thai-Lao Friendship had been completed some months 
ago. The border market next to the Bridge had been relocated to the other side of Ban 
Plee village. It was now situated along the road that led from Ban Plee to the 
neighbouring village. I assume that the Lao customers and traders arriving at the 
customary border checkpoint in Ban Plee now take a local samlo (three-wheeler) or 
walk to the Bridge. Those customers crossing over the Bridge will have to do the same 
if they want to reach the market. I suppose this will have led to a strong decrease in 
sales at the border market.  
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In addition to this information, my friend also reported that a wall had been erected, 
separating the village of Ban Plee from the new administrative buildings at the Bridge. 
However, instead of cutting the village off on one side, a new road was built that turns 
off the main road to the Bridge and which leads to the village instead. This way, the side 
of the village that ends at the Bridge is still accessible but the administrative buildings 
and the Bridge itself cannot be accessed via the village. When asking my friend about 
the apprehension that existed among villagers with regard to these constructions during 
my research, she emphasised: “Yes, they were apprehensive before, but now everyone 
is ok with this solution. They are fine now.” My friend also mentioned that the land 
prices along the Bridge have now gone up to 2,000,000 baht per rai of land (1 rai = 
1.6km2). Considering these major changes I strongly suggest for further research to be 
conducted along this part of the border in the near future.  
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